

CALE Discussion Paper No.13

November, 2015

The Symbolic Construction of the Enemy: the Case of Serbia and Japan

Prof. Dr. Djordje Stojanovic

Nagoya University
Center for Asian Legal Exchange

Center for Asian Legal Exchange (CALE)

Nagoya University, Japan

The Symbolic Construction of the Enemy: the Case of Serbia and Japan

Prof. Dr. Djordje Stojanovic

Serbia

Contents

Acknowledgments	3
Introduction.....	4
1. Post-positivist “agnosia”- some methodological issues.....	10
2. The postmodernist and/or poststructuralist conception of politics, state and international relations.....	19
3. National identity problem	41
4. Material production or social construction of the enemy: the realist paradigm <i>versus</i> the constructivist paradigm	58
5. Discursive coding of the enemy text in contemporary formulation of international narratives of Serbia	73
6. Discursive coding of the enemy text in the contemporary formulation of international narratives of Japan.....	91
Conclusion	110
Bibliography:.....	112

Acknowledgments

I want to thank the professors and staff at Nagoya University, Nagoya University Graduate School of Law and the Center for Asian Legal Exchange on exceptional kindness and assistance, and prof. dr. Mamoru Sadakata who not only made me a better scientist but also a better man overall.

Introduction

The war on the Balkan Peninsula, caused by the disintegration of Yugoslavia, has resulted in the creation of political space in which the phenomenon of perpetuation of inter-state or inter-ethnic hostility, in terms of meaningful Schmittian political identity inauguration grounded in the ontically-based friend-enemy relationship, can become a standard in defining the post-war relations between the former Yugoslav federal, now independent, state entities. In addition, on the one hand, to such “European state of affairs” we can add disagreements in the Hungarian-Slovak relations that culminated recently, or “petrified” disputes in the Macedonian-Greek and Turkish-Armenian relations, as well as Kurdish, Basque and Northern Irish problem. On the other hand, global international moments should not be overlooked, for example: the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, that led to the location of an international network of terrorists as the leading (absolute) enemy of the George W. Bush administration, and more or less connected to it, the wars in Iran and Afghanistan, and the international crisis and confrontation with frightening or potentially cataclysmic consequences of the “meta-hostility”, such as the diabolical genocide in Rwanda, permanent disagreements in the Pakistani-Indian or South Korean-North Korean relations. It is clear that the relevance of Schmitt’s ideas for substantive issues of world politics (nationalism, identity, war, balance of powers, sovereignty, the nature of the international system, etc.) should not be doubted at all. However, accepting the question of enmity as extremely important for political science and existing global political situation, I have to say that Schmitt’s realistic approach to the problem is only one of more possible theoretical perspectives in its explanation.

What is it actually about? The complicated time that we live in has become the time we do not wish to belong to, the world we make and are made does not seem to be the world we accept, reality has become so removed from the modernist promise of progress, equality, tolerance, freedom and peace that wondering what this world is about represents an extremely complex aporism which, in the theoretical universe, culminates as a continuous succession of radicalized disputes, while, at the level of real, everyday life, it suppresses, contorts, denies or destabilizes the universe of human spirituality. The foremost part of what systemically surrounds us and what we systemically belong to, that which “converges or diverges” us, what we believe in, has become a provisorium and the only certainty is currently a permanent and intense

uncertainty. In our pursuit of self-determination, we have agreed to imitation and manipulation, the “ultra-hegemony” of perpetually fluctuating, if arbitrary, symbols, icons, rituals and ceremonies, “megalomaniac cultural” codes that we find difficult to abandon or change. In other words, it has more or less become evident to all of us that the world in which we exist has long since become postmodern.

However, even in this well-advanced postmodern era, for a significant number of “theorists and practitioners” of every academic orientation and rank, there is nothing that provokes such aggressive, undisguised and persistent aversion as postmodernist ideas (which, of course, we cannot regard as some exclusive “official ideology” of postmodernism). In any case, elementary assumptions and key practices of the “so-called” modern world politics are tarnished by technological, organisational, social and, above all, by cultural changes in the sense of discontinuity, incongruousness, dissonance, fragmenting and dissensus. *Ergo*, it is my view that the reflexive antipode to the “enlightenmentist-positivist-modernist” school of thinkers, convinced of the possibility of absolute cognition, postmodernism, even in its radical variation, which abides the notion that no knowledge is possible, represents an unavoidable approach in the contemplation and explanation of such challenging topics as hostility, sovereignty, borders, war, identity or statesmanship.

The shift of emphasis from the epistemological and ontological perspective of knowledge, from the rigid canons of pure “scientific power”, towards the perspective of power and authority, contemplation about the imposing of true and authoritative interpretations, from empirically perceptible “facts” towards the hard-to-perceive social creations, suggests that today, it is far less important to plead for the achievement of Truth, and far more important to expose the dictate of it. After all, that “truth with the capital T” is, of course, an inherently modernist position *per se*, which is not of great, and certainly not of essential meaning for postmodernism. It has become virtually impossible to circumvent “methodological strategies” such as genealogy, simulacrum, discourse, text, narrative, deconstruction or “double reading” if we aim to complete our perception of a phenomenon or relation. How is it possible to ignore, say, the deconstruction of Kenneth Waltz’s paradigm presented in the book: *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis*,¹ carried out by Richard Ashley, which claims that for the rationality of man to be

¹ Waltz, K. (1959) *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis*, New York: Columbia University Press.

sovereign it cannot ignore chaos or anarchy, or, indirectly, war² or the provocative assertion by James Der Derian that, despite all differences, George W. Bush and Osama bin Laden resemble one another in their unwavering conviction of their own ethical and epistemological tenets.³

Finally, I will add that diatribes directed against postmodernism, albeit a much more postmodernist genre, go so far that they define its impact on the indigenous and global culture through a misconception of relativism, as an injection of the amoral and immoral, which, at least indirectly, led to the terrorist attacks on the aforementioned iconic symbols of the West (Pentagon and the World Trade Centre). My view of these issues and of many other apocalyptic events and tragedies is opposite, “trans-substantial”, if our focus is on the blame, then modernist positivism, with its understanding of nature and people as mere things that can be successfully and infinitely manipulated, often bordering on social engineering, is indeed responsible. It should be emphasised here once again that the age that we belong to is the age of transparent, turbulent and radical changes. Post-positivist racourse perceives it in the following way:⁴ (1) it is composed thus that it alters our international, interpersonal and intertextual relations in terms of inversion of objective reality to textuality; (2) the production modality is replaced by the informational one; (3) representation converts into simulation; (4) classical understanding of Imperialism metamorphoses into an Imperialism of Signs.

Arguable as it might be, for the purpose of this research I will define Carl Schmitt’s contemplation as dominantly realistic, essentially characterized by rationalism and positivism, while I will elaborate postmodernism (in line with the aforesaid) through a set of opposing qualities (antifoundationalism, antihumanism, antihistoricism anti-essentialism, linguistic anti-representationalism and antipositivistic utopism). In the sphere of international relations, the basic systemic postulates of realism can be designated as follows:⁵ (1) anarchy- the international system comprises states as political units with no central body or some overarching authority; (2) states potential for offensive- military power capable of inflicting damage to one another or potentially cause the destruction of a state; (3) states can never be absolutely certain of the intentions of other states- that is, it is not possible to know exactly if some state will not use its

² Ashley, R. (1989) “Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism, and War.” in Der Derian, J. and Shapiro, M. (eds) *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics*, New York: Lexington Books, pp. 259-323.

³ Der Derian, J. (2001) “The War of Networks.” *Theory and Event*, 5(4): 15.

⁴ See Der Derian, J. and Shapiro, M. (eds.) (1989) *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics*, New York: Lexington Books,

⁵ Mearsheimer, J. (1994-1995) “The False Promise of International Institutions.” *International Security*, 19(3): 10.

military potential against another state; (4) survival- main goal of every state is to preserve its own sovereignty; and (5) states strategically contemplate survival in the international system- states possess instrumental rationality which is doomed to periodical commission of errors as a result of imperfect information.

The academic *locus communis* is that constructivism lies in the middle between these two theoretical poles (realism and postmodernism) and represents the key “rival” to the postmodernist study of international relations in the frame that is classified as post-positivist theoretical corpus in mastering international relations (later I will present more philosophical classification of John Gerard Ruggie).⁶ It is a theoretical approach which attempts to resolve the disparity between scientific objectivity and anti-empirical relativism by emphasizing inter-subjectivity in the sphere of international relations. This approach foregrounds the sameness of the normative and material structure, underscoring the importance of identity in the shaping of political activity and emphasizes the co-constitutive relation between structure and agents.⁷ By underscoring inter-subjectivity of actors and their interaction, the relevance of the norms and practices defining the content and scope of international relations is emphasized, their construction is refracted through the lens of historically determined interpretations and, consequently, the element of meaning that the actors assign to some international situation or relation becomes a very important factor for their research. A direct consequence of the approach conceptualized in this way is that states create something more extensive and subtle than just a system, something that can be designated as the international society. Constructivism, therefore, rests on equalising the importance of material and normative structure, emphasizing the role of identity in defining political action and on the co-constitutive relation of agents and structures. Still, idealistic approach within constructivism should not be understood as an equivalent to utopianism (liberal idealism), but as a theoretical approach that emphasises the structure of human associability as determined rather by common ideas than material factors.

Considering the above-said, this study will first, in part one, discuss several theoretical tenets of this type of research. Namely, the research will employ “discursive triangulation” (multidisciplinarity, transdisciplinarity and neodisciplinarity) in elaborating the phenomenon,

⁶ See Adler, E. (1997) “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics.” *European Journal of International Relations*, 3(3): 319-363. and Ruggie, J. G. (1998) “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge.” *International Organization*, 52(4): 855-885.

⁷ Reus-Smit C. (2005) “Constructivism.” in Burchill, S., Linklater A., Devetak R., Donnelly J., Paterson M., Reus-Smit C. and True, J. (eds.) *Theories of International Relations*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 188-213.

construct or text of the enemy (independently from some “hard” positioned selection of the theoretical paradigm *a priori*) and will, accordingly, interpret key theoretical postulates of realism, constructivism and postmodernism (poststructuralism) along the lines of author’s key points in pursuing the subject of this research.⁸ With this in mind, paper will examine Schmitt’s emphasis on the human need for political identity, embodied in the analysis-intriguing friend-enemy distinction as the vertical explanatory base of the entire international system. His focus on identity aside, and because he identified the causes of war as invariable constants of the man’s psychological constitution, rather than by the functional dependence of ideational elements, Schmitt’s position can be defined as being closer to realism than to constructivism. While the inclusion-based “constructivist identity” implies the possibility of becoming the bearer of the structural metamorphosis of the international system towards the formulation of a qualitatively better global society, Schmitt’s exclusion-based “realistic identity” suggests the impossibility of global systemic change. The still controversial postmodernism will be used to illuminate the “extreme simulacral nature” in some conceptualisations of enemy, to interpret the creation of enemy from the completely inexistent or dislocated, simulated reality that is treated as some departing social complex, national imaginarium, in hegemonious discourse or narrative of one or another rank, with the intent of providing the symbolic justification and grounding of certain power distribution in the context of multiple juxtaposed “parallel international realities”.

Also, paper scopes the Serbian and Japanese idea of the enemy. Perhaps the substantive cultural dimension or the hostility criterion are not important for the friend-enemy relation in Schmitt’s, let’s call it “meta-thesis” (as it is constantly variable depending on the specific historical contingency), but it is definitely given at a specific point in time and situation, so the analysis of these moments could have significant implications for the resolutions of animosity which, in the Serbian case, culminated in violence. While the first part of the paper, at least at the level of Schmittian (realistic-rationalistic) perception of the phenomenon, discusses how the collective enemy has to exist if one wants to enter the sphere of the political and examines the basis and impacts of this concept refracted through the constructivist and postmodernist optics, the second part explains why this choice of enemy in the Serbian case ended in inter-ethnic

⁸ Cf. Long, D. (2011) “Interdisciplinarity and the Study of International Relations.” in Aalto, P., Harle, V. and Moio, S. (eds.) *International Studies: Interdisciplinary Approaches*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 31-66.

conflict, while in the Japanese case it identifies the general constructivist factors, ideas, norms and beliefs, relevant for the perpetuation of peace since the end of World War II.

Generally speaking, such approach is beneficial in at least three ways: (1) it affirms analytically theoretical validity of notional-normative-cultural area outreach on formulation of an international system on the level of principles (let aside whether such intervention entails optimistic or pessimistic vision of the world); (2) it explicitly shows that constructivist approach to the international relations demands constructivist interpretation of national identity as well; and (3) it points to the dialectics of permanent formulating and reformulating of national identity, including as an relevant element the definition of Otherness, as both a forming and formed factor in the international system, a special narrative sum of idiosyncratic domestic and foreign discursive elements or factors in the interpretation of an international state position.

1. Post-positivist “agnosia”- some methodological issues

In my opinion, the first rule of postmodern “methodological etiquette” is narrative. Of course, narrative here is not understood as a predominantly literary form, but mainly as an epistemological category. Similar to the concepts of time and space, narrative can be treated as something that is not characteristic of our experience, but as something abstract, such as “empty” coordinates, boundary markers or “pickets” of the cognitive field within which we learn about the world, as a contentless form imposed by our perception on a “stripped” flow of reality, thus ensuring it with the comprehensible empirical order. The point is not that we should talk about the world, tell stories about the world for the purpose of understanding it, but for the world to show itself to us in the form of stories, one can say, to tell the story of us. It is a kind of “epistemological finality”, not only in the sense that there is no narrator outside the narrative space (for example, this narrator may be the Truth), but it is impossible to imagine the world (its structure, form or categories) outside the narrativity and for that product or statement of imagination not to end as a story, because narrative itself is narrative in nature.

Since the story or narrative is actually a specific language, a linguistic universe, it could be said that at the foundation of every narrative lies a cultural code as a complex combination of signs and symbols, namely symbols and symbols, of this or that meaning. The cultural code that will be further discussed later is certainly a kind of “symbolic social contract” of its, I would say, parts, carriers of primary distribution of particular meanings, of individual identity views of the world, that aspire to become its images, but never actually are, because there are no pictures of the world beyond its symbolic representations, the image of the world outside of the image offered and perceived as reality. This discrepancy or gap, the fact that the individual image of the world does not refer to the objective reality but its narrative or discursive reflection, makes postmodern shift of such set position possible, this idea that the cultural code is constantly symbolically configured, rephrased and transformed through changes in the practice of our meaningful interactions and/or exchanges. In other words, from a transcendent and impersonal formatting by narrative, we become a self-narrative, a story about ourselves, and a fragment of a larger story about us.

In principle, we can identify four types of narratives:⁹ (1) ontological narratives- manifested in non-a priori and non-fixed, individual accounts, that are also a social product, addressed to the self and its position in the world and in our personal history. We use them to function as social actors, they are important for the theory of agency as they suggest relationality between identities (self-understanding) and agency (conditions for action). The insight into how people act to change the world implies also an understanding how people understand themselves (personal narratives rely on and invoke collective narratives (or cultural macronarratives), symbols, linguistic formulations, structures and vocabularies of motives, without which the personal would remain incomprehensible and impossible to interpret); (2) public narratives- which, unlike collective narratives as very broadly based and independent from some specific model, are stories attached to social and institutional formations larger than the individual, such as the family, religious institutions, literary system and nation (thus, the manipulation of literature and its influence on the national identity formulation, through the production of pseudo-histories that create or empower national mythologies played a significant part in the conflicts in former Yugoslavia, an issue that will be further discussed later); (3) conceptual narratives- constructed by social researchers as a vocabulary that can assimilate a contention that social life, social organisation, social action and social identity are narratively, that is, temporally and relationally constructed through ontological and public narratives and that they reflect the awareness of their historical and contingent nature; and (4) meta (master) narrative- in which we are incorporated, embedded or installed as contemporary social actors and social scientists, all sociological theories, tenets, or concepts are encoded in relation to their narrative attributes, although they exist as a presupposed epistemological dimension of social sciences, or more precisely, beyond their clear awareness, which renders them different from conceptual narratives (they include, for example, Progress, Industrialisation or Enlightenment, the epic opposite binoms such as Individual vs. Social, Capitalism vs. Communism and Barbarism vs. Civilised, or they can be progressive narratives of teleological unfolding such as Marxism and the triumph of Class Struggle, Liberalism with the triumph of Liberty or the rise of Nationalism).

⁹ Somers, M. R. and Gibson, G. D. (1993) "Reclaiming the Epistemological 'Other': Narrative and the Social Constitution of Identity." *CSST Working Paper #94* and *CRSO Working Paper #499*, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan, pp. 30-33.; Baker, M. (2006) *Translation and Conflict: A Narrative Account*, London: Routledge, pp. 28-50.; Hinchman, L. P. and Hinchman S. K. (eds.) (1997) *Memory, Identity, Community: The Idea of Narrative in the Human Sciences*, Albany: State University of New York Press; and Patterson, M. and Renwick Monroe, K. (1998) "Narrative in Political Science." *Annual Review of Political Science*, 1(1): 325-326.

A narrative can be defined through four characteristic features:¹⁰ (1) relationality of parts (hermeneutic composability)- underscores the fact that the meaning of some event can be discerned only in its relationship to other events; separate, isolated events do not possess relevant cognitive capacities, while relationality of parts turns events into episodes; (2) causal emplotment- refers to the order of elements of a narrative as a logical plot, or formulation of a network of configuration of mutual relations, allowing for events to have some significance and explanation, to turn a set of propositions into an understandable sequence of events that one can have an opinion about (two people can agree about a set of facts or events, but they may not agree about their interpretation); (3) selective appropriation- indicates the inclusion of some and the exclusion of other elements; through evaluative criteria, the narrator determines the adequacy (privilege) or inadequacy (averseness) from a whole array of intersecting and open events constituting experience; and (4) temporality or narrative diachronicity- is a constitutive element of a narrative, it does not indicate some correct order of their unfolding in reality or chronological time, but their irreducible durability, pointing out that some parts of a narrative are always situated in a series or sequence and that this order or configuration not only influences but also defines the meaning of a narrative.

The second thing of good postmodern “taste” is a relationship between knowledge and power and its manifestation in discourse and discursive formations, where discourse is defined as an organizing principle and organizational formation of knowledge, with rules and regulations that dictate specific practices, that is, ways of thinking and acting, and discursive formations as the hierarchical criss-crossing of particular discourses. Discourses operate through: enabling, constraining, and constituting.¹¹ They are like social scenarios that we consciously or unconsciously perform, what we believe to be our own experience is always experience of another, or from within another particular discourse, what we think about ourselves manifests the internationalization of many discourses, all that we are is enabled, constrained and constituted within or through discourses. Discourses produce knowledge, and knowledge is always a weapon of power that through discourse produces the truths we live. As Michel Foucault puts it, every society has its regime of truth, its general politics of truth: (1) the types of discourse it accepts

¹⁰ Somers, M. R. and Gibson, G. D. (1993) “Reclaiming the Epistemological 'Other': Narrative and the Social Constitution of Identity.” op. cit., pp. 27-29.; Baker, M. (2006) *Translation and Conflict: A Narrative Account*. London: Routledge, pp. 28-50.; and Patterson, M. and Renwick Monroe, K. (1998) “Narrative in Political Science.” op. cit., pp. 324-325.; Bruner, J. (1991) “The Narrative Construction of Reality.” *Critical Inquiry*, 18(1): 1-21.

¹¹ Storey, J. (2009) *Cultural Theory and Popular Culture: An Introduction*, Harlow: Pearson-Longman, pp. 128-131.

and assigns them a function of the truth; (2) the mechanisms and instances which enable the differentiation of true from false statements; (3) the means of sanctioning them; (4) the mechanisms and procedures for evaluation in the search for truth; and (5) the status positions of those who are responsible for determining what counts as true.¹² A regime of truth does not have to be true, it should be understood as the truth by which we act: when ideas become beliefs, they establish and legitimize a specific regime of truth. Discourse cannot be identified by language alone, by its institutionalized use at the level of discipline, politics, culture and small groups, it also includes complex sets of institutional practices and power relations that produce meaning.

As structural epistemological and metaphysical postulates of what the subject of postmodern conceptual repulsion is, and can be defined as Western Rationalistic Tradition, we determine:¹³ (1) the existence of reality independent of human representations, which means that despite the existence of intellectual and linguistic representation of the world, in the form of beliefs, experiences, statements and theories, there is a world that is completely independent of these representations, some of the views of independent, autonomous reality (metaphysical realism); (2) the functioning of language not only at communicative but also on referential level, language refers to objects and situations that exist independently of itself (understanding is possible because both the speaker and the listener may have shared thoughts, ideas, and meanings of reality independent of both); (3) theory of adequation or correspondence theory, which assumes that truth is a characteristic of the statement, a statement is true only if it corresponds to facts, when thoughts and objects match (*adaequatio intellectus et rei*), in the matching of the statement with the object of our statement, i.e. the statement and the object of our statement, that is what it is, regardless of what we think about it (for postmodernists, this is about essentialism, in its more rigorous form postmodernism is the abandonment of the explication of truth through the theory of correspondence or adequation, i.e. reservations about the belief that reality and truth are one, that there is only one true understanding of the real state of things, while in its more flexible form it does not manifest such rejection of the view that opinion represents the reality as much as a reference to what the representation implies); (4) objectivity of knowledge, because the content of what is known is always a true proposition, and because truth is a matter of accurate representation of an independently existing reality, knowledge does not depend on or cannot be

¹² Foucault, M. (2002) "Truth and power." in Faubion, J. D. (ed.) *Michel Foucault Essential Works: Power*, London: Penguin Books, p. 131.

¹³ Searle, J. R. (1993) "Rationality and Realism, What Is at Stake?" *Daedalus*, 122(4): 59-69.

derived from subjective attitudes or feelings, the truth of any claim to of knowledge is therefore, “emancipated” from motives, culture, ethnicity, race, class and gender of a person or persons who “make” that claim, and refers to empirical support that promotes it; (5) formal position of logic and rationality that provide procedures, methods, standards and canons (of proof, validity and reasonableness) as the basis for the assessment of different and competing claims to true knowledge; (6) the existence of valid criteria for assessing the validity of statements, theories, explications, interpretations and other sorts of accounts (some of these criteria are “objective” in the sense that their application is independent of human sensibility, while others are “intersubjective” in the sense that they appeal to shared features of human sensibility).

Keeping in mind the previous, suppose the dominant paradigm in political science is based on the following hierarchical sequence of methodological assumptions:¹⁴ (1) political science is focused on understanding of the truth about politics; (2) researches in the field of political science contribute to such orientation by adding to base of objective knowledge about politics; (3) growth of this knowledge is directly contingent on the formulation of theory that explains politics; (4) the formulation of theory is dependent on the development of universal generalizations regarding the behavior of political actors; (5) the growth of decontextualized generalizations occurs by testing falsifiable or refutable causal hypotheses, successful at the level of prediction; (6) the accumulation of predictions about political behavior is associated with the study of variables in samples involving large number of cases; and (7) the body of objective, causal knowledge can be put in service of society, especially by influencing public policy makers and state implementers of policies.

Supposedly only methodological, but also hegemonic perspective of the scientifically valid set like so pushes into the background the pluralistic perspective of contextual, contingent and multiplied political truths that imply stronger connection between theory and practice and greater bond between thought and action. Epistemologically speaking, when talking about positivism, at least when it comes to its diehard version, any statement that is not subject to sensory check is automatically qualified as metaphysical nonsense.¹⁵ What concepts refer to is manifestable: perceivable people or events that can be measured. For realism, social world is

¹⁴ Schram, S. (2003) “Return to Politics: Perestroika and Postparadigmatic Political Science.” *Political Theory*, 31(6): 835-836.

¹⁵ Reed, I. A. (2011) *Interpretation and Social Knowledge: On the Use of Theory in the Human Sciences*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, p. 40.

multilayered, and social knowledge includes in-depth interpretation, discovery of carrier strata that explain surface or visible outcomes, events and phenomena that we want to understand. Positivism is structured to encourage its followers to overlook contingency behind supposedly objective social categories. Such a point of view gravitates towards laws and regularities or towards models that marginalize meaning or treat it as a given social or economic factography. Contrary to that, interpretivism implies that meaning constitutes networks, discourses or paradigms, which can be understood only by considering them as a whole.

Postmodernism is marked by the principle that the authority of the interpreter to go beyond what was presented to social world is an entirely unjustified heuristic act, and that, almost as a rule, it is reduced to the exercise of a matrix of power. Use of a theory (such as Marxism and Rational Choice Theory) as a way to “scratch the surface” of social life is, in fact, a way not to reveal or clarify but prescribe and impose truth. It became completely irrelevant whether the “disguised or made up”, evident social truth is, in relation to its “chromatic” source, “covert” social truth, socially monochromatic, polychromatic, isochromatic or even achromatic, when this “meta-social palette” is not at all the place where the postmodern epistemological “veduta” rests or around which it revolves. The point is the “mirror” that is neither fixed nor big enough for “camouflaged” social reality to recognize itself in it, there are millions of little mirrors in the hands of individuals who, from different perspectives, lay claim to the complete interpretation of the reflection and its change caused by the change in the point of view: beyond every mirror there is nothing but a newly created and singularly unique array of mirrors. In its most strained form, it became quite irrelevant on which side of the mirror of “Truth” we are, because we were still “only” a reflection in an endless “carnival” continuum of masked reflections and refractions, a combination of signs that never equals to real us, we become what we are not, measured by those who are not, an unstable code position of the designator and the designated.

Therefore, in the case of the modernist conjunction of understanding of science and knowledge, discrepancy and hierarchy between the truth and the way, that is, medium or form of its expression are assumed. For the scientific method characteristic of modernity and foundationalist epistemology, objective truth exists autonomously in relation to any sign formula that mediates or transfers it; reason is undoubtedly more authoritative, superior to its own external matrix expressing it. In contrast to the assumption on the ontological and epistemological separation of the rhetorical or the linguistic from truth, postmodernists are more

focused on the poetic, aesthetic and political dimension of knowledge rather than its logical and empirical dimension, on how something becomes knowledge, instead of what knowledge is. Along this line, they actually promote rhetorical understanding of science, and relativize or “anarchize” reason by combining classical hierarchy binomials: (1) what doxa (δόξα) is and what episteme (ἐπιστήμη) is; (2) truth and its expression; (3) rationality and language; (4) phenomena and the reality; and (5) meaning and metaphor or metonymy.¹⁶ Previous shift of the focus of knowledge into the zone of the mechanism of symbolic construction result in knowledge and social reality no longer being considered only as objective products, but also as processes that are inherently of persuasive nature. Consequently, knowledge of truth is not treated as a matter of a non-linguistic rationality, because rationality itself is demystified and reconstituted as a historical creation and engagement of the holder of a rhetorical position.

By placing emphasis on sociology and political science, without eliminating other social sciences, consideration of methodology was also marked by the following features:¹⁷ (1) the existence of several different methodologies (such as qualitative, quantitative, autobiographical, “narrative”, etc.), that should not be treated as inherently superior or inferior, each of them has its weak points and tends to ignore some problems while favoring the others; (2) methodologies, especially the quantitative one, that simulate the complete absence of bias and perspective, deceive both themselves and their audience, it's just a desire for obtaining the status of intellectually more superior methodological variant and the implementation of its superiority and dictation; (3) methodologies are, in fact, literary strategies or rhetorical tools, ways of formulating proof; methods can be regarded as special imprimaturs that allow scientific papers to gain legitimacy and authority; (4) tendency to neglect their reasonableness or justification of their theoretical arguments during the peer review of scientific papers, and emphasizing their methodological sophistication, all for the sake of increasing the so-called “scientificity” of the very papers and the prevention of the erosion of scientific disciplines they originate from; and (5) the fact that many advocates of quantitative methods consider their non-quantitative counterpart illegitimate, therefore, unscientific, while many members of the qualitative side, which I think is in a far more complex situation, reject mathematics and statistics, and return to the neo-Kantian

¹⁶ Brown, R. H. (1990) “Rhetoric, Textuality, and the Postmodern Turn in Sociological Theory.” *Sociological Theory*, 8(2): 188-197.

¹⁷ Agger, B. (2004) *The Virtual Self: A Contemporary Sociology*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 93-97.

intellectual position- sharp separation of natural and social sciences, both in terms of method and substance.

We should also note the problem of insufficiently clear differentiation of “social and sociological” theoretical constructs.¹⁸ Namely, unlike “sociological theories”, based on the belief of their proponents that sociology is a science like any other (this, of course, also implies the natural scientific corpus) and thus must be posed or rounded off in accordance with strict methodological rules, procedures and standards, so that the facts once examined are taken as valid indicators of the objective nature of things they represent, “social theories”, in addition to respecting the factual, also have a strong critical note, they are scientifically “more flexible” and more agile in their political aspirations, less considerate to the facts and more interested in human values. *Ergo*, the proponents of sociological theories are *a priori* prone to “brutal” degradation of postmodernism (which does not mean they not deal with it, often at the level of “academic pasquinade”), while those who are prone to explanation, rejection or promotion of postmodernism, busy being engaged with all what questions the of a world conjunction, belong to the “block” of social theorists. According to the state of things, reference to something beyond hard factual argumentation and, as such controversial, but of obvious importance for understanding of the world we live in or that we live, social theorists cannot avoid dissension and mutual disputation.

More or less, it is clear that political theory seeks to offer, I would say, a comprehensive matrix of methodologically structured explaining of clusters of ideas, principles and facts in the form of certain statements and proposals for understanding political reality and its moral grounding.¹⁹ Since this matrix may at any moment refract through the ideological prism, its respective makers should become aware of their role in its potential ideological use and abuse, and always have a clearly structured tactic as well as a strategy for avoiding such possibilities. Either way, hardly any scholar or theorist in their efforts is: panoptic, they cannot possibly see all the topics or objects of their reflections from all viewpoints, or completely impartial, they cannot possibly filter out, clear their opinion or language from their own interests or prejudice. This, undoubtedly, does not mean that political theories are, or should be located outside the sphere of

¹⁸ Lemert, C. (2005) *Postmodernism Is Not What You Think: Why Globalization Threatens Modernity*, Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, pp. 24-26.

¹⁹ Thiele, L. P. (2002) *Thinking Politics: Perspectives in Ancient, Modern, and Postmodern Political Theory*, New York: Chatham House Publishers, pp. 216-238.

reason and rationality, but that the same ideas mean different things to different people, i.e. to different cultures. Opposite to the process of ideologization as a tendency to monological patternization in political theorizing, we can set up a process of ironization.

While ideology is based on a rigid fixation of systematization for the sake of providing “certain” and practical answers, irony is founded on the deconstruction of the world in terms of posing “unpleasant” and problematic questions. Unlike the fixed optics of an ideological template for the interpretation of the political state of affairs, ironic kaleidoscope offers a broad-set exegesis for the decomposition of immanent complexity and aporicity of political life, without any acceptance of a particular conceptual or value arrangement. *Ergo*, for proponents of irony there is competitive contestability of both ideas and principles that appear as set markers of political life, and of epistemological categories, such as reason and rationality, that are taken as a substructure of our ideas and principles. Irony thus becomes an inseparable attribute of postmodern perspectivism (that will be discussed later), that by favoring particular perspectives in perception of the world dismisses dogmatic and authoritarian statements about it, thus creating a certain skepticistic deflection as an embryo of irony. Abandoning primacy of some finite linguistic formulas that objectively define reality, postmodern irony is “trapped” in the tropological structure of permanently unstable pedestal on which knowledge is built.

2. The postmodernist and/or poststructuralist conception of politics, state and international relations

Prior to outlining the basic characteristics of postmodernism, I would like to briefly introduce the Enlightenment modernist paradigm. From an etymological point of view, the word modern or modernity are related to the word *modernus*, which, analogous to the word *hodiernus* (from *hodie* - today), had been derived from the word *modo* (recent, present, just now). It was first used as an antonym of the word *antiquus* (ancient, old), while subsequently terms such as *modernitas* (modern times) and *moderni* (a modern, contemporary man) came into usage. Under the term modernity we commonly understand a corpus of intellectual, social and political transformations that led to the creation of the contemporary world.²⁰ Modernism is a cultural movement originating from the end of the nineteenth century. Therefore, it could be said that modernity emanated from a sequence of undoubtedly significant historic moments and events in the period from the beginning of the fifteenth century to the beginning of the nineteenth century: Humanism and Renaissance, the invention of printing technology, the Reformation, geographical explorations, i.e. the discovery of non-European cultures (with particular emphasis on the discovery of America or the so-called “new world”), scientific revolution (distinguished through the combination of rational thinking and empirical research in order to explain natural world), as well as astonishing increase in production capabilities caused by technological advances and capitalist economic system, with its accompanying demographic expansion and rising numbers of big cities.

From the fifteenth to the seventeenth century, a gradual rise in confidence in the ability of human mind was taking place, thus fundamentally altering up to that point valid traditionalist or archaic matrix of the world and authority comprehension. However, it is important to mention that modernity, if its social dimensions are considered to be the focal point of interest, was frequently discussed through the prism of regeneration of its relationship with the ancient world as a model or an ideal that should have been (imitatively) reinstated. Not until the French

²⁰ Habermas, J. (1981) “Modernity versus Postmodernity.” *New German Critique*, 22: 3-14.; Habermas, J. (1987) *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 1-23.; Thiele, L. P. (2002) *Thinking Politics: Perspectives in Ancient, Modern, and Postmodern Political Theory*, op. cit., pp. 65-103.; Kumar, K. (1995) *From Post-Industrial to Post-Modern Society: New Theories of the Contemporary World*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 90-123.; Lemert, C. (2005) *Postmodernism Is Not What You Think: Why Globalization Threatens Modernity*, op. cit., p. 4.; and McGowan, J. (1998) *Hannah Arendt: An Introduction*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 36.

Enlightenment, at the end of the seventeenth and during the eighteenth century, did the final breach from the “nostalgic” view backwards and promotion of a belief in limitless increase of demystified and desacrilised knowledge and the progress based on it, i.e. repositioning of rational potential from the exclusive tendency towards conquering of the nature onto mastering the control over the social, moral and political betterment, take place.

Ergo, modernity rests on the teleological belief that history is marked by prudence (or rationality), direction and purpose, a belief with a temporal and spatial-population dimension.²¹ The first indicates that modernity is perceived as initiated by barbaric, destructive, religious-theomaniac, slavish, non-state and clan times, while the other identifies Europe as a pivot point of that metamorphosis, thus implying that the rest of the world has been lingering to a greater or lesser degree in wake of previously pinpointed geographical epicentre of the changes. Not only did modernist discourse treated its departure from the period of dark primordality as a sort of its own culmination manifested through a breach with time and space obscurity that it originated from, but the “act of abandonment” itself was multiplied and set as a separate principle of continuous progress: it transformed its own discursive discontinuity or a breach with a single rule into its own formative principle. In other words, modernity is not simply once depleted breach with traditional, but a law of a constant critical discord- metacriticism, an Enlightenment formula, designed in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, of continuous progress towards greater liberty, equality, prosperity, rationality and peace (which could be understood as the dynamics of the modernity phenomenon in the broadest sense, as well).

Certainly, it would be wrong to assume that ideological *theatrum mundi* of the late eighteenth and nineteenth century was comprised solely of the Enlightenment postulates, since, as a response to threats against the institutions, general conditions and doctrines of the old regime, programme conservatism was formulated as a separate ideological construct and a form of political engagement.²² The reason for its existence is conscious juxtaposition of the Enlightenment aspirations directed towards social change on the line of secularism, egalitarianism and self-rule, resistance to the challenges of radicalism and forces of modernity that were endangering traditional social and political order. Intellectual imperfectability of mankind has been most commonly identified as a theoretical foundation of conservatism, both in

²¹ Brown, W. (2001) *Politics Out of History*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 5-6.

²² See Hinde, J. R. (2000) *Jacob Burckhardt and the Crisis of Modernity*, Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press.

its religious and secular form. Thus, for Jacob Burckhardt that imperfection stemmed from the original sin, and the power of sin and imperfection is so strong that neither reason pursues what it knows nor thinking is able to induce and sustain the divine in us.²³ This standpoint manifests a diametrically opposite position to the one that distinguishes the Enlightenment, the one whose basis is immanent rationality of an individual and which claims that by engaging intellect and personal interest as a motivational agent better and more perfect world could be accomplished, thus implying a belief in historic and moral progress.

Peter Hamilton distinguishes ten main assumptions on which the paradigm of the Enlightenment rests, as follows (see figure 1):²⁴ (1) reason – implies the primacy of reason and rationality as a way to organising knowledge (with redemptive addition of experience and experimentation), rationalistic concept is determined as a process of rational thinking based on innate or inherent ideas characteristic to every thinking individual; (2) empiricism – a previous version of rationality is, thus, attached to (Lockean gnosologic and Berkeleyan methodological) empiricism, the idea that the comprehensive knowledge of nature and society is founded on empirical facts, matters that all human beings perceive through senses; (3) science – a view that scientific knowledge, directly reliant on the experimental method, is of crucial importance to enhancement of human knowledge in toto; (4) universalism – a concept that reason and science are applicable to any single case without any situational alteration to one’s principles (science generates universal laws that without exception govern the universe); (5) progress – a notion that natural and social state of human beings can be improved through implementation of science and reason, leading to ever increasing levels of happiness and prosperity; (6) individualism – a concept that every individual embodies the resulting outcome of their knowledge and actions, i.e. individual reasoning cannot be subordinated to some higher authority (in that sense, society is a sum or product of thought and action of a multitude of individuals); (7) toleration– a view that humans are essentially identical irrespective of their religious and moral beliefs, which implies negation of inherent primacy of European Christianity over the beliefs of other races or civilisations; (8) freedom – retraction from traditional restrictions in the matters of beliefs, communication trade, social interaction, sexuality and property (with still problematic range of freedom for women and lower classes); (9) uniformity of the human nature – a belief that the

²³ Ibidem, pp. 115.

²⁴ Hamilton, P. (1992) “The Enlightenment and the Birth of Social Science.” in Hall, S. and Gieben, B. (eds.) *Formations of Modernity*, Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 21-22.

defining characteristics of the human nature are the same at any circumstances; and (10) secularism – a point of view manifested through intensive anticlericalism, a demand for secular knowledge disentangled from religious dogma.




Figure 1. The paradigm of the Enlightenment in accordance with Peter Hamilton

One of the approaches to generally hard-to-define concept of postmodern claims that it represents terminological blend which suggests a certain order, ethos or movement that is either out of, against or after its modern counterpart.²⁵ This thesis, however, should be considered rather cautiously, because its modernistic nature is manifested through mere succession of modern by postmodern, through situating postmodern within the modern order of linear time, which makes it firmly bound to the meta-narrative of historical progress or evolution. On the other hand, postmodernity could be approached not from the vantage point of continuation or breach with modernity, but from the vantage point of discovery and transgression realised through the acceptance of the experimental moment hidden within the modernist movement. Postmodernity violates modernity and related narratives from within and promotes novel forms of historic time that contain their own strategic potentials. It (postmodernity) "sabotages" linear time of modernity by acting simultaneously in the past and future, not only is it a mere breach with tradition and modernity, but a historic deconstruction of the modern past in order to make room for a new undefined future.

Never is postmodernism what one thinks it is.²⁶ On the one hand, it is not what one would suppose it to be, since it in principle rejects and evades every model of definition. On the other hand, it is not what it is predominantly thought to be, it is not in principle a form of social thought. When we contemplate postmodernism it is of vital importance to distinguish the theories of the world from what is really happening in that same world, insight into the nature of the world should precede the adoption of any theoretical project on the basis of its nominally declared relevance. Postmodernism has presented a whole range of challenges to numerous sociological and cultural theories, but their likelihood should be tested in contrast to factography of the world itself. To claim that it is not what one thinks it is means to put to trial the concept that that idea can be an idea. Extraordinary "magical" allurements and intensity of the manifestation of the idea is foremost reason why it is extremely difficult to accept the concept that postmodernism can exist independently from postmodern reality. To claim that the realm of culture or social life has no foothold in reality, that it is more a spectacle than a reality itself, does not mean to negate the existence of the world, but to emphasise utter eccentricity of the form it abides in. To start with,

²⁵ Gane, N. (2002) *Max Weber and Postmodern Theory: Rationalization versus Re-enchantment*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 83-89.

²⁶ Lemert, C. (2005) *Postmodernism Is Not What You Think: Why Globalization Threatens Modernity*, op. cit., p. 26-31.

roughly speaking, I would say that postmodernism as a comprehensive philosophical paradigm, on the ontological level poses a proposition that reality was created, on the epistemological level that knowledge is fluid and temporary, on the methodological level that interpretive and critical methods are the most suitable for the study of pluralistic society, while on the axiological level it means that there is no value set which is automatically better than any other.

Michel Foucault as the intellectual postulate of his work would determine the exposure of the fact that majority of things surrounding humans and comprising broader human environment, the things they deem universal, are actually a result of extremely precise historic changes.²⁷ It revolves around the resistance to the concept of universal in human existence, which does not only exemplify arbitrariness of the institutions but identify free space still available to us, by universalising” the resistance to the universal uncovers changes that should be implemented ”put to function”. According to Jean Baudrillard, modernity no more commands capacities to produce those finalities and references, such as progress or humanity, which represented inseparable part of the European conception of the Enlightenment. When reality ceases to be what it used to be, when we are able to establish its absence, either nostalgia gains a completely new meaning or everything leads to panicky generation of the real, the culture tends to establish itself through oppressive simulation of hyperreality (a ”fantasised” reality which demands to be the only one).²⁸ In this respect, postmodern culture is not familiar with the bifurcation between real and unreal, true or false representation, it metamorphoses in”more or less” alluring simulation relieved of the”weight” of the real, which permeates the totality of the representation edifice as something intrinsically simulacrum (understood as an image, or, to be more precise, its semblance, as a truth that outside it there is no other truth that is referred to). Since postmodern culture is not disciplined, conditioned or “coerced” by anything that could be manifested outside itself, it breaches from representation per se and becomes uninhibited in construction of the imaginary universe without any point of external foothold.

Friedrich Nietzsche stands as the first professed thinker of the postmodernism, who resolved to strongly challenge the Enlightenment project with a view to destroy modernist shroud of the reason as such, by repudiating it as a mask for a new prime principle articulated as the will

²⁷ Martin, R. (1988) “Truth, Power, Self: An Interview with Michel Foucault.” in Martin, L. H., Gutman, H. and Hutton, P. H. (eds.) *Technologies of the Self*, Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, p. 11.

²⁸ Baudrillard, J. (1983) *Simulations*, New York: Semiotext(e), pp. 9-13.

to power.²⁹ In contrast to the fact that modernity proposes progress and emancipation, even then when theoreticians adherent to it have not succeeded in solving its inherent problems, Nietzsche identifies emergence of postmodernity, which refutes advance in knowledge and morality, further offering a dissonance and strife for domination as its basic qualities. For him, in this early phase, the truth is nothing else but the space of metaphors, metonymies and anthropomorphism.³⁰ It is a sum of human relations which have been poetically and rhetorically enhanced, transposed and embellished and which, after prolonged exploitation, seem to humans to be fixed, canonized and obligatory: the truths are the illusions we have forgotten them to be. To tell the truth means to lie in compliance with the established conventions; therefore, the term of illusion functions as an equivalent of unconscious lies. To claim that something is a lie, one has to rely on a certain belief that defines fake; therefore, the statement that lies are illusions suggests that all the propositions we call truths are, indeed, lies.

Nietzsche is further significant to postmodernism because he inaugurated perspectivist doctrine. According to him, traditionally understood objectivity is actually a pointless absurdity, so he negates the existence of knowledge per se (pure reason or absolute spirituality), as emancipated from the attributes of the individual who created it, and favours the interpretation founded on a certain specific projection point. From an epistemological point of view, the following characteristics could be attributed to perspectivism:³¹ (1) our knowledge about an object is derived from a particular perspective, from a viewpoint of specific interests and needs; therefore, knowledge is inevitably linked to a particular perspective (perspectivist proposition); (2) the more perspectives there are in circulation, the more vested interests are there in the cognition of an object, the more valid our concept of the object would be; a plurality of perspectives equals better knowledge (pluralistic proposition); (3) all the possible perspectives of the cognition object cannot be depleted, there are innumerable interpretations of interests, all of which are credible, the number of perspectives is limitless (infinity proposition); and (4) there is a whole range of factors that can deform our knowledge about an object, in other words, certain interests and urges distort the nature of the object ("puristic" proposition).

²⁹ Habermas, J. (1987) *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, op. cit., pp. 85-88.

³⁰ Clark, M. (1990) *Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 65.

³¹ Leiter, B. "Perspectivism in Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals." y Schacht, R. (yp.) *Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality: Essays On Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals*. University of California, Berkeley, 1994, ctp. 344-346.

Jean-Francois Lyotard is the author of in the field exceedingly renowned and influential book, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*.³² The question is whether there is a book lesser in volume but with more epochal, "vertical" reach in understanding the time and world we live in. At any rate, for him postmodernism represents the following: (1) a part of the present, i.e. modern times; (2) an intellectual reaction to the present; (3) a retreat from and criticism of the real (he questions representation in order to represent the sublimated); (4) the triumph of establishing the new rules of the game; (5) refusal to be nostalgic about the past; (6) an attempt at representing the unrepresentable; (7) the positioning of time, not a subject, as a main hero; (8) granting precedence to the signifier; and (9) a departure from the unquestionable acceptance of the grammar and vocabulary of the language, playing with it instead. Lyotard replaces the totalising recourse which views history and society through great or master narratives (metadiscourses), such as dialectics of the Spirit, hermeneutics of sense, emancipation of the rational or productive subject, and turns to small stories that originated from heterogeneous subjective positions of individuals and the plural of social groups.³³ Postmodernity does not follow modernity but is ever-present part of its nucleus, challenging and refuting comprehensive and totalising master narratives which serve to legitimise modernist practice. Modernist linear time does not apply to postmodernity, which combines "institutions" of the past and the future in a form of what is going to be, simultaneously being both in the first and the second position. By refusing to approve of metanarratives in ethical, political, aesthetical or metaphysical domain, Lyotard retreated to the philosophy of difference, not only unavoidable but preferable as well, the one that does not look for a solution in some higher unity, but in divergence or dissonance, hence favouring authenticity, particularity and singularity of a happening, i.e. event.

To this research particularly intriguing, also, is *The Diffèrend: Phrases in Dispute*,³⁴ where the author tried to explain diametrical, profound and incommensurate differences in the domain of discourse, ethics and politics. Lyotard's concept of *diffèrend* is the most similar to the term of friction or schism. The difference in question is the one that is utterly irreducible, marked by absence of any common basis or ground, i.e. non-existence of any common standards that one could refer to when judging what the different is. *Diffèrend* can be defined as a conflicting case

³² Lyotard, J. (1984) *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

³³ Ibidem, p. xiii.

³⁴ Lyotard, J. (1988) *The Diffèrend: Phrases in Dispute*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

among at least two sides which cannot be resolved justly, because the rule of judgment applicable to or for both sides is missing.³⁵ Abandoning the great narrative means abandoning its variant which refers to justice or goodness as a product of agreement of all the parties involved. In that sense, as it is based both on agreement and consensus, democratic policy assumes metadiscourse of the type, therefore for Lyotard the issue of the uttermost importance becomes the method of decision making in the instance of a friction when by definition consensus is not possible. The range of choices can go from violence to a new sort of political thought that will accept to the utmost frictions in the common social space. That common space should be filled by the norms that function more with the aim of minimising the evil, characterised as a deprivation of a variety of opportunities, rather than maximising the good. Let it be noted, Lyotard's term *différend* should not be confused with Jacques Derrida's term *différance*, which will be discussed further on.

Dominic Strinati identifies the following as a determining characteristics of postmodernism:³⁶ (1) the emergence of a society in which mass media and popular culture pose as the most important and most powerful institutions, institutions that profile all other kinds of social relationships, there is an equality sign drawn between culture and society (the idea that media reflect broader social reality is substituted by the idea that the society positions itself within the boundaries of mass media, the superficial layer of media presentation do not lead anymore to distort a certain reality outside itself, it is, in other words, the reality itself); (2) the emphasis on style and volubility is growing more and more important, signs are used for themselves only rather than for any usefulness or deeper value that they may represent (the consequence is neglect of the qualities such as artistic validity, integrity, seriousness, authenticity, realism, intellectual depth and strong narratives – the contents, the gist, and the meaning have become nonsensical); (3) elimination of distinction between high culture (art) and popular culture, postmodern popular culture does not appreciate "noble" diversity and "celestial" pretensions of the art; (4) the fact that due to the speed and scope of modern mass communications, ease and velocity with which people and information are able to move from one place to another, time and space are becoming less consistent and intelligible and more confusing and incoherent, that in the end leads postmodern popular culture to become a culture outside history, which does not

³⁵ Ibidem, p. xi

³⁶ Strinati, D. (2004) *An Introduction to Theories of Popular Culture*, London: Routledge, pp.211-216.

perceive history as continuous, linear narrative, as an undisputable sequence of events; (5) scepticism of the postmodern theory over metanarrative propositions (absolute, universal and comprehensive systems of knowledge and truth), over totalising discourses and the illusion of “universal” human history, which it considers to be disintegrated, diminished in value and legitimacy, and more and more liable to criticism.

While underlining that as a postmodernism he understands both the period and a form of theoretical thinking, Norman Denzin finds that postmodern social theory is characterised by the following (see figure 2):³⁷ (1) breach from complex systems theories that conceptualise society as a totality; (2) powerful preoccupation with the crisis of legitimacy and the experience denoted by modern, computerised and media”saturated” world cultural system; (3) advance in theorising which surpasses phenomenological, structural, poststructural and critical theoretical formulations; (4) radical conceptualisation of language, linguistic philosophy and pragmatism; (5) criticism of scientific knowledge and realism of the late capitalist era; (6) criticism of the subject of social theory; (7) restoration of commodification as the main theoretical issue; (8) focus on the disappearance of scientific, religious and artistic metanarratives from everyday life; (9) insistence on a novel perception of the social, language society and human subject; and (10) deep-rooted mistrust of reason and science as powers which would lead to benevolently set utopian society founded on consensus, rational communicative action and human liberty.

Jacques Derrida is the author of in academic circles rather influential concept of deconstruction, which can be denoted as the dismantling or disintegration of conceptual contradictions, as the disassembling of hierarchical system of thought, which can then be reinscribed within a different order of signification, i.e. similar to seeking meticulously for aporias, blind spots or moments of internal contradiction, where the text accidentally discloses disharmony between rhetoric and logic, between what one consciously has intended to say and what is, conversely, forced to say.³⁸ Apart from internal linguistic contradictions, deconstruction, hence, manifests also the fact that certain rhetoric forms, such as binary oppositions of subject and object, manifestation and reality, mind and body, male and female, self and others, external and internal or speech and writing, lead to establishment of hierarchy of values (logocentric procedure) that then becomes standardized as truth, thus making engagement on the level of

³⁷ Denzin, N. (1986) “Postmodern social theory.” *Sociological Theory*, 4(2): 194-195.

³⁸ Norris, C. (1987) *Derrida*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p. 19. and Derrida, J. (2001) *Writing and Difference*, London: Routledge.

refuting strategies of exclusion and inclusion, which are produced by above-mentioned binary oppositions. The notion is that world is a text or some arrangement of mutually permeated texts in a constant process of writing and rewriting. In postmodern thought culture, understood here as symbolic codification of reality, is above all manifested as a complex of “neo myths”, I would dare say, even phantasms, “neo fairy tales” and “neo legends”, generated within a systematically established communicative background or communicative range. No doubt it is more semiotic game, creation or production, rather than “hard” realistic continuation or extension of some real life experience. Its meaning has to be deconstructed, dismantled and tracked to the reader, the audience and the author, with no one of them gaining any interpretative preponderance over the others.

In medias res, deconstruction is focused not on the ability of language to represent reality, but on its ability to construct reality; it does not originally pertain to the capacity of the power to restrict action or urges, its conceptual focus is actually the capacity of the power to construct identities (within hierarchical established categories of experience and social structures) and thus “provoke” certain forms of action or urges. As a matter of fact, it revolves around the following characteristics of deconstructivism: (1) impossibility to reduce a text to a single substantial message; the same text sample can be interpreted in several equally legitimate ways, there is no mono-substratum or petrified essence, the interpretation itself depends on historical facts and distribution of power; (2) a criticism of binary oppositions in terms of poles of the binary axis being dependant on each other, with an accent on the manner of their integration, where there is a multitude of subtle nuances between them, not simply unsurpassable difference and *privilegium prioritatis* of one pole (category, element, etc.) over the other; (3) retraction from metaphysical hypothesis of history based on latter’s rationality, intelligibility, teleology, controllability and causality, i.e. from “naturalness” of politically motivated historic-reconstruction narratives, the deconstructivist genealogy of human history emphasises contingency of the historical production by its denaturalisation, deessentialisation and dereification.

When we mention politics it is most often in terms of engagement of, primarily public, power, social, not necessarily legitimised, propulsive moment, which acts, i.e. impacts, on people so that they strive toward certain goals or accept certain norms as guiding or organisational factors of their common existence: there is at play a manner or principle of its accumulation,

partaking and distribution.³⁹ Politics are a manifestation of the use of governing power for the purpose of regulating the social interactivity and allocation of scarce resources in order to satisfy certain individually attuned needs. Nevertheless, it does not merely amount to that particular dimension; it is a significant factor in determining the manner in which these needs are created and articulated, as well as determining the relations among them. Politics precedes and surpasses distribution of scarce or limited resources and fulfillment of individual preferences, as it is directly involved in formulation and perception of our resources, interests, relations and selves as individuals. The paramount characteristic of such a proposition is modernist individualistic concept, the presupposed individual as an independent participant and autonomous moral agent, whose manner of mutual interaction with other individuals and the manner in which the political community is formed and developed in terms of the outcomes of that mutuality, serve as a research core of the modern political theory and science. Individualistic conception of power tripod-like accumulates around the following problem sets:⁴⁰ (1) the nature and level of power certain individuals hold; (2) the nature of political processes and institutions responsible for distribution and management of the power of individuals; and (3) moral and rational standards that the individual has to maintain in order to exercise power or defy it.

For those liberals who accept above outlined individualistic concept, the key proposition is prepolitical position of the autonomous agent. *Ergo*, individuals constitute politics, not the other way around. Such a point of view is in contradiction with communitarianist philosophy that favours the significance of moulding or cultivating attitudes, values and behaviour of the members of political community, in terms of the maintenance of social life and political society. The principles linked to individual autonomy and social order cannot be treated as ahistorical truths, but as segments that directly rely on broader context, a combination of these or those historical and cultural circumstances. Such a view of politics has not been based solely on the action outlined by the fulfillment of individual interests, but has been concerned with formulation of identity, of what one is and how it is being what it is. To that end, communitarist hypothesis is similar to what we encounter in postmodernist theoretical sphere. Nevertheless, while communitarism remains confined to highlighting traditional means of moulding moral identities (such as strengthening of the family, state interventionism for the sake of inciting cultural and

³⁹ Thiele, L. P. (2002) *Thinking Politics: Perspectives in Ancient, Modern, and Postmodern Political Theory*, op. cit., pp. 65-99.

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 70.

ethical expression or a need for the increase in the level of social structure) with a view to individuals having to be fused into a highly organised social whole, postmodernist approach accentuates competitive dimension of identities that originated from social and political institutions, difference and variety of (complex, multilayered and evolutionary) identities.

The logic of identities, characteristic of philosophical and theoretical discourse that denies and suppresses diversity, is marked by a projection of the entity through unifying substratum, and to the detriment of processes or relations.⁴¹ In no way could be from the realm of identification of what we are eliminated the fact that we do so through distinguishing against others; every totalisation of identity, its reduction, hermetisation or occlusion, will cause us to perceive the others, through this “impoverished stereotyping”, reduction, as simplified, one-dimensional or “anaemic”. *Ergo*, for a political recourse interesting locus, from a research point, is not establishment of the fact that we all have identities but which fragment of our identity will be in the foreground, which will be driven to the background, how our identities metamorphose and what sort of relationships they will embark on under the influence of the variety appreciation. Modernist inclination subsumes deliberate individual wielding of the power, an individual taken as an autonomous agent of fixed nature and relatively stable, persistent and freely chosen interests, while postmodern orientation assumes individual and collective identities formed in due time within certain social context and interests arisen from these identities.

Without denying the importance of structuralist “glorification” of the power aggregated on the level of governing and economic elite, postmodernist recourse insists on them not being the sole institutional loci which not only influence our lives but shape them as well. In other words, there is a whole pleiad of proteic social forces responsible for production of different identities, a proclivity to discursive social “albums” recasted as customary systems, which permeate society and generate social identities. Their study should be completed part by part and from bottom to top, through individual practices, particular institutions and individual events, which in themselves are products of the type of power residing in the epicentre of our research endeavours. Certainly, never should it be neglected, as it has been already explicitly stated, that some independent research standpoint, is mostly a consequence of some type of social power, as well. Postmodernist renunciation of the existence of a certain petrified essence that defines humankind or humanity, does not in any way imply that a human can be whatever “comes to

⁴¹ Young, I. M. (1990) *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 98.

their mind”.⁴² Identities are by no means roles that can be swapped like clothes on a daily basis, but complex matrices of norms and desires, thinking and behaviour, for whose formation time, directly proportional to the integration into dense social networks, is a requisite. In that tone, postmodern tendency toward politics presupposes multidimensional construction of identities that are not easy to change. Multidimensionality can be understood as a product of multilayered social environment, as a fact that we are members, participants and subjects of different groups, associations, organisations and relations that form our views, values, behaviour, and, consequently, self-understanding.

At this point two focal concepts of Foucault’s methodological approach should be mentioned: “the archeology of knowledge” (or archeological analysis) and “the genealogy of power”, both equally important to him, mutually supportive, and, to a certain degree, complementary.⁴³ The archeology of knowledge embodies identification of a sequence of formational rules which determine the conditions for something to be claimed, in any given moment, within the boundaries of some specific discourse. To understand the archeological analysis (here, archeology, naturally, does not designate either academic discipline or colloquial notion of it) it is necessary to incorporate a whole range of concepts or constructs (such as *savoir*, *connaissance*, discursive formation, discursive practice, enunciation rules, discontinuity, event, periodisation etc.), where none of the constructs can be “torn” or “drawn out” in order to be examined or implemented separately without endangering the method itself, but both their individual understanding and comprehension of them as mutually bound and intertwined into a whole, is needed. The former could be best illustrated by methodological positioning of the concepts *savoir* and *connaissance*. According to Foucault, therefore, “archeology” is not a research discipline but the domain of research.⁴⁴ In other words, there is in the society not only a corpus of knowledge, philosophical ideas and everyday informal thought, but institutions,

⁴² Thiele, L. P. (2002) *Thinking Politics: Perspectives in Ancient, Modern, and Postmodern Political Theory*, op. cit., p. 80.

⁴³ See Foucault, M. (1966) *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*, New York: Vintage.; Foucault, M. (1969) *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language*, New York: Harper Colophon.; Foucault, M. (1994) “The Order of Things.” in Faubion, J. D. (ed.) *Michel Foucault Essential Works: Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology*, New York: The New Press, pp. 261-269.; Gutting, G. (1989) *Michel Foucault’s Archaeology of Scientific Reason*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.; Dean, M. (2003) *Critical and Effective Histories: Foucault’s Methods and Historical Sociology*, London: Routledge.; Sheridan, A. (2005) *Michel Foucault: The Will to Truth*, London: Routledge.; and Scheurich, J. J. and McKenzie, K. B. (2007) “Foucauldian Archeological Analysis.” in Ritzer, G. (ed.) *The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology*, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 1771–1774.; and Ritzer, G. (2011) *Sociological Theory*, 8th edn. New York: McGraw-Hill, pp. 605-645.

⁴⁴ Foucault, M. (1994) “The Order of Things.” op. cit., pp. 261-262.

economic practices and political activities and customs referring to a certain implicit knowledge (*savoir*) typical of that society. Thus specified knowledge fundamentally differs from formal corpus of knowledge (*des connaissances*), which can be found in scientific monographs, philosophical theories and religious dogmas. The most relevant is the fact that implicit knowledge (*savoir*) makes it possible at a certain point for theories, thoughts and practices to emerge, that *savoir* represents the broadest discursive conditions (it could be said, a sort of pre-knowledge) necessary for the development of *connaissance*, particular sciences or disciplines (e.g. quantum physics or evolutionary biology). The archeology is an extraordinary quest for the most comprehensive system or rules, for the discourse and its oral and textual components, with the quest not representing hermeneutic need for their comprehension, but analytical, descriptive and organisational operativeness, they are irreducible and do not yield to the interpretation which would lead to deeper understanding.

In the simplest of terms, genealogy embodies tracing of the processes through which we “unconditionally” accept or acquiesce to our world as natural and meaningful.⁴⁵ It is quite a specific type of intellectual history, the way of connecting various historical elements into organised and systematically directed trajectories. However, genealogy, at a fundamental level, embodies non-acceptance or a criticism of a sort of modernist teleological dimension of history as a constant advance from a temporally and sense-wise fixed point. Conversely, according to Foucault, not only do not such “points-footholds” exist but are often fabricated. Still, he does not deny the role of the reason as a part of thus perceived history, but does not treat it as a sole participant in more broadly set dramaturgy of modernity.⁴⁶ Genealogy is, then, preoccupied with the process through which we construct the genesis and apply meaning to a certain view of the past, representation that defines our everyday life and restricts our political and social options, adjusting them to its own construct. While archeology is an experiential decomposition of

⁴⁵ Foucault, M. (1994) “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History.” in Faubion, J. D. (ed.) *Michel Foucault Essential Works: Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology*, New York: The New Press, pp. 369-393.; Bleiker, R. (2003) *Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 24-29.; Dean, M. (2003) *Critical and Effective Histories: Foucault’s Methods and Historical Sociology*, London: Routledge; Scheurich, J. J. and McKenzie, K. B. (2005) “Foucault’s Methodologies: Archeology and Genealogy.” in Denzin, N. and Lincoln, Y. (eds.) *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research*, London: SAGE, pp. 841-869.; Devetak R. (2005) “Postmodernism.” in Burchill, S., Linklater A., Devetak R. et al. (eds.) *Theories of International Relations*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 161-188.; Fuller, S. (2007) “Genealogy.” in Ritzer, G. (ed.) *The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology*, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 1896-1897.; and Ritzer, G. (2011) *Sociological Theory*, 8th edn. New York: McGraw-Hill, pp. 605-645.

⁴⁶ Foucault, M. (1994) “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History.” op. cit., pp. 373-374.

historical discourses, genealogy is both their critical reconsideration and the analysis of their attitude to issues and problems of the contemporary world. When we focus on genealogy of power, there is at play consideration of ways to govern oneself and others through production of knowledge, which brings people into a position of the subjects, and then governs them. It is important to underline here that such a proposition does not imply a conscious conspiracy committed by some elite, but the emphasis is put on the structural relationship between knowledge and power.

In crudest terms, differentiation of poststructuralism and postmodernism can be drawn from the fact that, provided they are theories, poststructuralism is a theory of knowledge and language while postmodernism is a theory of society, culture and history (such a proposition entails significant overlaps). Postmodernism is closely connected with postindustrialist concept of modern society, where the manufacturing of raw materials into industrial products undergoes ever greater changes with production and distribution of symbols, knowledge and information. Characteristic of it is profound constructivism that emphasises more the human creativity than some “deeper” ontological realities. Greater and greater efficiency and pervading dimension of communication technologies led to creation of simultaneous and non-vertical phenomenological notions that do not “probe” either space or time. Consequently, retraction from meta-narratives, through which we determine our “status and locus”, and modern understanding of power represents a specific interpretation of political community and economy: the world is nothing more than a text we have to interpret.

In its more rigid form, as already mentioned, postmodernism represents abandoning explication of the truth via the theory of correspondence or adequacy, i.e. reservations toward teleological-metaphysical belief that reality and truth are one, that there is only one truthful idea of what things really are, while in its less rigid form it does not manifest so much the rejection of a view that thinking represents reality as reliance on what that representation means. Postmodernism is antireductionist and pluralistic, equally in its causal priorities and its policy, which are more liberal than radical. Generally speaking, postmodernism directs its attention to the novel aspects of social reality, such as systems of thought and language that stipulate public discourse/practice. It shall be added to the previously mentioned, established distinction that nature of the relationship postmodernism has to poststructuralism also depends on whether one regards postmodernism as a historical period, cultural context or theoretical approach. Due to

great scope of diversity in postmodernist theorising, there are analytical commentaries which less determine it as a theory/theories than a corpus of thought whose ideological space has been constituted via centrality of the concepts of language, power, identity and resistance.

On the one hand, it could be said that structuralism is focused on the fundamental rules of the organisation of social phenomena into a social system with aim of objectivity, coherence, rigidity and veracity. Structural analysis (similar to functionalism and Marxism) aims to clarify social phenomena in terms of concepts of linguistic and social structures, rules, regulations and systems, and to develop grand, synthesising theories (I would say– the theories that encompass the already all-encompassing). On the other hand, poststructuralism, as well as postmodernism, is focused on complex and diffuse links between power and knowledge, on the manner in which individuals are being constituted as subjects with given unifying identities, i.e. on micro policies and subjectivity, differences and everyday life. It represents the means of analysis to a higher or lesser degree deposited rules and meanings that have an impact on political construction of social, political and cultural identity; the initial proposition is that what exists becomes comprehensible or understandable only when it is united or merged with a specific form which constitutes its identity (formulation of the identity is not based on some metaphysical authority such as God, nature, man or reason).

Postmodernism denies the existence of an omnivalid historical pattern and negates current “state of affairs” as inevitable and unconditional (there is no omniscient historical axis, but merely a shift from one discourse to another). This discursive theoretical approach accords precedence to the political over the social, and as the discourse coexists with the social, discursive order is politically construed through the acts of inclusion and exclusion, in other words- through the use of power (every truth is, therefore, political truth). All in all, as main characteristics of poststructural, but also of postmodern, discursive theory, the following can be selected:⁴⁷ (1) antiessential ontology (opposes the idea of self-determining centre which structures society and determines identity, while itself does not undergo the process of structuring); (2) linguistic form of analysis; (3) primacy of politics; and (4) anti-foundationalist epistemology (the non-existence of any extradiscursive authority in terms of empirical facts,

⁴⁷ Torfing, J. (2005) “Poststructuralist Discourse Theory: Foucault, Laclau, Mouffe, and Žižek.” in Janoski, T., Alford, R. R., Hicks, A. M. and Schwartz, M. A. (eds.) *The Handbook of Political Sociology: States, Civil Societies, and Globalization*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 155.

methodological rules or privileged criteria of scientificity for the sake of preservation of truth or science).

Thus, Timothy Mitchell, in poststructuralist, but postmodernist fashion as well, determines state-centric approaches as an attempt to explain the state as an autonomous entity, whose actions are irreducible to or determinable by social forces, which, again, demands drawing a clear line between state and society rather than providing analytical advantage to the state at the expense of society.⁴⁸ The main analytical preoccupation is aimed at formulation of a stable demarcation line when “osmosis” is evident, not only of state, official with semiofficial, but also of semiofficial with unofficial practice, in a way that state remains separate and self-guided object. Weber’s well-known definition of state, understood as an organisation which within precisely determined territory has a monopoly on legitimate use of physical force, says nothing of how to formulate contours of that amorphous organisation. It should be mentioned that postmodernist approach to democracy is manifested via conceptualisation of agonistic respect through negotiation on identities and differences; therefore the “natural” domain of its interest becomes pluralist policy of identities characteristic of public sphere.

Above problematised organisational issue has not been solved either by the new proponents of state-centric approach, who offer a more narrow definition of a state as a system for decision-making. Mitchell emphasises that the “narrowed theoretical focus” sees the essence of the state not in the monopolistic organisation of coercion nor the structures of legal and ideological order nor in mechanisms by which social interests achieve the political representation nor in arrangements which preserve the given relationship between producers and the owners of capital, but in modeling and expressing of authoritative intentions or ideas (terminologically marked either as “rule establishment” or “decision making” or establishment of “concrete, individual public policies”), which actually transforms the state into subjective realm of plans, programmes and ideas.⁴⁹ We surmise that in this context the state can be branded as a “controlled utopia”. *Ergo*, this subjective proposition copies a disputable distinction between state and society onto apparently “sharper” distinction between subjective and objective, including even the perspective of demarcation between meaning and reality. Within such a conceptualisation the

⁴⁸ Mitchell, T. (1991) “The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics.” *The American Political Science Review*, 85(1): 81-82.

⁴⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 82.

state, concludes Mitchell, emerges as separate from society in an unproblematic manner which indicates that intentions or ideas are treated as “seceded” from the outer world that they refer to. Mitchell considers that the state should not be examined as contemporary structure, but as a powerful metaphysical effect of practices which enable that structure to exist (thus the national state is the key structural element of the modern social world, it encompasses such institutions as army, school and bureaucracy, while, except that, its increased presence takes the shape that appears separately from social world and provides external structure for it).⁵⁰ In the same vein, by forming the territorial borders and exerting the complete control over their crossing (which is definitely a characteristic of the modern state), state practice defines and enables constitution of national entity (“drawing” the borders comprises also the practices such as passports, immigration laws, inspections, etc.) Such a constellation, unfamiliar just two hundred, or even a hundred years ago, has produced an almost transcendental entity – national state, which seems to be much more than a sum of constitutive mundane activities and emerges as a structure which consists of and renders both order and meaning to human lives (what we call the state, and consequently deliberate as an intrinsic object distanced from the society, manifests a sum of structural effects of the type).

Such a hypothesis has as its result the fact that the state and the question of its borders is defined in comparison to the society by the following five propositions:⁵¹ (1) whether it is treated as an agent, an instrument, an organisation or a structure, the state should not be regarded as an independent entity, separate and opposed to the other entity which can be labeled as a society (or economy); (2) the distinction between the state and the society (or the state and the economy) should not be taken as a defining quality of the modern political order, the state must not be discarded as some abstraction or ideological construct, subdued for the sake of some more real, material reality; (3) the state either should not be defined via subjectivist view that essentially establishes it as a phenomenon of decision or policy making; (4) the state should be deliberated as a result of a detailed process of spatial organisation, temporal involvement, functional specification and control, which create the semblance or impression of the world divided into the state and the society (or the state and the economy); the essence of modern politics is not, then, its formulation on the one side of the divide, but production and reproduction of the demarcation

⁵⁰ Ibidem, p. 94.

⁵¹ Ibidem, p. 95. and Mitchell, T. (2006) “Society, Economy, and the State Effect.” in Sharma, A. and Gupta, A. (eds.) *The Anthropology of the State: A Reader*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 184-185.

mark; and (5) these processes create an effect of the state not only as an entity that is separate from the society (or economy) but as a remote dimension of structure, context, codification, planning and intentionality.

Mitchell's main aim is to approach the state not as an object, location or agent but as a set of powerful but difficult to pinpoint methods of ordering and presenting the social practice, which create an effect of an agent or structure, i.e. the state, as something that is outside the "category" of the social. From the standpoint of the majority of other theories of state such a hypothesis can be criticised in two ways: the first refers to the incorrect substitution of something real (and objectified in a form of an independent entity) by an impression, while the second relates to classification of the term "impression" as something "too" illusory. On the same note, critical position incorporates or suggests a return of the focus to real political forces. Certainly, these two critical notes, as well as Mitchell's critical observations on the issue of statist approach are not absolute and definite, not in a sense of lacking critical universality but in a sense that they represent condensed and particular expression of a certain theoretical position that can be criticised as well. In that sense, not only does the internal methodological organisation of "the criticism of the criticism" of some interpretation of the state important but the theoretical paradigm by which we wish to explain everything concerning the state assume an important if not crucial position.

The remarks of Georg Sorensen should be added here, who as main differences between the modern and postmodern state (allowing that the meaning of postmodern varies from author to author) identifies the following characteristics:⁵² (1) concerning the government, the modern state is a centralised system of democratic rule, founded on administrative, police and military structure, sanctioned by legal system, with clearly highlighted monopoly of legitimate use of force within a given territory, while the postmodern state entails government on several levels and in several mutually overlapping zones, it is a government in the context of supranational, international and transnational relations, where the interaction and blurring of the borderlines between national and international policy making take place; (2) concerning the nation, the modern state refers to people who within a given territory comprise a community of citizens, with political, social and economic rights, and a community of sentiments, with linguistic, cultural and

⁵² Sorensen, G. (2006) "The Transformation of the State." in Hay, C., Lister, M. and Marsh, D. (eds.) *The State: Theories and Issues*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 205.

historical ties (a high level of cohesion and obligatoriness), while the postmodern state brings supranational elements to both the community of citizens and the community of sentiments, where the state is no more the primary object of collective loyalty; and (3) concerning the economy, the modern state champions self-sufficient, isolated economy in terms of incorporating of all the sectors needed for its reproduction, while the postmodern state highlights the economic activities within cross border networks (economic self-sufficiency is significantly diminished). It should be added here that, according to Robert Cooper, there are several distinguishing factors of the postmodern state in relation to all the others:⁵³ (1) blurring the distinction between internal and external domains of the state; (2) mutual interference in traditionally defined space of internal affairs and mutual supervision; (3) utter rejection of the use of force in resolving disputes and, consequently, legal codification of such a platform of response; and (4) security which is based on transparency, mutual openness and interdependence. The postmodern state is inherently paradoxical entity, deprived of stability of a prediscursive, a fixed and immutable identity, and a possibility of discovering a performative nature of one's own identity, it is based on a regulated and stylised repetition of practices (such as foreign policy) with a view to controlling unpredicted situations and its own security.

With respect to the above-mentioned, let us highlight some of the undoubtable poststructuralist and postmodernist achievements in the sphere of international relations and politics *in genere*:⁵⁴ (1) uncovering the significance of the problem and paradox of representation for the modern political life; (2) posing questions about visible and utterable, vision and language; (3) openness of the theory to the importance and functioning of the paradox and ambiguities of political life; (4) problematisation of the subject; (5) new ways of deliberation of mediation, power and resistance issues; (6) repeated deliberation of political functions of knowledge, remembrance and history; (7) a novel approach to the relationship of time and space, dynamics and place, restrictions and violations; (8) introducing a specific interpretation of the relationship between parts and the whole, local and total, individualisation and social institutionalisation; (9) demonstration of the relevance and possibility of serious deliberation of diverse subalternate expressions of the modern political life, coupled with constant focus of difficulties, dangers and paradoxes characteristic of every attempt at theorising or urging towards

⁵³ Cooper, R. (2000) *The Postmodern State and the World Order*, London: Demos, p. 22.

⁵⁴ Ashley, R. (1996) "The Achievements of Post-structuralism." in Smith, S., Booth K. and Zalewski, M. (eds..) *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 245-246.

radical (enemy) otherness; (10) openness to forcing the issue of politics, with a view to its insufficient inclusion in the institutional categories of the social; (11) openness to forcing the issue of politics of the marginalised movements, never sufficiently encompassed by the logic of socially-oriented politics; (12) inquiry into the dependence of modern state governance on the practice of repressing resistance, domestication or extraterritorialisation of the excess, then creation of some exclusive area of subjectivity which the state can claim to represent; (13) interpretation of the practice of international organisations and diplomacy, not as an area of interstate action relating to the occurrences outside their borders, but as a means of global positioning of what could be defined as an external danger, thus enabling unguided orchestration practically effective, mutually recognisable borders behind which certain activities can be excluded without questioning assumed presence of national communities; (14) implications of the constructs of race, ethnic identity, gender, needs, rights, etc. in the practice of state governance; (15) inquiry into a possibility of rearticulation of traditional constructs such as community, pluralism, democracy, citizenry, etc.; (16) innovation and elaboration of deconstructivist, interpretive-analytical and other methods, which despite problematising the notion of methodology itself, enable engaged, strict and critically-minded questioning of events and activities imposed and surpassed by the limits of social opportunity; (17) demonstration of a feasibility of inquiry modalities which are truly transdisciplinary and which, as such, question the focus on ‘purely’ disciplinary inquiries.

3. National identity problem

As main scientific approaches to the national identity original primordialist or essentialist approach and instrumentalist and constructivist, as subsequent approaches, stand out. The concept of primordialism underlines the significance of primordial community for the identity, which it understands as basic human category given by birth, i.e. unchangeable and closed concept. The sense of community founded on the idea of common descent and historical experience of the community, together with common myths, tradition and culture, is essentially irrational and unutterable, and bounds people by deep ties. National identity is considered as fundamental, since along with characteristics acquired by birth, through those that are acquired by affiliation to the national culture, emotions, instincts and collective experiences memory are transferred as well, and in a manner that has not much to do with will of an individual. In that sense, national identity is largely predestined.

In the basis of the latter approaches to the national identity, the instrumentalist and constructivist ones, lie social, political or interest constructs. Identity is perceived as multiple, changeable, fluid, related to the particular circumstances and choice the individual makes within them. According to the instrumentalist view which favours rational approach to the identity, national societies are created out of interest and are artificially kept alive where there are pragmatic reasons to it; national identity is perceived through its functionality both to the state/political community- economic-territorial-political functionality that provides resources, territory, labour force and political unity to the state, and to the individual, it supplies referential frame for perception of the self and others, i.e. for identification.⁵⁵

Antiessentialist and constructivist approach insist on identity as produced, created in various historical, discursive and social contexts that are changeable and to a large extent dependant on subjective experience and definition. As a most general starting point in this part of the paper, constructivist approach implies combining, on the one hand, elements of primordial understanding of identity- although it sets off from a rational basis of the identity, it does not exclude either the existence of “primordial” emotions (feelings of deep and unutterable closeness) or the forms of cultural determinedness. However, it observes them in a constructivist

⁵⁵ Smit, A. (1998) *Nacionalni identitet (National identity)*, Beograd: XX vek, pp. 32-34. [Smith. A. (1991) *National identity*, London: Penguin Books.]

manner – on the other hand, it respects instrumentalist emphasis on political and pragmatic interest/construct as an important basis of national affiliation.⁵⁶

National identity as a sociopsychological phenomenon is construed during life and is a product of a fusion of primordial bonds' of a cultural origin, i.e. unique cultural determinednesses adopted through the processes of socialisation, and choices an individual makes by following his interests, cultural and political/ideological preferences. As a social construct, national identity is a product of a choice among certain discourses, i.e. it is diversely articulated in different discursive practices. With a view to that, national identity can be to a certain degree historically “traced”, since a future member of a nation does not enter historically and culturally empty space, although he is not decisively restrained by already present “heritage”. When viewed as a social construct that is present within the constraints of a certain sociocultural context, national identity is a product of discursive practices and cultural codes inwrought within dominant discourses about it. According to the proponents of social constructivism, all objects of our consciousness including our understanding of a person and our identity, are constructed through language, and produced by discourses as coherent systems of representation. Discourse seen as a means of constructing meanings which influences and organises both our action and our understanding of the self enables us to perceive the issues from within. Discourse is not what upgrades or represents already existing categories, but what designs them. Conceptions about “us” and “the others” encompass the repertory of certain identities while using restrictively, or excluding, the repertory of others.⁵⁷

If we adopt as our starting thesis that one of the social constructivism that claims reality itself does not exist but only its individual and collective constructions, then processes of their origin, social transfer and (ideological, political) (mis)use transpire as very important. We deal here with the standpoints of social constructivism, on the basis of which our understanding of ourselves and social reality are perceived as social constructions dependant on culture from which they originate, i.e. cultural patterns woven into the language. Moreover, it is emphasised that the relation among verbal signs, mental images and objects they relate to ceases to be a mere representation, and becomes constitutive, i.e. the existence of an object and its representation

⁵⁶ See Cornell, S. and Hartmann, D. (2007) *Ethnicity and Race: Making Identities in a Changing World*, London: SAGE.

⁵⁷ See Burr, V. (1995) *An Introduction to Social Constructionism*, London: Routledge. And Foucault, M. (1969) *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language*, New York: Harper Colophon.

become inextricable from each other. Thus we reach the concept of discourse and its role in the construction of social life and identity.

Contemporary studies focus on the examining how discourses of a society at the same time reflect, constitute and reproduce certain social organisation, cultural values, beliefs and norms; how a discourse illuminates/generates social processes, particularly within social conflicts.⁵⁸ Discourse is a practice that forms the object of discussion and provides a referential context, a means of interpretation of the world and assigning a meaning to that world, which we internalise via language, education and social interactions. Language, thus, through discourse, enables us to subjectively experience both ourselves and the world. Identity is born out of human interactions, constructed via discourses which we possess within our culture, and devised through permeating of various categories of affiliation. An insight into constructive nature of the national identity does not, however, mean a rejection of any permanency of national identifications, or acceptance of the view which reduces them to changeable interest constructs or dominant/topical identity strategies. Contemporary deliberations of the nation and national identity phenomena actually gather around this fundamental theoretical controversy established on the relation determinedness-permanency-determination to construction-changeability-fluidity. The basis of conceptual starting point for representation of this for the issue of identity crucial theoretical controversy is, in this paper, composed of ideas of Benedict Anderson, Anthony Smith, Jean-François Bayart and Stuart Hall.

The notion of subjective imagining as a basis of national identifications Benedict Anderson has, through expanding cultural roots, placed at the mere core of understanding the nation and national identity phenomena.⁵⁹ By insisting on, for his analysis, fundamental distinction between nationalism as an ideological movement and national identity as a collective cultural phenomenon, Anthony Smith has determined nationalism as a political ideology with a cultural doctrine at its core.⁶⁰ The foundation of the thesis on imaginary in identity affirmation has been laid by Jean-François Bayart, through linking the processes of tradition codification to

⁵⁸ See Grimshaw, A. (2001) "Discourse and Sociology: Sociology and Discourse." in Schiffrin, D., Tannen D. and Hamilton, H. E. (eds.) *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003, pp.750-752.

⁵⁹ See Anderson, B. (1998) *Nacija, zamišljena zajednica (Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism)*, Beograd: Plato. [Anderson, B. (1983) *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London: Verso.]

⁶⁰ Smit, A. (1998) *Nacionalni identitet (National identity)*, op. cit., pp. 6, 120.

the processes of national identity construction.⁶¹ Perceiving the processes of creation of the national identity as a fusion of planned establishment of political control via cultural homogenisation and conflicting processes, compromises and unconscious adoptions through courses of cultural community formation, Bayart wanted to emphasise the contradictory unity of construction and formation of the nation. According to Anderson's assumption, "being nation" is not being linked to political ideologies, but to great cultural systems which created undeniable referential context, namely religious community and dynastic kingdom that had preceded and from which and against whom these originated. Being nation was enabled through spontaneous distillation of a compound mixture of independent historical powers,⁶² it was situated in a complex social change, which is not solely economic, but cultural as well; it is a change in understanding time, space, sign, communication, the other and oneself.

In anthropological approach, Anderson defined nation as "imagined political community" inherently restricted and sovereign; restricted because even the greatest nations have limits and none is imagined to correspond humankind; sovereign because the notion of nation appeared in an era when the legitimacy of dynastic kingdom was crumbling, i.e. when its historical sovereignty became people's sovereignty, i.e. sovereignty of the members of the nation.⁶³ The notion of "imagined nation" in Anderson's definition has a specific meaning which is meant to include into consideration real and complex social processes that generate the point of being a nation. Imagining nation is a real (although partly subjective) social process of creating a unique community. Nations are imagined communities because their members are mutually connected not by acquaintance but a system of notions about their togetherness existing in every of them; these are real phenomena whose production happens on an imaginary level.

The instrument and medium of imagination that creates imagined community of a nation is culture. As Anderson explained, nations became imaginable only when three fundamental cultural conceptions lost their primacy. The first conception referred to the privileged status of certain written, holy languages in the approach to "ontological truth", which created transcontinental religious communities (such as Christianity and Islam). In the period of

⁶¹ See Bajar, Ž. F. (2009) "Imaginarno u identitetskoj afirmaciji (Imaginary in an Identity Affirmation)." in Halpern, K. and Ruano-Borbalan, Ž. K. (eds) *Identitet(i): pojedinci, grupa, društvo (Identity/Identities: Individual, Group, Society)*, Beograd: Clio, pp. 384-390.

⁶² Anderson, B. (1998) *Nacija, zamišljena zajednica (Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism)*, op. cit., pp. 14, 22.

⁶³ Ibidem, p. 17.

domination of this cultural system, confessional affiliation was a means of distinction between communities. The second cultural conception was associated with divine foundation of the authority of the ruler, i.e. considering loyalty to the ruler and Holy Writ as “crucial approach to being”, based on the belief that society is naturally organised around and under the reign of sublime centres – monarchs. The third was the conception of time according to which cosmology and history were inseparable, and origin of the world and humans in essence identical.⁶⁴

Changes in understanding of time led to fundamental shift in comprehension of reality. While eternity in a religious sense was anchored in every moment of the history and represented just one and the same moment that perpetually persisted in the present, proclaiming in every moment the divine order, the new order founded on the notion of empty time (filled with external characteristics of a calendar) has opened the way towards the new understanding of the world. By demolishing the structure of sacred time numerous individual moments, which have to be gathered into a certain sense, surface. That sense was brought actually by nation, comprehended analogously to the idea of “social organism that calendar-like moves through homogenous empty time”, as a solid community that continuously moves through the history.⁶⁵ Specific social change that created conditions for the advent of nation, was, according to Anderson, determined by interaction “between systems of production and production relationships (capitalism), technology of communication (printing), and enormous diversity of human languages”; it enabled creation of a “new form of imagined community which by its basic morphology laid the scene for a modern nation”.⁶⁶ Anderson tried to show how institution practice ruptures in discursive practice, and that fracture actually demonstrated modularity of nation and specificity of a style of its imagining on the basis of which, according to the author, nations mutually differ.

The creation of national cultures coincides, according to Jean-François Bayart, with “a movement of cultural alienation” which we witness from the 18th century via inventing tradition, i.e. “a tendency of re-use of fragments of a more or less phantasmagoric past”, that accompanies social, political and cultural changes and emergence of a modern state in the West.⁶⁷ Parallel with the processes of systematic evaluation of the elements of the folklore culture, social groups

⁶⁴ Ibidem, p. 43.

⁶⁵ Ibidem, p. 34.

⁶⁶ Ibidem, pp. 49, 51.

⁶⁷ Bajar, Ž. F. (2009) “Imaginarno u identitetskoj afirmaciji (Imaginary in an Identity Affirmation).” in Halpern, K. and Ruano-Borbalan, Ž. K. (eds) *Identitet(i): pojedinci, grupa, društvo (Identity/Identities: Individual, Group, Society)*, Beograd: Clio, p. 386

retroactively react to that building work under their own values, their own cultures. As Bayart succinctly puts it, “building of national identities is inseparable from their formation”. Distinction between building as a conscious creation of the devices of political control by a certain social class or party and formation which delineates conflicting, unintentional and utterly unconscious process and which leads to the chaos of conflicts and compromises via masses of nameless people, perfectly fits the description of a contradictory process of national identity creation. It is, thus, at the same time a result of its construction via dominant groups or phases of social ascent, and formation, in other words, of that total alchemy created within societies.⁶⁸

Building and development of awareness of national unity, provision of a common history, language and culture of its members for an imaginary community, in the conditions of cultural heterogeneity of the pre-modern era, is a project that largely exceeds a scale of a mere political-ideological construct for mobilisation of the masses in the creation of state borders. As emphasised by Anne-Marie Thiesse, for the idea of nation to be accepted as legitimate and transformative social power, it is necessary to create common identity of the nation members around which, through cultural-historical references and common practice, a common sense of affiliation could be developed. Ernest Renan’s definitions use as their starting point precisely the idea of heritage as a basis of the national idea. Finding objective characteristics inadequate for defining nation, Renan underlined the importance of spiritual creed, moral awareness and solidarity, common indivisible and inalienable heritage, memory, but also current consent, a will to cohabitate, i.e. continue to respect/preserve the heritage that we acquired as indivisible. The formation of the national identity was comprised of the building of those heritages which have fundamentally proven to be mutually quite similar.⁶⁹

What is particularly important, the building enterprise of tradition codification involved also the endeavours to standardise the national language. As Anderson points out, the nation was from the beginning understood through language, and not blood. In other words, important was that exact moment of an individual’s initiation into their social role and language practice of the members of a national (language) community, as one of the vital factual and symbolic

⁶⁸ Ibidem, pp. 386-387.

⁶⁹ According to Tijes, A. M. (2009) “Kulturna proizvodnja evropskih nacija (Cultural Production of European nations).” in Halpern, K. and Ruano-Borbalan, Ž. K. (eds.), *Identitet(i): pojedinci, grupa, društvo (Identity/Identities: Individual, Group, Society)*, Beograd: Clio, p. 335.

confirmations of membership and unity of the nation.⁷⁰ The printed (national) languages laid the foundation of national awareness through creating of a unified field of exchange and communication below Latin while above vernacular, through connecting the readers via print, which both in its secular visible invisibility created an embryo of nationally conceived community. Printing capitalism strengthened language, which in time contributed to the formation of the notion of antiquity, vitally important for the subjective conception of a nation.

Imagining the nation in Anderson's terms "does not entail any internal necessity, nor is it a proof of a real historical continuity, but a consequence of both a symbolic treatment of time and space and selection of those elements of the cultural past that in any given moment can supply and confirm the idea of continuity".⁷¹ Deeper insight into the cultural foundations of a national identity Anthony Smith achieved through matching it with ethnic identity/community, trying to explain exactly the character of cultural doctrine that lies in their foundation, exploring the past and processes of nation creation. Linking modern nations with any kind of ethnic cores, however, is a problematic and often criticised thesis in the contemporary research. The most common argument of criticism is the existence of significant examples of nations shaped without ethnic (merging of the cultures of successive waves in America, Argentina and Australia),⁷² although neither these facts exclude the possibility of, where ethnic existed, nations being shaped on the ethnic bases as a kind of cultural configuration, nor could this serve as an argument sufficient for a basic rebuttal of the proposition. As Smith underlines, the first nations, historically speaking, were modelled became models for later cases of modelling. That ethnic model was sociologically productive, as it fitted easily with the pre-modern type of community.⁷³

Similar proposition on modelling the nation during its "transplantation" into new sociocultural and political environments can be found with Anderson, too. Being a nation have been transplanted into various social areas where, merging with political and ideological constellations, it gained its function via official nationalism, becoming thus an efficient product for the mobilisation of the masses in order to create state borders. As a consequence of nation

⁷⁰ Anderson, B. (1998) *Nacija, zamišljena zajednica (Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism)*, op. cit., p. 138.

⁷¹ Đorđević, J. (2009) *Postkultura: uvod u studije kulture (Postculture: An Introduction to the Study of Culture)*, Beograd: Clio, p. 339.

⁷² Kordić, S. (2010) "Ideologija nacionalnog identiteta i nacionalne kulture (The Ideology of National Identity and National Culture)." in Ajdačić, D. and Lazarević Di Đakomo, P. (eds.) *U čast Pera Jakobsena (In honor of Per Jacobsen)*, Beograd: SlovoSlavia, p. 232.

⁷³ Smit, A. (1998) *Nacionalni identitet (National identity)*, op. cit., pp. 70-71.

modularity, the variety of abundant concrete manifestations of this social phenomenon has resulted in impossibility of providing a universally valid scientific definition. Opposite to the diversity of the types of nationalities stands specific universality of nation; one of its crucial anthropological dimensions Anderson determined by perceiving it as “a secular way to transform destiny into continuity, to give meaning to the coincidence”,⁷⁴ indicating at that close similarity between nationalistic and religious mentality.

Yet another significant aspect of permanency associated with national identity is certainly the durability of functions that it performs, on which even “traditionalist” and “modernists” agree. Anthony Smith singles out two categories of national identity functions: internal and external. External functions, territorial, economic and legal-political, related to creation of a social, economic and political environment where members of a nation exist (authorisation of legal rights and obligations, legal institutions which reflect distinct values, traditions and characteristics of a nation). Internal functions of a national identity originate from its ethnic and cultural dimensions; they relate to the establishment of social ties among the members of a nation via repertory of common values, symbols and traditions; they are evident in the processes of a socialisation of an individual as a national and citizen of a given nation; therefore, they are concerned with the assumption of cooperation among confronted social classes and their acceptance of a unitary collective self-definition.⁷⁵

Even though scientific approach to the national identity rejected a long ago a view that national feeling is given by nature, its foundations are still being perceived as in a specific manner “given”. The character and content of that determinedness are highly complex, difficult to analyse and dependent on a multitude of factors; but what is certain is that it does not mean unchangeability and that esteem for it does not necessarily lead to the essentialisation of the problem, or politicisation of ethnic identities. It is possible to establish numerous relations between ethnic and national identity, where one of the more relevant is definitely the one related to cultural configuration. The study of national identity as a social construct entails scrutiny of its cultural foundations which to a large extent coincide with the ethical one, at least on the basis of

⁷⁴ Anderson, B. (1998) *Nacija, zamišljena zajednica (Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism)*, op. cit., pp. 2, 8-9.

⁷⁵ Smit, A. (1998) *Nacionalni identitet (National identity)*, op. cit., pp. 32-34;

terms that Smith highlighted; it is about ideology, language, mythology, symbolism and (collective) consciousness that serve as a basis for national identity, being intertwined.⁷⁶

By stressing symbolical-cultural attributes of ethnic identity, Smith has positioned it in a certain way also in cultural foundations of a nation themselves. Among underlined traits of ethnic and national identity that the author mentions, compatible are just those attributes with mainly cultural and historical content and highly subjective nature.⁷⁷ According to him, the distinctive characteristics of national identity are: historical territory, i.e. homeland; common myths and historical memory; common mass public culture; common legal rights and responsibilities of nation members; common economy with a territorial mobility of nation members.⁷⁸ The approach to national identity which relies on isolating its distinctive characteristics is problematic, though, in a sense that by it institutions and creative work of an ethnic group/nation are assigned to an already defined list of cultural traits understood in an unhistorical manner; this leads to reasoning which qualifies cultural change as impoverishment and decline. Every concept that sees in isolation a foundation for the appearance and preservation of collective identities is essentially wrong, because such a view “solidifies a social reality of a group founded on isolation and its cultural development”, while in reality all societies/nations/ cultures maintain constant, more or less intensive relations with their surroundings.

To a great extent statistically, Smith’s approach inadequately takes account of one of the crucial dimensions of identity, its relational nature, the relation with the other. The meaning of affiliation is always defined by its relation with non-members and perceived differences. Furthermore, the importance of the deliberation of historical nature and changeability of national identifications is underestimated. The abovementioned components of national identity cannot be accepted as entities *sui generis*, as they are the ones that are constituted/constructed in relation to the others and in a certain sociocultural, historical context.⁷⁹ By determining the central paradox of an ethnicity as coexistence of me and permanence and seeing national identity as constantly varying individual expression within certain social and cultural parameters which limit the perspective and cultural content of a given community. and via which the heritage of tradition is

⁷⁶ Žunić, D. (1999) Nacionalizam i književnost: srpska književnost od 1985 do 1995 (*Nationalism and Literature: Serbian Literature from 1985 to 1995*), Beograd: Open Society Institute (available at: <http://rss.archives.ceu.hu/archive/00001127/01/133.pdf>), p. 12.

⁷⁷Smit, A. (1998) *Nacionalni identitet (National identity)*, op. cit., pp. 39- 41.

⁷⁸Ibidem, pp. 29-30.

⁷⁹ Radenović, S. (2006) “Nacionalni identitet, etnicitet, (kritička) kultura sećanja (National Identity, Ethnicity, (critical) Culture of Memory).” *Filozofija i društvo*, 3(2): 226.

transferred transgenerationally, Smith still respects to some extent the dynamic nature of national identity. Linking ethnic and national identity by a common cultural configuration directs us to study of mutually connected processes that make a twofold spiral of ethnic identities: “on the one hand the emergence of the essentialisation of the features which leads a group to imagine itself as a social species, while on the other creating flexible social boundaries that induce the same social groups to expand or divide”.⁸⁰

Instrumentalist proposition of national identity reduces culture to an inert possibility, a resource from which a social group/party/government on its own choosing draws its emblems⁸¹ leaving aside emotions, norms and values that are transferred transgenerationally via language and processes of socialisation and to a large extent adopted unconsciously. On such a proposition are based reductive research approaches that referral to identity or culture perceive exclusively through reduction to identity strategies or political goals.⁸² Identity policies are constructed by interested political agents to serve accessing the power, in other words the elites staying in power, and due to competitive relationship they often lead to political instability and even an armed conflict. What is controversial here is equating of a negative extreme of manifestation and misuse of a phenomenon with phenomenon itself. According to Bayart, the affirmation of some cultural identity is always in itself a potential source of a conflict, even of totalitarianism. A certain culture imagined as authentic is defined as an opposite to neighbouring cultures, which are seen as radically diverse; that assumption of non-being-identical is according to the author equal to the principle of exclusiveness, whose logical conclusion is a campaign of ethnic cleansing. Intercultural exchange is perceived as a threat to authenticity of cultural identity to which it refers.

Establishment of links between culture and (national/ethnic) identity does not necessarily have to mean the adoption of a concept of total and unconditional cultural homogenisation and cultural identity as a petrified set of cultural characteristics; it is because the homogeneity of culture in relation to each of its basic characteristics always represents merely a frame within which a spectrum of diverse nuances that match individual variances of norms and cultural patterns realisation. Inseparable from the notion of cultural community, cultural identity, still,

⁸⁰ Formozo, B. (2009) “Rasprave o etnicitetu (Discussions about Ethnicity).” in Halpern, K. and Ruano-Borbalan, Ž. K. (eds) *Identitet(i): pojedinci, grupa, društvo (Identity/Identities: Individual, Group, Society)*, Beograd: Clío, pp. 307.

⁸¹ Ibidem, p. 300.

⁸² Ruano-Borbalan, Ž. K. (2009) “Identitet, resurs za akciju (Identity, a Resource for Action).” in Halpern, K. and Ruano-Borbalan, Ž. K. (eds) *Identitet(i): pojedinci, grupa, društvo (Identity/Identities: Individual, Group, Society)*, Beograd: Clío. p. 424.

represents the source of danger of equating cultural community with ethnic and religious ones, in which case – as exemplified through experiences – cultural pluralism translates into ethnic and religious which inevitably gains political dimension and leads to conflicts.⁸³ The creation and strengthening of cultural identities, when subjected to political processes, particularly struggle for power, relies on existent traditions, most often a religious one. Numerous contemporary interethnic conflicts rest on radicalisation of the identity, accompanied with instrumentalisation of religious, ethnic and other traditions.⁸⁴

The term identity joined with the term culture has achieved a contemporary scientific and media success. As Jean-Claude Ruano-Borbolan points out, this success emanates from the fact that a concept of cultural identity has enabled us to ridicule anthropologists old racial theory, which subjugated colonised peoples to an unlimited domination.⁸⁵ Contemporary usage of the term of identity coupled with the term of culture is, however, at the least ambiguous, and for some authors even problematic. In the context of defending the rights of the oppressed, minorities, as stated by Borbolan, this concept “serves at the same time to immortalise differentialism that is not far from the idea of race and can support all nationalisms, xenophobisms and ethnocentrism”.⁸⁶ Despite the fact that the notion of cultural identity can converge on the ideas of intercultural dialogue, there remains a negative meaning potential that is associated with the extremes of understanding the unity of a national culture, and with it a controversy in interpretation.

Not rarely in literature do we encounter contrary theses on the growth of a nation on the foundation of a particular, already present ethnic reality, in other words theses that refute the establishment of any kind of continuity between nations and pre-modern forms of association. The fact is, however, that ethnic reality can symbolically and mythologically contribute to the feeling of ethno-national continuity that does not have to represent a real continuity at that.⁸⁷ As Smith underlines, a creation of a coherent mythology and symbolism of a historical and cultural community from available cultural components poses as an important condition for the existence

⁸³ Žunić, D. (1999) Nacionalizam i književnost: srpska književnost od 1985 do 1995 (*Nationalism and Literature: Serbian Literature from 1985 to 1995*), op. cit., p. 16.

⁸⁴ Ruano-Borbalan, Ž. K. (2009) “Identitet, resurs za akciju (Identity, a Resource for Action).” op. cit., p. 326.

⁸⁵ Ibidem, pp. 423-424.

⁸⁶ Ibidem, p. 424.

⁸⁷ Žunić, D. (1999) Nacionalizam i književnost: srpska književnost od 1985 do 1995 (*Nationalism and Literature: Serbian Literature from 1985 to 1995*), op. cit., p. 9.

of a nation, no matter how clear or constructed ethnic ties were.⁸⁸ It is basically one of the crucial reasons for the mere notion of ethnic identity to acquire negative meaning, particularly when it is equated to cultural or religious identity, which is understandable to a degree if we bear in mind numerous examples from the recent history that speak of to what extent those equations have been politically manipulated.

Orientation towards the past, the so-called “culture of remembrance” is considered to be a characteristic of an ethnicity which specifically distinguishes it from the other categories of a collective identity. It is about the past that is being memorised, transmitted and interpreted in a selective manner through which certain individuals and events develop into significant symbols of ethnicity. Culture of remembrance is comprised of common myths and historical memory, as well as ways/mechanisms of their social transfer/transmission, i.e. inventing, processing, maintaining, suppressing, forgetting and remodelling the past; it is a sum of individual and collective constructions/images of the past that participate in the interpretation of the present and creation of a vision of the future. Opposite to the collective memory, which is dynamically and reconstructively similar to a mosaic of chosen topics, as needs it fulfills are changeable, critical culture of memory is not restricted to distinction of symbolical structures within selective analysis of the past, but always takes into account interest, ideological, political and personal determinedness of the process. What is vital is why and how we remember, in other words how the past is interpreted; therefore, along with material remnants of the past, symbols and meanings, also ideologies, myths, prejudices and stereotypes present in their current usage, are taken into consideration.⁸⁹ Culture of remembrance stands as a part of a cultural apparatus that creates meaning, through expressing the past it shapes conceptions of the present and plays an important role in the self-introspection of individuals and groups.

The significance of the critical approach to culture of remembrance is underlined by the fact that it is a permanent factor in interethnic tensions. Along with unequal and uneven forces of cultural representations that partake in the struggle for political and social authority, it is none other but the unequal distribution of ethno history that is one of the more prominent causes of interethnic tensions and conflicts. Ethnohistory, in other words, can be a vital source of cultural power and focal point of cultural politicisation if it is characterised by wealth and authenticity.

⁸⁸ Smit, A. (1998) *Nacionalni identitet (National identity)*, op. cit., p. 71.

⁸⁹ Radenović, S. (2006) “Nacionalni identitet, etnicitet, (kritička) kultura sećanja (National Identity, Ethnicity, (critical) Culture of Memory).” op. cit., p. 233.

Communities of such histories possess a competitive advantage over the ones where those are scarce or “dubious”. The lack of continuous, long and rich ethnohistory is quite often compensated by “cultural wars” in which science (philology, anthropology and archeology) is engaged into establishment of vague genealogies, rooting of populations in the domestic grounds, documenting their peculiar traits, and annexation of past civilisations.⁹⁰

One of the products of “cultural wars”, a phenomenon called “strategic syncretism“, lies exactly in the procedure through which self-definition is performed in relation to the other via borrowing from that other its most valuable and effective cultural characteristics.⁹¹ Widely spread processes of vernacular mobilisation and cultural politicisation draw their strength from cultural competition of nations/ethnic communities. Keeping that in mind, along with the experiences of the recent wars in our region, we can notice the perceptiveness of Smith’s forecast according to which “in view of the number of ethnic communities and categories that can be mobilised via reenactment of even indistinct ethno histories, the probability of ending cultural wars of ethnic or nations and suppressing nationalism, is ever so slight”.⁹² The fact that even today in many regions of the world national and ethnic identities act as instruments for seizing the power possibly due to their manipulability which partly stem from great emotional legitimacy that they relish, while partly is founded on the systems of political socialisation which along with essential values of the liberal democracy also instil into citizens from a precocious age loyalty to the nation/homeland as a value. The character of this loyalty mainly depends on political culture narrative of the society in question, i.e. whether it inclines to authoritarian or democratic model.

Political socialisation encompasses a totality of all processes through which prevalent political norms of political culture of the society in question are acquired, retained and alternated. Political culture which is passed from one generation to the next, is being transformed in concordance with the change in socio-political conditions provides axiological coherence for the systems of national identification via symbolical systems of culture. Permeation of instrumentality and autotelic in the functioning of a symbolical culture in this sense is evident in principles, rules, hierarchy of values which in the history of culture supplied religious, philosophical and ideological concepts, determining one principal and superior scale; and in its

⁹⁰ Smit, A. (1998) *Nacionalni identitet (National identity)*, op. cit., pp. 352-354.

⁹¹ Bajar, Ž. F. (2009) “Imaginarno u identitetskoj afirmaciji (Imaginary in an Identity Affirmation).” op. cit., pp. 387-388.

⁹² Smit, A. (1998) *Nacionalni identitet (National identity)*, op. cit., pp. 352-354.

content, the so-called ideological homeland, as Osowski dubbed the totality of attitudes of group/national community members and their correlates to common fund of spatial, artistic, intellectual, ideological and religious symbols that are seen as a product and heritage. Internalisation of these values “is correlated to the conviction of their special relationship with their own group, its historical fate, character, and way of acting”.⁹³

Ethno-political entities as a recent creation stand as, according to Bayart, “a product of engineering for the creation of the identity”.⁹⁴ They show that religious, language, ethnic differences, but also solidarity, exist in a strong form only when they are used for political goals. In fact, the importance that these differences assume is intensified in times of instability, social and political changes, in other words, when the other is needed as enemy so that in an atmosphere of jeopardy the support of the members of a community could be easier won. With that aim is activated ethnic identity which determines symbolical construction of a cultural difference and dichotomisation of the others as strangers and which as an authentic group identity performs its “natural” functions until it becomes a basis for politics and ideologies and transforms into ethnonationalism; then it “mutates” into a powerful weapon of political mobilisation, which uses ethnic categories as point of reference for a political identity.

On the one hand, history has confirmed that the production of otherness is a multitude of times well-tried and proven means of identity construction. In produced conditions of jeopardy the other is equated to an enemy, it becomes a catalyst of identity, as dichotomies to the other gain primacy in self-determination.⁹⁵ On the other hand, the modern age brought ambivalence, heterogeneity, multiplicity and openness of perspectives, and identities have become changeable, pluralistic, historical, contextual and dynamic. Whatever approach to the manipulability of national identification we take, it is always upon citizens to have a final choice in understanding/accepting or not the political enterprise of their government as national interest. Every political elite will aspire to create and spread the conceptions of national identity that are in concordance with their political goals. If it comes to the identification of the given political agenda and national interest, demanded obedience does not seem any more as a mere subjugation

⁹³ Kloskowska, A. (2005) *Sociologija kulture (Sociology of Culture)*, Beograd: Čigoja štampa, pp. 353-355.

⁹⁴ Ruano-Borbalan, Ž. K. (2009) “Kultura, vrednosti, sve postmoderne (Culture, values, all kinds of postmodern)?” in Halpern, K. and Ruano-Borbalan, Ž. K. (eds) *Identitet(i): pojedinci, grupa, društvo (Identity/Identities: Individual, Group, Society)*, Beograd: Clio, pp. 326.

⁹⁵ Đurić, J. (2008) “Identitet i interkulturalnost- Srbija kao mesto prožimanja Balkana i (Srednje) Evrope [Identity and Interculturality- Serbia as a Place of Permeation among Balkans and (Central) Europe].” *Filozofija i društvo*, 19(3): 223.

to the interests of the government. Such a view is to an extent still an instrumentalist reduction which construction of collective identities scales down to political goals and strategies without dealing with either social interactions on which their implementation depends, or neutralising effect of the opposite powers which can even lead to the contrary effect.

In public sphere, as a sphere of openness where there is a constant struggle of different discourses for prestige in delineating of social reality and its phenomena and, even, various identities that find their affirmation in it, manipulative patterns of national identification enter competitive relations (more or less equal depending on achieved democratic quality of the public domain) with other patterns. Contemporary understanding of the identity respects its hardly dissectible multidimensionality, its dynamic, relational character and correlation of identity and culture, i.e. identity and discourse. The category of identity marks in contemporary interpretation what is not singular but multiplies and transforms itself during its life, and is a product of various antagonistic discourses, practices and positions that often intersect one another. The advance towards discursive construction of identity strengthened the cultural paradigm interested in the problems of identity erosion produced by the new processes of globalisation.⁹⁶ Cultural paradigm topicalises issues of discursive political constructions of ethnic, national, cultural identities, where it interprets the identity as a space for resistance. Being viewed as an effect of a discourse, identity becomes decentralised, unstable, discontinuous and capable of transformation or metamorphosis, as its construction, based on certain strategies just temporarily stabilises cultural categories.

The disappearance of traditional cultural identities deprives individuals of cultural boundaries they are used to, but that still does not mean that breaking the cycle of long-lasting cultural cycles, whose role is to match the significance/meaning of the present to the past and the future of identities, leads to reduction of collective identities to functions in the technology of governance. Identities are not monolithic and static but comprised of multiple interlinked, intertwined or overlapping layers, which, although potentially given, can be altered, abandoned and lost, imposed and taken away and again (re)constructed.⁹⁷

⁹⁶ Đorđević, J. (2009) *Postkultura: uvod u studije kulture (Postculture: An Introduction to the Study of Culture)*, op. cit., p. 355.

⁹⁷ , J. (2008) "Identitet i interkulturalnost- Srbija kao mesto prožimanja Balkana i (Srednje) Evrope [Identity and Interculturality- Serbia as a Place of Permeation among Balkans and (Central) Europe]." op. cit., p. 229.

Stuart Hall isolates three possible methods of defense from homogenising globalisation which he sees as anticipation of a great crisis of identity, in other words significant element in creation of fragmented identities.⁹⁸ The first is reaffirmation of national identity, the second insisting on ethnic independence, while the third is creation of new, decentralised identities, and which is according to the author the only one adequate for contemporaneity. Without refuting the fact that national and ethnic identifications are what people internalise in a such way that they experience discourse as essences, the natural order of things, Hall identifies them as temporary because identification poses as a never completed process, determined thus that it can never be conquered or lost, supported or terminated, realising itself on the basis of a fantasy of appropriation. Hence identities always merely temporarily conquered, a consequence of some form of articulation, as noncompulsory connections among discursive concepts which only temporarily are linked by connotative or evocative ties and that on the basis of the action of power and power of tradition. Identities that seem to us intact and eternal are actually historically specific temporary stabilisation or arbitrary closeness of the meanings.

National identity is on the one hand socially programmed through mechanisms of socialisation and dominant patterns of identification and cultural values woven into leading discourses in the public sphere; on the other hand, as it is individually-psychologically realised, national identity is also a part of an individual identity formula within which, in compliance with personal choices of an individual, can be stronger or weaker, or even absent. Furthermore, in compliance with their own cultural preferences, individuals adopt elements of their national culture and determines the extent at which they are going to be determinative for their cultural identity. With all these conditionalities, culture still is primary frame/context for individual choices, which poses as one of the fundamental argumentations in the protection of minority identities in multiethnic states, primarily as a protection of the rights of minority groups to maintain their own culture. The idea that the construction of differences, as foundations of self-identification of a collective/ethnic group/nation, unstable product susceptible to modelling is acceptable only to the extent that it respects complexity of cultural mechanisms and processes of demarcation that lie in the basis of the development of distinctive features; as these mechanisms and processes define the character of a specific continuity in national identifications, through

⁹⁸ According to Đorđević, J. (2009) *Postkultura: uvod u studije kulture (Postculture: An Introduction to the Study of Culture)*, op. cit., pp. 362-363.

establishment of symbolical-axiological structures, a form of permanency within the dynamic of changes immanent to society and culture in general.

The poststructuralist contribution to discourse analysis does not rely on the complete acceptance of the idealist perspective, it definitely contains the promotion of the materialist nature of any discourse structure as well.⁹⁹ In contrast to rationalists and conventional constructivists, focused on scrutinizing the explanatory potential of ideational factors (such as ideas, ideal, identity or culture) as opposed to material factors, poststructuralists attach importance both to ideas and matter as inseparable elements of a single whole. *Ergo*, the poststructuralist notion of discourse implies interest in material facts in terms of analysing their production and priority. Discourse takes into account social conditions in which a text is produced and interpreted through three dimensions:¹⁰⁰ (1) situational- defining the immediate social setting in which discourse takes place; (2) institutional- forming a broader frame for discourse; and (3) social- implying the totality of a given society as an organisational entity. Consistently, the methodological objective is the understanding of relations between the text, of the way in which it is produced and of social conditions in which it is conceived, promulgated and understood.

⁹⁹ Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C. (1985) *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*, London: Verso, pp. 108-109.

¹⁰⁰ Renwick, N. and Cao, Q. (1999) "China's Political Discourse Towards the 21st Century: Victimhood, Identity, and Political Power." *East Asia: An International Quarterly*, 17(4): 116-120.

4. Material production or social construction of the enemy: the realist paradigm *versus* the constructivist paradigm

To a greater or lesser degree, the conceptual position of ideas in the theoretical observation of international relations still poses as a space for persistent and comprehensive academic debates between rationalists (realists, neo-realists and neo-liberal institutionalists) and proponents of the interpretative methodological school of thought (poststructuralists, postmodernists, feminists and Frankfurt school critical theory's followers). Political realism, "power politics" (*Realpolitik*), therefore, poses as the oldest and most often applied theoretical thinking on international relations, which could be historically traced back as far as Thucydides in 5th century B.C. At the most general level,¹⁰¹ political realism cannot be reduced to some comprehensive and all-encompassing, centrally positioned theory, but only defined through sets of common source (first) principles and underlying assumptions from which its various theoretical variants emanate. However, it is not the matter of having a particular and explicit complex of assumptions and propositions, but of the wholeness of that original alignment of principles, alignment compounded of "axiomatic premises" and reformed by the dynamics of changeable "normative cross-section".

Ergo, it is evident the necessity to differentiate certain borderline characteristics of realism, perceived as a theoretical paradigm (a perspective, orientation or philosophical disposition), from what is going to be any of its constitutive individual assumptions. Political realism, thus, is not fixated or petrified, it is immanent in the process of constant rethinking and reformulation towards better explanations and more precise forecasts, refining and clarification of theoretical concepts which underlie its research programmes, as well as their broadening towards untreated problem areas.¹⁰² Nonetheless, political realism is more than a scientifically based research programme, it is also a political philosophy and worldview.

To begin with, I shall mention several most representative general postulates of realism. Thus, relying on Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527) and his book *The Prince*, according to Edward

¹⁰¹ See Schweller, R. (1997) "New Realist Research on Alliance: Refining, Not Refuting, Waltz's Balancing Proposition." *American Political Science Review*, 91(4): 927-930. and Vasquez, J. (1997) "The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative versus Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition." *American Political Science Review*, 91(4): 899-912.

¹⁰² Schweller, R. "New Realist Research on Alliance: Refining, Not Refuting, Waltz's Balancing Proposition." *op. cit.*, pp. 927.

Carr, realistic philosophy has three conceptual foundation stones:¹⁰³ (1) history is a sequence of causes and consequences, intellectually comprehensible and analysable, but not prone to manipulation by “imagination” (utopian standpoint); (2) theory does not create practice, but practice theory; (3) politics is not in the function of ethics, but the reverse. For Hans Morgenthau, still, realism stands for:¹⁰⁴ (1) politics that is manifested in objective laws based on the human nature; (2) the concept of interests which is determined in the sense of power; (3) changeability of the power and interests contents; (4) inapplicability of moral principles to the functioning of the states; (5) refusal to identify moral intentions connected with an individual state as a universal moral law; and (6) autonomy of the political domain. According to Kenneth Waltz, the elements of realism are the following:¹⁰⁵ (1) state interests that represent initial mechanism of state action; (2) needs associated with politics connected with lack of regulation of competition among states; (3) calculations based on these particular needs that may result in policies adjusted to state interests; and (4) success of thus defined policies which is manifested in the preservation and strength of the state.

For Robert Gilpin, realism rests on:¹⁰⁶ (1) “conflict groups” as basic units of social and political activity (current primary “conflict group” is a national state, which superseded by succeeding to achieve a higher level of efficiency in the organisation of the military power, regulation of economic relations and provision of security); (2) national, i.e. group interest as the focal point of state motivation, that can be economic, ethnic or territorial in nature (shifting national interest is dictated by currently governing elites and objective components, such as economic facts or geographical position); (3) power and to it and from it ensuing relations present an essential characteristic of international affairs sphere (it is the broadening of the definition of the power that excludes “pure” moral exigencies and deliberate persuasion as powerful motives in a political life- moral functions best on the level of a particular group, not among groups, and implies three forms of power- economic, military and psychological).

¹⁰³ Carr, E. (1946) *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*. London: Macmillan, pp. 63-64.

¹⁰⁴ Morgenthau, H. (1954) *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. 2nd edn. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, pp. 4-10.

¹⁰⁵ Waltz, K. (1979) *Theory of International Politics*. New York: Random House, pp. 117.

¹⁰⁶ Gilpin, R. (1996) “No one loves a political realist.” *Security Studies*, 5(3): 7-8.

According to Randall Schweller, there are seven basic assumptions relevant to realistic school of thought:¹⁰⁷ (1) the basic scheme of human to human relationship is not conceived as individual relation but is of a collective nature, people treat one another as members of groups that determine and control their loyalty; (2) international affairs take place in an anarchical environment; (3) power is essential quality of the international politics, it is absolutely requisite for the realisation of national goals, whether these are ruling the world or aspiring to bare survival, there is no clear line between the will for power and apparently reduced strategy, the will for life; (4) the intrinsic nature of international interactions is conflicting, a world without struggle would be a world in which the life as we know it, would cease to exist; (5) humankind is not able to overcome conflicts through positive power of reason to devise a sort of scientific pacifism; (6) politics is a product of ethics, morality is the effect of power; (7) state exigencies, needs and reasons always prevail over ethical and moral values.

For John Mearsheimer, realism, again, rests on five assumptions related to the international system:¹⁰⁸ (1) the international system is archaic (which, let us repeat, does not mean a state of chaos, but manifests organising principle that indicates that the independent political units, states, have no central government superior to them, sovereignty is inherent to the state, there is no “governing government”; (2) states inevitably possess certain offensive military capacities, which enables them to inflict damage or destruction on one another – states are to one another a potential source of danger; (3) states can never be absolutely sure of other states’ intentions, i.e. a possibility of their offensive military capacities’ engagement cannot be completely dismissed; (4) survival is a primary motive that governs states, which tend to perpetuate their sovereignty; (5) states deliberate strategically on their survival, they are instrumentally rational.

Let us now draw a principal distinction between “classical” or traditional and structural or new realism. While “classical” realism equally champions anarchism and egoism, structural realism endeavours to abstract all qualities of the state other than its capacities of registering and determining the impact of anarchy, that relational distribution of capability. More or less as a

¹⁰⁷ Schweller, R. (1997) “New Realist Research on Alliance: Refining, Not Refuting, Waltz’s Balancing Proposition.” *American Political Science Review*, 91(4): 927.

¹⁰⁸ Mearsheimer, J. (1994-1995) “The False Promise of International Institutions.” *International Security*, 19(3): 10.

crucial differences between these two types the following can be identified:¹⁰⁹ (1) the existence of philosophical skirmishes about disciplines which serve as a basis of the theory of realism (traditional variant is predominantly tied to sociology and history, while neorealism mainly relies on microeconomics); (2) traditional realism treats power as a goal in itself (states can tend towards increase of both power and security), while neorealism sees security as the highest state goal; (3) traditional realists claim that power and interests of the state dictate the behaviour, while neorealists see anarchy and distribution of capabilities as important; (4) traditional realism, as a theory of foreign policy, is focused on the relative distribution of capabilities between certain states or their coalitions, while neorealism, as a theory of the international policy or international relations, is oriented towards distribution of capabilities on the level of the integrity of the system or polarity of it; (5) followers of the classical realism claim that international system is composed of units, interactions and structure, interaction gives rise to process variables such as institutions, norms and rules, while proponents of neorealism cannot treat process variables as system attributes.

Keeping the above in mind, according to Kenneth Waltz, thus for neorealist proposition, the organisation of the international system is related to the postulated principle of sovereign equality of its elements or units and from it resulting general attributes of system decentralisation and anarchism. Since it can be established there is some form of superior government authorised to govern the elements of the international system, these confront one another through relations of coordination.¹¹⁰ Anarchism permanence arouses the issue of the functional nature of units. Unlike hierarchical internal political system, where its segments are differentiated through function they perform, anarchic international system is comprised of units functionally similar to one another, since anarchism itself enforces certain rules that favour units which behave in a similar way. Neorealism is characterised by states which are ranked or positioned solely in relation to their power, only material capabilities generate the position of a unit in a given international structure.

If we approach this distinction from an intense critical perspective of poststructuralist discourse of Richard Ashley, the difference between classical realism and neorealism can be

¹⁰⁹ Schweller, R. and Priess, D.(1997) "A Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding the Institutions Debate." *Mershon International Studies Review*, 41(1): 7.

¹¹⁰ Waltz, K. (1986) "Political Structures." y Keohane, R. (yp.) *Neorealism and Its Critics*, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 81.

interpreted on several different levels.¹¹¹ On a methodological level, the first variant of realism is based on an intuitive approach, all the while remaining in a close relationship with a current statesmanship practice, while the latter one endeavours to objectify political life, with the intention of gaining a status of a social science for the international relations. If we allow for such a critical constellation, it comes into view that neorealism has neglected what is within classical realism treated as a focal conceptual point – the relevance of diplomatic practice. Furthermore, proponents of the classical realism are not particularly interested in economic subject matters, while neorealists are preoccupied with them. They are also proponents of statism or state-centrism, where such theoretical position, in fact, denotes more a belief in eternity, incessantness or metadimensionality of a state-centric world, and less an inclination towards a state capable of resulting in some form of etatism, i.e. totalitarianism.

Classical realism opens room for international implications or changes derived from subjective attitudes of statesmen, while neorealism rests on the conviction that objective structures, such as position a state occupies in the international state hierarchy or physical characteristics of the states that constitute the international system, determine the functioning or behaviour of statesmen. Moreover, neorealism can be quite radically criticised for assuming transhistorical truth, objectivism and value-neutral technical intellect as elements which profile limits and kind of action. In concordance with such theoretical qualificative, realism is, to put it mildly, gained reputation of an amoral, or, if you wish, even immoral doctrine, the one that does not question the supremacy of the state uninhibited by any fundamental ethical considerations. Truth be told, neorealism states the existence of national interest as a landmark of state action, which definitely implies some sort of state engagement that is not strictly connected/adherent to particular and selfish interests of the ruling class. The point is that ethical and political activity cannot be performed unless state practice and relative theory are equally appreciated, which might suggest distinction of realism from idealism and abstract theorising.

The main critical nexus of inadequacy and incorrectness of realistic (particularly neorealistic) orientation can be grouped around following subject matters:¹¹² (1) domestic politics must be appreciated to the utmost, since structural conditions, as well as power conditions, are

¹¹¹ See Ashley R. (1986) “The Poverty of Neorealism.” in Keohane, R. (ed.) *Neorealism and Its Critics*. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 255-301.

¹¹² Vasquez, J (1999) *The Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 377-382.

insufficient to define activity in the sphere of foreign policy; (2) systemic level of analysis should be supplemented by engagement on other levels, particularly formulating of the foreign policy theory; (3) insufficient determination of realistic predictions; (4) model of preoccupation with actions related to the balance of power is neither an adequate answer to the anarchism of the international system, nor does it occur in conditions in which it should be expected nor bears consequences that can be absolutely and always anticipated; and (5) the existence of isolated areas of peace whose presence is not included by the realistic paradigm, and which is associated with democratic-liberal states.

The starting premise of Schmitt's definition of the political and the friend-enemy distinction represents the notion that all relevant conceptual observations of human life *in genere* are based on dual antithetical categories (e.g., ethics in the distinction between good and evil, aesthetics in the distinction between beautiful and ugly, economics in the distinction between lucrative and unlucrative). In this context, Schmitt's perception of the political is derived from the fundamental (profound) friend-enemy distinction.¹¹³ Man has an inherent need for political identity that can be achieved solely through the identification of some otherness as the enemy of one's own self. *Ergo*, the peak point of politics (and not of the political) is materialized in the act of recognising the enemy as the enemy.¹¹⁴ Since the political environment contains a variety of states, religions, classes and other forms of collective human association, group differences arise from an area that is, as Schmitt says, "pluriverse" and not universal.¹¹⁵ The groups' conflict potential and intergroup antagonisms are both inevitable as well as perpetuated (continuous): even when a political entity annuls or neutralises the enemy, the inevitable recidivist recognition of a new existential, disparate enmity occurs.

Such a conjunction is less intended at any final distinction between people, which causes the designation of the other as the enemy, and more at people's gravitating towards reproducing the "ominous" hostility (that is, the "ominous" enemy) over and over again. It is understood that the whole thesis is dependent upon the assumption that mankind has a "genotypic" need to create political groups that are recognized as such only through polarity towards their political enemies. Survival in the international system implies the preservation of political identity, which entails the elimination of the possibility for a collective to reach the level of general inter-collective

¹¹³ Schmitt, C. (1996) *The Concept of the Political*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 25-27.

¹¹⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 67.

¹¹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 53.

friendship; finding a political enemy for its own political identity is postulated because it represents its *conditio sine qua non*.

According to Schmitt, the friend-enemy formation must be understood in its existential and concretized, “objective” or “substantive” sense, it is inherent reality, not an abstraction or a normative ideal, the relationship between the friend-enemy opposite cannot be treated as “imaginative-metaphorical”.¹¹⁶ An enemy is something different and alien, and in extreme culminated (intensified), conflict (collision) with him is a “more than likely” option.¹¹⁷ Simultaneously, human diversity is embodied in civilization rife with potential conflict hotspots. The political is always associated with war, the friend-enemy relation obtains its true meaning in reference to the possibility of killing, physical elimination. For all that, the political is not to be confused with war or even with its glorification, its possibility is what defines the space of the political.¹¹⁸ In the context of the state, the friend-enemy is manifested ambivalently. On the one hand, such a concept of the political supports the state, because it is the state that identifies specific decisions determining the sovereignty and basic political unity of the collective. On the other hand, the idea of the state presupposes the idea of the political, while the inverse presupposition is not necessary: other entities (nation, church, trade union or any other social group) can replace the state as a political entity.¹¹⁹

It appears that the concept of the political, based on the antithetical friend-enemy binomial, incorporates the existential decision about friends and enemies that constitutes the collective identity, associations, or communities, while the ethical is only subsequently derived from identity so formulated. The reality, “objective content” in the understanding of a collective’s self-identity is also reflected in the fact that it arises from the actual components, from “homogenizing substance”, the physical and ethical similarity manifested through the common: race, convictions, fate, language, tradition and religion.¹²⁰ However, Schmitt does not relinquish the infinitesimal, “ontic” political quest to find the enemy. Identity is established negatively by means of defining the enemy: who we are depends on who our enemies are. The open possibility that friends may become enemies suggests that identity is fluid and redefineable. The criteria on which collectivities base their own identities change over time, myriad transformations, development

¹¹⁶ Ibidem, pp. 27-28, 33, 67-68.

¹¹⁷ Ibidem, p. 27.

¹¹⁸ Ibidem, p. 34.

¹¹⁹ Ibidem, p. 37.

¹²⁰ Schmitt, C. (2008) *Constitutional Theory*, Durham: Duke University Press, pp. 258-260, 264-265.

and revolutionary leaps inherent in human history result in new forms and dimensions of political assembling.¹²¹ Political assembling can arise from religious, moral, ethical or other domains, as long as the underlying primordial, proto-oppositeness is sufficiently intense to produce the possibility of physical violence.¹²² Yet, there is no political activity that can be consistently specified: any conflict, whether ethical, religious or economic, can enter the sphere of the political if its intensity is sufficient to transform difference into hostility.

Schmitt differentiates private from public (political) enemies, invoking the terminological distinction that was diachronically marked back in Old Greek and Latin (*echthros* and *polemios*, that is, *inimicus* and *hostis*). According to him, only public enemies (not individuals) are enemies, only groups can be enemies, because hostility exists only when one collective, even potentially, enters into confrontation with a similar collective (this particularly refers to nations). For Schmitt's argumentation, the pivotal criterion of the friend-enemy division (content of identity), is of no consequence, the political choice of friend or enemy is entirely arbitrary, not justified or based on reasons and it manifests an absolute decision created out of nothingness.¹²³ What counts is the form of identity, that is, regardless of its own self-determination, people always shows the will to determine its political existence through the friend-enemy dichotomy.¹²⁴ Let us add to this a few facts that will be important for the end of this segment of the paper, when a framework for the conceptual construction of the enemy will be proposed. It can, therefore, be said that a private enemy is, in terms of content, is distinctly characterised by emotionality, especially hatred, whereas the stance toward an enemy with a public status can include components of emotional empathy, but it definitely isn't defined by sentiments ("affectivity"). Thus, for ancient Greeks, the maxim "help a friend, harm an enemy" represented the first principle of social interactivity; in the Hellenic world the moral good and pleasure in inflicting damage to the enemy is a very influential ethical variable.¹²⁵ In his *Rhetoric*, Aristotle says that good is the opposite of evil, as well as the opposite of what is useful to an enemy (being courageous is good, because being fearful is useful to the enemy), adding that in some extraordinary situations the same thing can be

¹²¹ Schmitt, C. (1996) *The Concept of the Political*, op. cit., p. 47.

¹²² Ibidem, p. 37.

¹²³ Schmitt, C. (2005) *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 66.

¹²⁴ Schmitt, C. (1996) *The Concept of the Political*, op. cit., p. 28.

¹²⁵ See: Blundell, M. W. (1991) *Helping Friends and Harming Enemies: A Study in Sophocles and Greek Ethics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991.

useful to the two opposite sides (accidents bring people closer if faced with the shared danger).¹²⁶ Although Socrates disputes Polemarchus' idea that justice is a craft that benefits or harms both friends and enemies,¹²⁷ for it is not the proper function of a just man to harm anyone at all¹²⁸, the question of hostility in the public functioning of the polis occupies an important position in the structuring of Plato's ideal state.

Understanding the distinction between private and public enemies in Schmitt's work implies a differentiation of a respectable or normal enemy from the absolute variety that is an intimidating or criminalised enemy. Departing from the Schmittean theoretical vocabulary setup, normal enemies can be said to "play by the rules", their non-radicality ("conventionality") concerning the very foundations of the system being undisputable. By contrast, the absolute enemy represents a radical challenge to "ontic" foundations of the community on the meta-level (not only as a physical threat, but also in terms of threats to the social imaginary, the space of references through which the actors valorize their own activities and those of others).¹²⁹ In other words, to return to "orthodox" Schmittean theoretical flows, a respectable (normal) enemy is that with whom, regardless of the fight, peace can be made, whereas the absolute enemy is that who needs to be destroyed (eliminated) or punished and humiliated.¹³⁰ According to Schmitt, since 17th century, wars have been rated, by contrast to the medieval theological doctrine of the just war, by their outcome rather than intentions; the war has become a legal means of changing a system of ownership, and thus, humanisation, rationalisation and legalisation of warfare were carried out.¹³¹

By contrast, the modern understanding of war incorporates the separation of a just from an unjust war, the notion that makes an offender out of an enemy, an enemy who is no longer treated as a legally defined enemy (*iustus hostis*) but as a criminal, and is referred to by Schmitt as a quasi-theological concept of war.¹³² Unlike the more acute forms of hostility and violence culminated in some form of ideological fanaticism, realistic interpretation of the friend-enemy

¹²⁶ Aristotel (1987) *Retorika (Rhetoric)*, Belgrade: Nezavisna izdanja 40, 1362b-1363a, pp. 38-39.

¹²⁷ Platon (1983) *Država (The Republic)*, Belgrade: Beogradski grafičko-izdavački zavod, 332d, p. 8.

¹²⁸ Ibidem, 335d, p. 13.

¹²⁹ Buck-Morss, S. (2000) *Dreamworld and Catastrophe: The Passing of Mass Utopia in East and West*, Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 12-13, 145.

¹³⁰ Schwab, G. (1996) "Introduction." in Schmitt, C. (1996) *The Concept of the Political*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 9-11.

¹³¹ Schmitt, C. (2003) *The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum*, New York: Telos Press, p. 100.

¹³² Ibidem, p. 124.

relationship conceptually proclaims a more “civilised”, “etiquette”, variant of violent behaviour towards others, a metamorphosis of the terrifying enemy into the “classic” one.¹³³ The point is that the “war in white gloves” is treated as a possible result of the conflict of interest, devoid of intense ideological attributes, and as such it can be resolved through some form of compromise manifested by the achievement of peace.

Man, according to Schmitt, represents not an evil, but a dynamic being of danger, which, due to its indeterminability, unpredictability and incomprehensibility is in the risk area.¹³⁴ The problem is greatly complicated by the modern realist premise that, even in a system where all elements are stably good-hearted and benevolent, someone who is your friend today could easily become an enemy as soon as tomorrow.¹³⁵ Schmitt does not relate political hostility to moral evil (someone who is morally evil need not be the enemy), but to the existential discrepancy between us and the enemy. His separation of the political as a distinct sphere is particularly problematic because it implies that political decisions do not have any ethical repercussions.¹³⁶ By and large, a collectivity that ignores the identification of the enemy cannot survive as a political entity. It loses its chance to react adequately in response to actual violence targeted towards it, risking to be defeated in a potential showdown with the enemy.¹³⁷ What is even worse, if an enemy is not determined, if the group loses energy, capacity or will for the act, it completely loses the chance for self-determination: its identity disappears, its political existence abated (even if it declared itself a universal friend, things would change: the antithetical pair of friend-enemy is a necessity; it does not leave the world, but weak collectives decline).¹³⁸

Constructivism, on the other hand, can be defined as a quite broadly established scientific method that encompasses in itself various schools of thought on social: Weberian interpretative sociology, symbolic interactionism, variants of Marxism, Veblenian institutionalism, poststructuralism and hermeneutics, it rests on irreducibility of the intersubjective dimension of human action.¹³⁹ Humans are cultural beings, endowed with a capacity and will to take a deliberative stand of the world and furnish it with meaning. Such a conjunction opens up space

¹³³ See Desch, M. “It is Kind to be Cruel: The Humanity of American Realism.” *Review of International Studies*, 29(3): 415-426.

¹³⁴ Schmitt, C. (1996) *The Concept of the Political.*, op. cit., pp. 60-61.

¹³⁵ Mearsheimer, J. (1999) *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, p. 31.

¹³⁶ Scheuerman, W. (1999) *Carl Schmitt: The End of Law*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 248-249.

¹³⁷ Marder, M. (2005) “Carl Schmitt and the Risk of the Political.” *Telos*, 132: 22.

¹³⁸ Schmitt, C. (1996) *The Concept of the Political.*, op. cit., pp. 45-53.

¹³⁹ Palan, R. (2000) “A world of their making: an evaluation of the constructivist critique in International Relations.” *Review of International Studies*, 26(4): 576.

for a new class of facts, social facts, those that do not exist in the physical world of material objects, but their mere existence depends on human agreement, thus requiring human institutions for their presence.¹⁴⁰ Constructivists, in fact, hold that the international relations are prevalently comprised of social facts, just as ontological realists did, because not only do they believe in the existence of the material world, but in the resistance on the occasion of taking action on it. *Ergo*, for constructivism the way in which material world profiles human action and interactions and is being shaped by it (human action and interactions) depends on the dynamics of normative and epistemic interpretation of the material world.

Various classifications or categorizations of constructivist ideas testify to their diversity and breadth.¹⁴¹ Thus we can distinguish: (1) critical and conventional constructivism; (2) modern and postmodern constructivism; or (3) modern, legal, narrative and genealogical constructivism. Apart from the need to restore order in not so negligible number of relevant differences, concentration on the differences contributes to a more comprehensive and deeper understanding of the complexity of the constructivist theorising. With a view to that, three conceptual origins, ontological dialogic circles: (1) constructivism inspired by sociological institutionalism; (2) constructivism inspired by Jurgen Habermas' theory of communicative action; (3) constructivism inspired by Michel Foucault's deliberation of knowledge and power. When we put focus on the first variance, the guiding thought is that social structure has ontological primacy; it is a starting analytical level and is guided by the logic of adequacy, constitutive power of norms over interests and behaviour, while its rules and values create all the relevant agents in the arena of the international politics. Recast in constructivist conceptual apparatus, it means that the norms constitute state identities and interests. Opposite to the Western model of the social science where an individual is treated as an unproblematic, irreducible and autonomous actor, whose aspirations are not in direct causal relation to cultural context, institutionalism axiomises the individual as a product, not a producer, of the society and culture. The norms shape national security interests, i.e. security policy, and the state identity.

The second variance is based on the logic of argumentation, i.e. on the significance of communicative action in mediation between agents and intersubjective values. The norms do not formulate identities and interests in some direct, mechanical and unproblematic way, a multitude

¹⁴⁰ Weber, M. (1949) *The methodology of the Social Science*. Glencoe: The Free Press, pp. 81.

¹⁴¹ Reus-Smith, C. (2002) "Imagining society: constructivism and the English School." *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 4(3): 493-496.

of situations are marked by bringing face to face diverse, sometimes antithetic or paradoxical, norms that may be interpreted in different ways. Opposite to the realists, who would in such a situation determine the reaction of the agent via selfish criteria of power enhancement, Habermasian constructivist movement claims that agents on the most general level participate in the process of argumentation; through collective communicative process they reach the cognition of whether their assumptions about world are correct (the sphere of theoretical discourses) or in which situations their norms of adequate behaviour are being activated and how these can be justified (the sphere of practical discourses).¹⁴² Discussion, demonstration and argumentation imply an effort of the agents to question value attributes inherent in any normative or causal statement and to aspire to normative consensus in connection with their understanding of situational context and justification of the principles and norms that govern their actions.

The third variance of the constructivism is actually extracted from Foucault's deliberation of knowledge and power. In other words, creation, production or delivery of a discourse represent a form of power, they generate and legitimise certain types of behaviour and living conditions as normal, i.e. construct certain categories that degrade, marginalise or make inconceivable certain practices and views: disciplinary, even it could be said commanding, moment is manifested in promotion of what is standard, normal and natural, and simultaneously of what is deviant, unthinkable of and to be unanimously condemned. Such thorough examination of norms and their impact on self-understanding and preferences bears severe consequences, the origin of norms and meanings in a specific era and context is discursively contingent, and not a matter of some rational evolution. Restrictivity of the norms is not only limitative behaviour factor, norms are also productive in the sense of constituting what we are, and we form our identities through implicitly grasped norms and commonly accepted practices.

Constructivism can be also classified by the engaged level of analysis. With a view to that, theoretical perspective of Alexander Wendt is of systemic nature, domestic political sphere is treated as theoretically irrelevant. He finds that the conceptual nucleus of constructivism as a structural theory could be expressed by three propositions:¹⁴³ (1) states are basic units of analysis in the international political theory; (2) key structures in a state system are rather intersubjective than material; and (3) state identities and interests are constructed by these social structures than

¹⁴² Risse, T. (2000) "Let's argue!: Communicative Action in World Politics." *International Organization*, 54(1): 7.

¹⁴³ Wendt, A. (1994) "Collective Identity Formation and the International State." *The American Political Science Review*, 88(2): 385.

exogenously given by human nature or domestic politics. Diversely to this approach, there is a constructivist movement that emphasizes relations between domestic social and legal norms and identities, interests and state actions. Finally, we can mention “holistic” constructivists, those who endeavour to put the international and domestic domains under a common analytical optics, by treating external and internal as two sides of the same social and political order.

Emphasizing that, by and large, every classification is arbitrary and registering the sociological, feminist, jurisprudential, genealogical, emancipatory and interpretive variants, while underscoring their underlying philosophical bases and their relation to the possibility or grounding of social science, John Gerard Ruggie distinguishes between three types of constructivism:¹⁴⁴ (1) neo-classical constructivism- indicates its ties with the classical tradition and implies (1.1) an epistemological affinity with pragmatism, (1.2) a set of analytical tools for making sense of intersubjective meanings and (1.3) a commitment to the idea of social science, positioned as more plural and more social than was the case in mainstream theories, with acknowledgement for the fact that its insights would be temporary and unstable; (2) postmodernist constructivism- emphasises the linguistic construction of subjects which generates a discursive practice as fundamental elements of reality and analysis, that is, a logic of interpretation marked by complete reserve to cataloging (classifying), various calculations and to specifying the “real causes”; and (3) naturalistic constructivism- stemming from the assumption that it is no longer necessary to select between the insider and outsider perception of social action or social order, not because social science emulates the natural sciences as was the case with naturalistic monoism, but because their respective ontologies are virtually identical; scientific research of the natural-material and social world is largely oriented toward examining the hidden and the non-observable, intersubjective aspects of social life mainly exist independently from the mental states of most individuals who constitute it.

Constructivist model relates choices associated with a certain type of behaviour to certain identities and interests that are not presupposed but are of process nature. Within this process, agents acquire and reproduce identities, narratives of what they are, that reversely formulate interests that are influential in matters of selection of a certain type of behaviour. Nevertheless, without denying the necessity of quantitative research and risking to become “quasi-

¹⁴⁴ Ruggie, J. G. (1998) “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge.” *International Organization*, 52(4): 880-882.

anachronous”, we succumb to the opinion that questioning of the position of ideas, norms and culture in world politics brings to the foreground interpretative methodological approach. This is directly linked to the fact that agents attach meaning to their engagement, those meanings are modelled through already existing sphere of intersubjective meanings incorporated in the language and other symbols, while the consequences of such meanings can never be perceived in an adequate way if they are treated as some measurable variables that influence behaviour in some direct or quantified manner. To toe the line, national identity is manifested as one of the most complex cultural-discursive phenomena, which by sheer broadness of its rasp can significantly influence perception and creation of the international manifestation if some national society, primarily seen as a national state, without rejecting a possibility, if not even a rule, that the international system influences formulation and reformulation of national identity.

In summa, besides the undeniable importance of identity in the Carl Schmitt’s theoretical opus, his work cannot be classified as constructivist but as realist. The rationale is that the “demarcation line” between realism and constructivism is not the simplistic dilemma whether ideas matter, but whether ideas have enough “propulsive” power to transform the international system into a more just and peaceful world. While some forms of cooperation in the international system are possible, if only through the direct dependence on material factors, the realistic answer is, beyond any doubt, no. For Schmitt, collective identity is not relative to the affirmation of the other but rather, the collective perception of the other is expressed by its determination through the prism of something existentially different, something that provides a counterpoint to the definition of the collective self. Identity is important, it is based upon integration and changeable, but its exclusion-basis disables great transformational interventions towards its harmonization and in theoretical terms, it is primarily associated with self-recognition.

For constructivists, change is possible. The primary guidance for the conduct of states is a socially constructed ideational structure of the international system based on convictions, norms and rules, which underlies their understanding of the world and actions (as ideas change, so does the perception of national interests and the actual behaviour). In this context, the formulation and promotion of the ideas of trust, cooperation and peace can lead to a better world.¹⁴⁵ The constructivist concept of identity is inherently inclusive, it implies external confirmation,

¹⁴⁵ See Wendt, A. (1992) “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics.” *International Organization*, 46(2), 1992, p. 391-425.

“verification” of one’s own right to exist and, regardless of any potential rivalries, equality with the other. Evidently and quite unlike Schmitt's self-recognition, social recognition matters. It is logical to assume that this mutual promotion between self and other can evolve into a friendship, a friend-friend relationship and lead to an identity that will extend the “friend” to all people of a potential single world state.¹⁴⁶ A potential world community could not be by any means reduced to social ontology characteristic of any particular community. Quite contrary, we are dealing with quite a different concept.¹⁴⁷ Therefore, unlike certain specific community that would base its identity on dialectical relation of the Sameness and the Otherness, the world community would emanate from the notion of humanity as a community marked by common natural resources and planetary habitat.

¹⁴⁶ See Wendt, A. (2003) “Why a World State is Inevitable.” *European Journal of International Relations*, 9(4), 2003, p. 491-542.

¹⁴⁷ See Bartelson, J. (2009) *Visions of World Community*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

5. Discursive coding of the enemy text in contemporary formulation of international narratives of Serbia

From the politicological-sociological-anthropological perspective, the production of enemy is a collective act, it is a phenomenon that can seldom be reduced to an individual's doing, it involves social engagement, something in which we all participate together. Hence, the assumption that the enemy is „ontologically rooted“ in things or the order of things should be dismissed, while the idea that it is manufactured or socially construed should be wholly embraced.¹⁴⁸ Thus, at the very nucleus of the construction of enemy lies the process of reification. Reification can be defined as the apprehension of results of human activity as if they were something other than human products, like facts of nature, results of cosmic laws and manifestation of divine will.¹⁴⁹ In other words, reification is the approach to conceptual categories as objectified ontological categories, a process involving the transposition of complex everyday experience in abstract terms, for the sake of their easier management by simplification and generalisation. Abstractions begin to have experiences of their own, others are reified in social interactions, losing their concrete livingness in abstraction: people overlook their authorship position in relation to the human world, they refuse the responsibility for the direct construction of the world, reified world is, hence, by definition, a dehumanised world.

Following the theoretical framework elaborated by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann,¹⁵⁰ James Aho outlines several steps or stages in the social construction of an enemy (it is not specified whether all of these stages are necessary or if they follow some precisely established order):¹⁵¹ (1) naming or labelling- which serves not only to describe, but also to discredit, defame or distance *Us* from *Them*, as a rhetorical round-off in the design of an enemy and in the creation of preconditions for his satanization ; (2) legitimation- a formal process of validation through the lens of „licenced“ power of the jurispudent, legislative, ecclesiastical or parliamentary provenance, whereby the labelled undergoes the public degradation ceremony in

¹⁴⁸ ¹⁴⁸ Aho, J. (1994) *This Thing of Darkness: A Sociology of the Enemy*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, p. 26.

¹⁴⁹ Berger, P. and Luckmann T. (1991) *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*, London: Penguin Books, p. 106.

¹⁵⁰ See Berger, P. and Luckmann T. (1991) *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*, London: Penguin Books.

¹⁵¹ Aho, J. (1994) *This Thing of Darkness: A Sociology of the Enemy*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, p. 27-31.

which his actions are not treated as accidental, but rather as holistic, as part of the totality of evil (the gestalt of evil); (3) mythmaking- the specificum of this stage is that it can have its own separate fate as it can be used for the validation of formal legitimation, often making use of the media as a credible source to support the construction of the enemy through biographical or historical documenting, ranging from half-truths to total fabrications (the reconstruction of the background context is more imaginative if ceremonial qualification is absent, let's add that efficient mythmaking implies the usage of authoritative jargon compatible with the official „scientific-theoretical“ concept of evil); (4) sedimentation- the constructed myth linked to a certain label transcends the act of naming itself, it becomes separated from its source, original purpose and becomes an indiscernible part of the everyday and implied “knowledge” of society, a matter of common sense, an indisputable common denominator of all of “us”, something that “everybody knows”, it is transmitted and disseminated through the media, by word of mouth from person to person or passed from generation to generation; (5) ritualism or ritualization- because human memory is unstable, newly-found characterizations must be permanently embedded, so ritual becomes a remarkable pedagogical tool for this purpose of sustaining the tension and threat in constant reminder of the danger coming from the enemy.

It can be said that the ideational formulation of enemy, in terms of content, presents a set of identity ideas, norms and concepts that constitute a framework for the contemplation of threat, rivalry and violence. The enemy represents a source of hostile antagonism targeted at our survival or important goals, whether the hostile attitude is or is not marked by active violence between us (the Group Self) and them (the Group Other). Ideational formulation of the enemy includes inherited and created normative components (national myths, religious beliefs, normatised standards of courage, self-sacrifice, violence, etc.), as well as the ways of getting into and out of conflicts. Two main perspectives associated with the ideational formulation of the enemy are the view of the Self and of the Other. View of the Self implies what a collective has to do when confronted with the enemy, understood as a test of strength and value of a collective (this is manifested through certain rituals, stereotypes and traditional patterns of behavior). The idea of Other serves to indicate the two characteristics of the collective identity:¹⁵² the relational dimension, in the sense that identity is always constituted in relation to Others, and the exclusion

¹⁵² Rousseau, D. (2006) *Identifying Threats and Threatening Identities: The Social Construction of Realism and Liberalism*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 12.

dimension, in the sense that Otherness is delineated by the sphere of collectivity, Other denoting what the collective self is not. In other words, the texts related to the enemy, as a supplement to a semantic associative set, encompass a broad range of interpretation, from a blasphemer to a barbarian, while all the time linked with a form of radically perceived danger or jeopardy, which is not necessarily transposed into a manifestation of violence.¹⁵³

The phenomenon of enmification, more associated with the psychological discourse, can be said to play a crucial part if not in the creation, then certainly in the perpetuation and intensification of enmity.¹⁵⁴ Because it vilifies, dehumanizes and fuels antagonism against the Other, every potentially violent (armed) collision contains the process of enmification as its indelible precondition or prerequisite. The variety of enemy perceptions suggests that, in addition to its negative characterisation, the socio-cultural and ideological perspective play an important part. Because perceptions of the enemy are extracted from personal experience and are based in psycho-cultural dispositions idiosyncratic to a particular group culture or political ideology, the composition of the enemy identity and intensity of the antagonistic feeling cannot be treated as a result of some universal rational mechanism.¹⁵⁵ Ergo, the internal power structure and legitimizing myths, as well as the broader cultural profiling of some political community, can be a nodal point in the understanding and steering of the enmification process. The greater the degree of incongruency of the value-symbolic narrative codes of a society, along with its perceived and self-perceived status of vulnerability or instability of a political leadership, it is possible to anticipate for the process of enmification to gain in socio-cultural-contextual centrality and momentum. In sum, for an authentic and full interpretation of the enemy narrative, it is necessary to grasp both the practice of its construction as well as the practice of its deconstruction.

¹⁵³ Aho, J. (1994) *This Thing of Darkness: A Sociology of the Enemy*, op. cit., pp. 107-121. and Aho, J. (1998) *The Things of the World: A Social Phenomenology*, London: Praeger, pp. 71-81.; See also Vilho, H. (2000) *The Enemy with a Thousand Faces: The Tradition of the Other in Western Political Thought and History*, London: Praeger.

¹⁵⁴ Rieber, W. R. and Kelly, R. J. (1991) "Substance and Shadow: Images of the Enemy." in Rieber, W. R. (ed.) *The Psychology of War and Peace: The Image of the Enemy*, New York: Plenum Press, pp. 3-41. and Oppenheimer, L. (2006) "The Development of Enemy Images: A Theoretical Contribution." *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, 12(3): 269-292.

¹⁵⁵ Szalay, L. B. and Mir-Djalali, E. (1991) "Image of the enemy: Critical parameters, cultural variations." in Rieber, W. R. (ed.) *The psychology of war and peace: The image of the enemy* New York: Plenum Press, pp. 213-250.

In its stricter sense, the process of enmification includes four stages:¹⁵⁶ (1) registering a danger or threat- aiming to jeopardize, destabilise or devalue the fundamental sense of the “affective nucleus”, identity; (2) distortion- which enables individuals to reduce or rationalise contradiction in their lives by justifying their attitudes, beliefs and behaviours, even if their dominant feature is violence; (3) rigidification- as a form of petrification or reification of the position that generates hostile imagery and likens stereotypes with the truth, namely „the protective hermetical isolation“ of identity from possible attacks, as the perpetuation and persistence of hostility becomes the default component of the history and identity of the respective parties; and (4) collusion- when animosity becomes an integral part of identity, then the mutual odium becomes beneficial to the hostile relationship, the maintenance of adversity and conflict potential grows into a unifying group objective, a rallying point or even, a patriotic duty. Once again, I emphasize that the most acute, but not necessary, form of negative reification is an armed conflict, which implies the fabrication of enemy as an impersonal entity defined by stereotypes.

More or less, it is possible to register two crucial, if contradictory, principles of enmification which refer to the “attraction and repulsion“ for the enemy:¹⁵⁷ (1) the similarity between us and the enemy is evident, but we attribute our own negative traits to the enemy (put another way, our unconscious generates the nexus between us and the enemy, while consciously we do not admit any undesirable traits as our own, so we continue to project the difference between “Them“ and “Us“); and (2) despite reinforcing the distance from our enemies, hostility still connects ”Us” with ”Them”. The process of enmification is characteristic both of the individual and collective domains,¹⁵⁸ although rooted in the individual, enmification can also be a group phenomenon when our aversions are arranged around some shared ideological features. The collective enmification alternative, with its national and international scope, is less rational, often surpasses the individual empirical frame and thus, susceptible to manipulation for the purpose of mass mobilization. Hence, it is evident that the ideological narrative constructs at the national level lead to projecting classification criteria distinguishing ”Us” from the antagonized

¹⁵⁶ Tidwell, A. C. (1998) *Conflict Resolved? A Critical Assessment of Conflict Resolution*, New York: Continuum, 135-137.

¹⁵⁷ Tidwell, A. C. (1998) *Conflict Resolved? A Critical Assessment of Conflict Resolution*, op. cit., p. 132.

¹⁵⁸ Rieber, W. R. and Kelly, R. J. (1991) “Substance and Shadow: Images of the Enemy.” in Rieber, W. R. (ed.) *The Psychology of War and Peace: The Image of the Enemy*, op. cit., pp. 6-8.

“Others” (who these “Others” are will depend on the past experience of some other country, from the historical constructivist component to who has been labelled as the “other”).

Bearing this in mind, we can identify destructive ideologies as a specific normative vision of the ideal social arrangement within which some group is identified as the obstructive element in realising the projected ideological “utopia”. There are different kinds of destructive ideologies:¹⁵⁹ (1) the “better world” ideologies –based on enhancing the welfare for all people, except for ideological enemies; (2) nationalist ideologies – focused on power, wealth and a group’s purity; (3) antagonistic ideologies – characterized by the vertically aligned discrediting of some external group and its perception a hostile species, prepared to inflict some damage upon us; (5) ideologies of superiority- implying the justification of subordination of another group based on the inherent superiority of the dominant group, whether due to race, religion or individual traits; (6) ideologies of development – characterized by projections of economic progress.

Leaving aside the thesis put forward by some psycho-political studies that we must have any enemy virtually at all times, this is specific in that it indicates that groups attempt to relieve internal conflicts and inter-group violence by utilising a shared group imaginarium, stereotypes or fantasies about the enemy, which is an entirely different posit from the e.g. structural view of conflict.¹⁶⁰ Perceptions refer to beliefs and hypotheses which individuals deem valid. The group alternative of perceptions is called stereotypes and they will be elaborated further in this paper. Perceptions and stereotypes about the enemy are a result of the fundamental human need for identity and of group dynamic. The identity of some individual is largely comprised of his social identity and is therefore profiled by belonging to a group, which implies systemic comparison, differentiation and distancing from other groups. As already mentioned, intergroup conflicts are not necessarily violent. In this respect: (1) because every individual has multiple identities, compatibility among them reduces the probability of violent conflict; (2) inadequate material conditions characterized by some kind of deprivation intensify existing identity conflicts; (3) chances for violence also increase due to refusal to accept some other identity as this is believed

¹⁵⁹ Staub, E. (1998) “Early Intervention: Prediction and Action.” in Langholtz, H. J. *The Psychology of Peacekeeping*, Praeger, London, p. 32.

¹⁶⁰ Coleman, M. (1984) “Nuclear Politics in the 1980s.” *Journal of Psychohistory*, 12(1): 125. Also see Stein, J. G. “Image, Identity and Conflict Resolution.” in Crocker, C. A., Hampson, F. O. and Aall, P. (eds.) *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict*, Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, pp. 93-111.

to have an adverse effect on an individual's own identity; (4) egocentric tendencies may lead to exaggerating someone's actions in the sense that they are targeted at us; (5) someone's actions are often evaluated in the dimension of personality rather than situational factors; (6) identity conflicts are often utilised in the pursuit of political goals, as an easiest strategy in the countries characterised by deep rifts and their elites' proclivity for mass media control.

The role of public discourses in strengthening ethnic stereotypes and contemporary mythical images is primary, these expressions are characterised by axiomaticism and lack of argumentation. Meaning of the arguments is acquired by stereotypes by relying on social, political and ideological context; that contents of meanings of stereotypes adapt to the changes in social reality but also that by stereotypical strategies can be altered even notions about them. In scientific, especially politicological discourse, reductions of meanings of stereotypes to the rhetoric of simplifying truths about "ours" and "them", "us" and "others", i.e. ethnic distance that is manifested in overestimating of "ours" and underestimating of "theirs", are amply present; however, even though it is one of its manifestations, it is not a whole truth about its nature and social functions; stereotypes represent unavoidable mechanisms of our psychological constitution, our cognition and socio-psychological processes in general. As a manifestation of the necessity of language (thought) economy, in other words simplification and equalisation- typification of notions of the world, stereotype is not merely a verbal reality but something that even on semantic level possesses a value of "a primary realia".

Those are historically changeable, but still stable everyday categorisations, typifications of the surroundings. As such stereotypes have a vital cognitive function. As systems of social adaptation and demarcation, stereotypes have also an important social role. In the sphere of everyday and public communication they codify behaviour in different situations, which makes them important social landmarks.¹⁶¹ Particularly significant to our issue is also the fact that cultural identity is actually constituted via cultural stereotypes, understood as systems of promotional postulates, or as structures of perception/interpretation of the world, in the sense of the series of concepts that are schematised through socialisation and education. The basis of these

¹⁶¹ Rot, K. (2000) *Slike u glavama (Images in the minds)*, Beograd, XX vek and Krug, p. 260 and Đerić, G. (2005) *Prvo lice množine: kolektivno samopoimanje i predstavljanje- mitovi, karakteri, mentalne mape i stereotipi (First Person Plural: Collective Selfawareness and Representation- Myths, Characters, Mental Maps and Stereotypes)*, Beograd: Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju and Filip Višnjić, pp. 34, 36, 42-43.

processes makes capability of symbolisation and comprehension of the meaning which provide a common context for the interpretation of the world.¹⁶²

In the domain of public political application a pragmatic importance of stereotypes is particularly prominent, in the form of the effects of ideological mobilisation of their meanings. This is possible because they play an important role also in strengthening of common notions of every collective, via clear value attributes. As such, stereotypes play an important role in strengthening of the group cohesion; by marking the boundaries between group members and those that are not, they enable group identification (whether it is defined via gender, age, profession, kinship, language, religion, or via ethnic, cultural affiliation, identification with a nation or state) and represent vital factors in construction of both individual and social/national identity.¹⁶³ For the issue that we deal with, particularly important are ethnic stereotypes, as clichéd, formulaic and axiomatic notions which (the same as national myths, national characterology and national space-time “topography”) represent forms of narratives by which collective convictions and self-comprehension are expressed.

Ethnic stereotypes are quite often equated to prejudices, as judgments that exist even before a personal experience of an individual within a certain group and that an individual accepts without any verification, and which originate from the interaction of affective stances and mainly cognitive stereotypes, are acquired early and non-critically accepted, therefore they represent a basis for the inception of affective clichés about “enemy”. There is a thin line between a stereotype as a simplifying and generalising stance on the qualities of some social group or its members and a prejudice as a point of view on the same that has a negative connotation. In its extreme form, negative and destructive side of the stereotype is evident in the phenomena of racism, chauvinism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia related to it.¹⁶⁴ A stereotype is strengthened through repetition in everyday and public usages, while its negation does not lead to automatic rebuttal. For that very reason, the possibility of its political instrumentalisation makes it a potential danger, since expansion and the meaning of the facts of realistic explanations,

¹⁶² Golubović, Z. (1999) *Ja i drugi: antropološka istraživanja individualnog i kolektivnog identiteta (I and Other: Anthropological Studies of Individual and Collective Identity)*, Beograd: Republika, pp. 33.

¹⁶³ Rot, K. (2000) *Slike u glavama (Images in the minds)*, op. cit., pp. 275-277.

¹⁶⁴ ; Đerić, G. (2005) *Prvo lice množine: kolektivno samopoimanje i predstavljanje- mitovi, karakteri, mentalne mape i stereotipi ((First Person Plural: Collective Selfawareness and Representation- Myths, Characters, Mental Maps and Stereotypes)*, op. cit., p. 3; and Rot, K. (2000) *Slike u glavama (Images in the minds)*, op. cit., pp. 260-261

stereotypes acquire precisely in the times of political tensions, thus becoming overly value-nuanced, stiff prejudices which inevitably influence reaching the political estimates.

Under the circumstances, ethnic categories become referential points for the political identity, through which leaders and/or political elites perform political mobilisation, the ethnic awareness is politicised and becomes the foundation of the ideology.¹⁶⁵ Ethnic stereotypes, in the form of national character, mythical reminiscence and mapping of the national space and time, as the three forms of narrative they use to express themselves, construct beliefs and self-understandings via language. All three of them stand at the disposal of the discourses of national representation, i.e. possibilities of their ideological and political usage.

The most common meaning of the term stereotype, which is of utmost significance, is related to ethnic stereotypes as simple sketches of characteristics and values of a nation. As narrations through which convictions about collectives are verbalised, they are characterised by a high level of viability in the public sphere, since they constitute the basis of a national representation discourse. To politics ethnic and ideological stereotypes are indispensable; it creates, nurtures and uses them. Within the context of political/ideological directing, ethnic stereotypes can be viewed as language clichés through which both a notion of a certain group and a general social situation are being mystified. A treatment of ethnic stereotypes in science quite often has a similar function: when stereotypes are understood as objective, real “characteristics” of a people/nation or when by referring to the widespread use of a certain stereotype social phenomena are explained. In both cases, analyses do not restrain to indicating “the physiognomy of the people”, they confirm or reevaluate the real condition, settle one image, indicate accuracy/inaccuracy of conclusions about a certain phenomenon, justify political will or right of the stronger. Through stereotypes a new value order is established, diverse interests expressed, certain standpoints, concepts defended, and being used to persuade.

Resorting to a stereotype is a sign of necessity of systematisation and simplification of not only the cognition processes, but also intellectual inertness and ideological impressionability and achieving concord on values and their meanings. As a simple way to recognition of a common evaluation stereotype encompasses mobilisation of meanings in one direction and is the expression of the interpretation in one way only, with a predictable outcome. It is not about “a

¹⁶⁵ Golubović, Z. (1999) *Ja i drugi: antropološka istraživanja individualnog i kolektivnog identiteta (I and Other: Anthropological Studies of Individual and Collective Identity)*, op.cit., pp. 77.

grain of truth” or “truthful core” of a stereotype but a success of functioning in a given context and fulfillment of truth of a set context.¹⁶⁶ Stereotypes can be examined from a more general aspect, without boundaries of internal characterisation through interactive dynamics of the sameness and the difference in principle, as they serve for the positioning in a contemporary or historical context. Characterisation of a nation is inseparable from the other universal standardizations, such as those towards cultural achievements, openness or clannishness of a social structure. On stereotype based comparative qualifying practices are of a prime significance in self-identification of a nation and its perception in a broader context. Similar to regulatory principles, which depending on the context are filled with diverse contents, such qualifications surpass the relevance of contrasting and identifying diversity, since they emphasise it as a permanent term.¹⁶⁷

A collective evaluation of the members of other nations is manifested in the form of mobilisation of “preserved” knowledge and a fundamental attitude to it, which is made topical in encounter with some member. Mobilisation of notions that have a tendency of being made true at a certain point has its footing in the sphere of “symbolic topography” of a nation, from which the argumentation for constituting of the credibility of a current sense is drawn. Thus symbolic points of identification become argumentation for the relationship that they topicalise. Topicalised typifications can be analysed in the sense of specific needs of a given moment and adaptation to novelty in the social reality, forthcoming events, or of a symptom of a necessity of change. Within the context of national identification, myths belong to the so-called basic identifiers, side by side with language and religion. The analysis of the domain of understanding mythical narrations in everyday discourse shows dominant viability of a name or formula by which is myth represented at the expense of its meaning. The fact that contents of the myth and its meaning is forgotten indicates not only the importance of a domain of clichéd, linguistically reduced communicability and transferability of mythic narratives but the importance of insight into what of the original myth is forgotten and what remembered and accented through current mythic reminiscences. Mythical names and formulae themselves are the carriers of certain beliefs

¹⁶⁶ Đerić, G. (2005) *Prvo lice množine: kolektivno samopoimanje i predstavljanje- mitovi, karakteri, mentalne mape i stereotipi* ((*First Person Plural: Collective Selfawareness and Representation- Myths, Characters, Mental Maps and Stereotypes*), op. cit., pp. 42-43.

¹⁶⁷ Ibidem, op.cit., pp. 76.

and images of sense on which myth actually is sustained. A name-symbol does not explain, but simply contain and produces the meaning.

Mythological story in a current political setting and public use in general, is not a story from the oral tradition but applicable cliché or linguistic stereotype, a reference and argumentation in ideological use. By placing into the context of a contemporary situation, formulae derived from mythical narrations codify and direct the reality itself, transforming into a fundamental argument of political mobilisation for certain agents. In the process of political mobilisation, constituents of the mythical identification can gain and lose significance. For that reason in the analysis of social phenomena, it is more logical to ask questions about assumptions that insist on social functions of discourses propped against mythological story. Reduced discursive representation of a national myth, in the sense of expression through derived formulae, opens the possibility of studying this phenomenon as a stereotype. In such a usage myths are “standardised and stereotyped narrations of national history, which highlight what is important in cultural remembrance and indicate the foundations of community association”. By objectifying relevant parts of the common history, myths gain permanent strength of symbolic directing identification.

Mutual and unbreakable links between myth and language ensure permanency. Myth is conditioned by discourse which expresses in time established descriptive and value relation to a collective; that link is linguistic and functional: in myths symbolic collective accents are underlined, which become a basis of stereotypisation of collective self-understanding and national identification. As they are narrational and expressed via formulaic statements, or language, both myths and stereotypes are determined by the totality of linguistic conditions of a collective.¹⁶⁸ Mythological notions possess a significant stability and in everyday discourse irrespective of environment changeability, because of them being deeply rooted in historical and cultural remembrance and because of the adaptability of both stereotypes and mythic narratives to current circumstances. The subject matter of myths and stereotypes, as well as the phenomena themselves, are strong points of every community. They give a specific nuance and depth to what is understood as collective memory for the very fact that they are related to current perceptions of the social reality.

¹⁶⁸ Ibidem, op.cit., pp. 33.

Before we get into the deconstruction of the Serbian idea of enemy, it would be useful to point out the ideational setting of enmity in the Second Yugoslavia. Yugoslav political-cultural code was basically constructed on two forms of enmity, founded, only seemingly, on the ideological premises of class. The first form was the internal enemy (all those “reactionary-regressive” social elements, individuals or groups, who professed a certain type of change that was incompatible with the ideal communist programme of the socialist community organization within the Yugoslav federation), while the other was the external enemy (in a variant of an “expected” capitalist enemy or the variant of the “paradoxical” Soviet enemy). Internal enemy was divided into several subgroups spanning, ideologically speaking, a wide ideological landscape, from pro-liberal insistence on increasing civil liberties to an extreme nationalist ideology. Bound by the iconography and narratives resulting from the ritual manifestations of brotherhood and unity of nations and nationalities and the foreign policy doctrine of peaceful coexistence and nonalignment, Yugoslav identity found its “proto-symbolic” line in a multinational fight against fascism, substantially reinforced by the simultaneous struggle against national class forces (“traitors”). In other words, the Yugoslav class revolution was, from its conception, branded with an absurd national prefix. Within the fully fledged political oxymoron “national communism”, workers equality was intensely covered by national equality, that was to reveal its universalist, anational “class sublimation” on the federal level.

In this respect, the Yugoslav identity was primarily related to the multinational anti-fascist courage, multinational anti-fascist sacrifice, multinational anti-fascist allegiance, as the symbolic and value revivalist of Yugoslavism, that was to upgrade itself in the second instance by class components in a monolithic, one-party (yet federal) discourse. Not even the concept of self-management could avoid this national value prefix. From the 1974 Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia introduced ethnic federalism, a space was opened for the full flourishing of separate national identities. Of course, national histories became the basis for “invented traditions”, that established continuity with the past. Invented tradition means practice of ritual or symbolic nature, openly controlled or manifested by tacitly accepted rules aiming to instill certain values and norms of behavior in the short period of time through repetition,

implying a link with the past.¹⁶⁹ The moment national intolerance became the main political distinction, internal tension peaked and the war in Yugoslavia became inevitable.

At this point, let's attempt to determine more precisely the natural and unnatural enemy. For Socrates, natural enmity is that between Hellenes and barbarians, whereas conflict among the Hellenes, natural friends, points to a disease of Hellas and is called discord.¹⁷⁰ Therefore, while hostility between Hellenic poleis and barbarians represents something understood and expected, corresponding to a diametrical opposition of these two value- existential systems *per se*, hostility and warfare between the Hellenic poleis is a manifestation of something deviant and problematic. For a specific group of people, category of the natural enemy will depend on the description and/or selection of enemy properties or combination of properties set in the foreground (racial attributes, national attributes, religious attributes, ideological attributes, etc.). *Ergo*, this sets the purpose of identifying with one group rather than another and the very substantial base of distinction. Identification of the natural enemy helps to label others who are simply different from others who pose a far more serious challenge (threat) to the unity of the collective we belong to, and to whom no legal or ethical norms apply in a potential war.

In the context of ex-Yugoslavia, natural enemies were all those who in any way posed a threat to the party's revolutionary elite, or to the legacy (tradition) created under its influence of the National Liberation struggle, as the pillar of genuine socialist system, based on ideologically presupposed "national-class" or "national workers" unity. Thus, in the period immediately after World War II, we could identify as "pure" or natural Yugoslav enemies: the United States, epitome of the Western Bloc's imperialist-capitalist model, and the full spectrum of internal enemies ("fifth column"). To avoid any confusion, the certainty of the natural enemy provides a certain hermeneutical security by allowing the option that hostility does not end in a war, while identifying the absolute enemy implies deploying all (available) combat resources until its final elimination or neutralization. As the center of the Eastern Bloc's statist-authoritarian variant of the socialist model, the USSR became a threat to the Yugoslav party elite and class revolution and after the famous Cominform Resolution of 1948, a former ideological friend was culturally turned into an enemy.

¹⁶⁹ Hobsbawm, E. (1985) "Introduction: Inventing Traditions." in Hobsbawm, E. and Ranger, T. (eds.) *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 1.

¹⁷⁰ Platon (1983) *Država (The Republic)*, op. cit., 470c, p. 160.

However, the construction of differences did not lead to the process of demonisation (by creating an evil enemy); on the symbolic plane, it stopped at the level of the “natural” enemy (due to various factors: a shared anti-fascist struggle, somewhat similar clichés of class victims, oppression, heroism, etc.): possible armed conflict existed as an option, but the one-party dominance received yet another mythological zone of distinction of only potentially violent nature. A value-consistent and stabilized matrix of reasoning and behavior was created, Yugoslav identity substantively “attempted” to mythologically surpass the bipolar division of the world (thus gravitation toward Third World countries is not surprising), while failing to incorporate, in terms of values, national mythology in it. National myths proved to be culturally more persistent, at the very least, national myths sprang from a few central motifs: the golden age, the warrior ideal, sacrifice, martyrdom, treason, conspiracy, salvation and charismatic savior,¹⁷¹ they absorbed their parallel Yugoslav mythological counterparts, in spite of the heavy propaganda machinery of manipulation supervised and directed by the party’s elite (and added to state repression).

The war began with the “mapping of the enemy” in which Serbs and Montenegrins, as a friendly “unified” national option, had a shared status of absolute (mortal) enemies with the Croats, Bosniaks and Albanians. This constellation is consistent with the understanding that the ultimate evil is at its source conceptualized through the distinction at the level of enemies who had had some form of friendship, in the case of the second Yugoslavia: living in a common federal state founded on the ideal of brotherhood and unity of nations and nationalities, rather than on the distinction associated with external enemies.¹⁷² To this we can also add the fact that the type of hostility is always directed to the construction of essential differences that did not exist before the confrontation itself (in the case of Serbs and Croats, and Serbs and Muslims, this process could be expressed as “narcissism of small differences”).¹⁷³ The formulation of these new differences often generates violence, because of the imposed need for the unambiguous, rigid substrate of hostility, which is value-intense enough to express the new collective other and justify entry into war.

¹⁷¹ Tismaneanu, V. (1998) *Fantasies of Salvation: Democracy, Nationalism and Myth in Post-Communist Europe*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998, p. 9.

¹⁷² See Pagels, E. (1996) *The Origin of Satan: How Christians Demonized Jews, Pagans, and Heretics*, New York: Vintage Books.

¹⁷³ Ignatieff, M. (1998) *The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience*, New York: Henry Holt and Company, p. 38.

The Serbian conceptual formulation of the enemy, as an expression of the vernacular, mythical and libertarian political culture, was significantly built around the myth of Kosovo and the associated set of abstract notions of the “ultimate” enemy (or, so to speak, the abstract “*dušmanin*”):¹⁷⁴ a highly placed national allegory of an anonymous, non-specific enemy (in terms of its perceptively sublimated timeless model) who must be resisted or else, the Serbian identity is lost. At this level, we can identify the main implications of the Kosovo myth: at: (1) the idea of “celestial enemy” based on the idea of the “celestial people” (2) the “celestial enemy” represents something more unjust, so an important provision for all Serbian enemies is a higher, diabolical or great injustice, they are morally positioned as an evil *per se*, (3) the “celestial enemy” is not only a national enemy, he is a general evil, to defeat the enemy meant to restore justice throughout the Christian world, (4) considering that the Serbian “celestial people” is fighting the “celestial enemy”, it is essentially also a liberating people, the people of freedom, and an *a priori* just people. Let us add to this: (1) the idea of self-importance- the fact that the Serbian living space was always within the sphere of interests of the dominant world powers, who always tended toward restricting its freedom, the Serbs essentially were in the “permanent” state of war so they have, accordingly, developed a very strong collective identity;¹⁷⁵ (2) the idea of the importance and sacrifice- Serbs do not go to war with the small, “epigones and satellites” of great powers, but always with the most powerful, so every sacrifice is justified if it leads to conservation or struggle for independence; and (3) the idea of “civilizational amalgamation” and the ingratitude of the neighboring nations- Serbs have always represented the Occident for the Orient, and the Orient for the Occident, while those they brought freedom to always found a reason to declare them tyrants.

All this, in concurrence with Slobodan Milosevic's authoritarian system, based on instrumented mythological constructions of war as an “armageddonesque” collision between “capitalism and socialism”, “liberalism and social democracy of the Swedish type”, and the final showdown with the New World Order, led to treating nations from the region as indirect bearers of great evil, thus making them enemies against whom all means were allowed and against whom ruthlessness was asked and required. The ideal of Milosevic's enemy was the absolute enemy,

¹⁷⁴ *Dušmanin* (from Turkish *dusman*- enemy), word connotatively associated with moral corruption, that is moral evil, in Serbian language, while the word “enemy” excludes extreme moral implications.

¹⁷⁵ Matić, M. (1998) *Srpska politička tradicija (Serbian Political Tradition)*, Belgrade: Insitut za političke studije, p. 26.

materialized as the United States and the European Union, clearly marked as global and ultimate evil in a binary moral code, whose polarity of “Milosevic's Serbian good” was underlined by populist ideological premises based on the selective use of history and the metaphors of struggle against class and neo-colonial oppression characteristic of the discourse of the Second Yugoslavia. Milosevic's hate speech was made up of emotional pathos that, at the symbolic level, always inclined to be anational in explaining all the actions undertaken in favour of the war (he only protected the rights of Serbs), while its dramatic nature always implied vengeful rhetoric of the one unjustly attacked by domestic traitors, *ustaša*-like¹⁷⁶ elements and Islamic fundamentalists. Finally, the path that began at the celebration of the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo in 1989 finished with the loss of that same Kosovo 11 years later, in an environment defined by mortal foes.

Things changed with the democratic transformation that took place in Serbia. These transformations can be interpreted from the Max Weber and Edward Shils perspective in understanding of the concept of charisma.¹⁷⁷ In fact, in modern (mass) democracies, status and functioning of political parties is perhaps the most striking example of possible Weberian installation (institutionalization) of the charismatic principle in the political life of a community. Due to the fact that the position of a party as opposed to an administrative bureaucracy is marked by the absence of coercion, it must win the elections in order to achieve its own goals through extrapolation (appropriation) of state funds and power. Agents of change in the setting of political values of a particular democratic system are, therefore, political leaders and their parties, they are the only ones able to control and alter a particular institutional structure. Those who take an electoral victory are able to legitimize the proclaimed values, first at the charismatic level and later at the legal-rational level, those who fail must wait for the next election cycle. The participation of masses in the political process results in two political arrangements: “democracy with a leader” and “democracy without a leader”. The contemporary Serbia can be seen as “democracy without a leader”.

¹⁷⁶ Ustaša- member of Croatian Revolutionary Movement, fascist and terrorist organization which was active before, during and after World War II.

¹⁷⁷ See Weber, M. (1978) *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*. Berkeley: University of California Press.; Shils, E. (1958) “Tradition and Liberty: Antinomy and Interdependence.” *Ethics*, 68(3): 153-165.; Shils, E. (1965) “Charisma, Order, and Status.” *American Sociological Review*, 30(2): 199-213.; and Shils, E. (1975) *Center and Periphery: Essays in Macrosociology*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Liberal “democracy without a leader” annuls the competition for fundamental political values, symbolic (political-cultural) frame of a regime, the electoral process is in a “political hibernation”, reduced to a public applause, adulation to or manipulation with masses for the sake of state functions or, in other words, of authority, and the problem of accountability is significantly increased. On the one hand, the template of such a position of political charisma implies that every time a (liberal) value structure of a democratic leadership (that is far below the threshold of a revolution, but certainly above the threshold of political reformism) is overlooked, when it is taken as unquestionable in the architecture of democratic systems, the entire democratic model is in danger of bureaucratization, i.e. the value treatment of the bureaucratic system *per se* (this certainly implies the view of democracy as a constant inquiring value and normative concept). On the other hand, this suggests the co-existence of democratically profiled charismatic value and symbolic templates that are in a state of constant competition and even conflict of different charismas in democratic institutions- the one that has yet to enter the process of routinization and the one that has already been institutionalized, and also the possibility of the emergence of charisma not only in crisis situations but also in the regular functioning of the democratic system.

Shils’ setting suggests that in a complex democratic situation we can speak of someone who gets a larger or smaller amount of charisma by the very act of belonging to a certain institution (and it expresses its closeness to the “transcendent” state of affairs), by the position (higher or lower) or role (significant or more marginal) he/she takes in a certain institution (at that: charisma tends to be spread across the whole institutional distribution of a socio-political order) and, independently of the previous two elements that position charismatic principle as value, symbolic and ideological connective tissue of a social-political order, by his/her individually proclaimed and collectively accepted charismatic singularity as a generator of institutional (social and political) changes. In my opinion, such conceptual positioning of charisma in democracies cannot be marked as “obfuscation” of the balance of powers, but as inevitable trait of a democratically acquired authority. When extreme, the state force (coercion) is a democratic legitimate power, if it was partly charismatically (valuably) verified by the will of the people. For Shils, if my interpretation is correct, there is a difference between being charismatic and a charismatic, that is, someone is charismatic for being, for example, a holder of the role of the state president, because the institution of the state president is already charismatic,

and because he/she won the votes of the charismatic electorate or the people (citizens). Anyone who is institutionally charismatic may not be a charismatic, in terms of special giftedness and the change of institutions. For Weber, if we accept the previous distinction, a charismatic precedes being charismatic, that is, the institutionalization or routinization of charisma; charisma is partly cyclical: it ranges from one charismatic to another, with declines in intensity through the process of routinization or institutionalization, but never so it completely disappears as an institutional element.

The current political leadership of Serbia draws its charismatic background almost entirely from the realized democratic metamorphosis on the line of Shils' systemic charismatic matrix. *Ergo*, the separation of the Serbian Progressive Party from the Serbian Radical Party, led in September 2008 by Tomislav Nikolic, the President of the Republic of Serbia, and Aleksandar Vucic, the First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence of the Republic of Serbia, and also the European "turn" of Ivica Dacic, the Prime Minister and Minister of Interior of the Republic of Serbia and the former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia in the Government of Mirko Cvetkovic, shouldn't actually be treated as charismatic turning points, acts of individual charismatic "inauguration". The idea is that in the above cases it is the case of the final shift away from "bad" charismatic leaders, negation of radicalistic premises of the "Seseljism" of Vojislav Seselj and the "Slobism" of Slobodan Milosevic, than of promoting new and authentic charismatic figures, of distancing that was more or less a mere political survival tactic. More precisely: it was more of a process of a unique "de-charismatisation", of subversion of charismatic movements whose followers they were, in the direction of the inversion of a personal charismatic potential with the charismatic background of an emerging democratic socio-political context. Such political moves implied a new historical instance in the Serbian political space. It is about a democratic value matrix that axiomatically profiled and postulated a possible cultural and symbolic content of their "pseudo-charismatic" manifestation determined by a democratic institutional structure, that is, by a democratic political system. At play, therefore, is not a personal charisma or institutional charisma of Weberian provenance, but the identification of a potential personal charismatic code with the democratic systemic charismatic code. This shift in the charismatic coding of Serbian leadership is analogous with recoding of Serbian enemies: perception of the Yugoslav nations and NATO states shifts

from “evil *dušmanin*” to normal enemies, with whom it is possible and necessary to negotiate, regardless of any potential disputes and disagreements.

6. Discursive coding of the enemy text in the contemporary formulation of international narratives of Japan

In the broadest historical context, the economic significance of Asia manifested through initial establishment of trade relations, dates back to Hellenic era. At the beginning of XIX century China accounted for 28% and India 16% of the total global GDP, while midcentury, as a result of “western colonisation”, this conjunction was radically changed.¹⁷⁸ A period of approximately 150 years of Asian economic depression and Euro-American domination ensued. That led to the global GDP of East Asia amount to 4% in the 60s of the past century.¹⁷⁹ Quite contrary, present-day “Asian economic Phoenix” encompasses four particularly significant world economies: Japan, India, China and South Korea; and the overall Asian economic situation can be safely evaluated as a driving force of the global economy, with participation of East Asia in the global GDP rising to 25%. It is worth mentioning that distinction between Asia and East Asia (or pro-Western expression “Far East”) actually should indicate dominantly regional, rather than continental dimension, of economic transformations, which clearly suggests that final outcome of identification of the East-Asian region, is without doubt of economic nature.

I will agree with the thesis that one of the most recurrent analytical approaches in researching the historical, cultural and social dimensions of Japan can be identified as the obliteration of theoretical discourse for the sake of underscoring the implicit and genuine premises of the Japanese cultural “being”.¹⁸⁰ Alternatively, even when applying some theoretical framework, which, as a rule, is of Western provenance, it represents a kind of imposed theoretical elaboration of the national issue through, more or less, fixed facts particular to the Japanese culture. The problem with the first analytical (“indigenist”) variation is that it would be inconceivable to undertake any cultural analysis that would exclude theoretical premises and also that any indigenous research employ a specific theoretical starting point that implies the incompatibility of social and cultural systems. In any case, the approach is extracted from the theoretical postulates of the incompatibility of the Japanese (oriental) culture with Western theory as a reflection of Occidental cultural space and represents a (latent or implicit) manifestation of cultural imperialism. At the same time indigenous research in its broadest sense can be defined as

¹⁷⁸ See Madison, A. *The World Economy: A Millennial Prospective*. OECD, Paris. 2001.

¹⁷⁹ Dent, C. M. *East Asian Regionalism*. op. cit., p. 2.

¹⁸⁰ Doak, K. (2007) *A History of Nationalism in Modern Japan: Placing the People*, Leiden: Brill, pp. 1-36.

the studying of authentic local phenomena at the level of their local (emic) and global (etic) implications.

At the beginning, I will identify key historical instances that outline the contours of the Japanese evolutionary model (more for the purpose of orientation and sequencing than as a comprehensive analytically determining method): the Jomon period- from 10 000BC to 300BC; the Yayoi period - from 300BC to 300AD; the Yamato period- from 300AD to 645AD; the Asuka period - from 645 to 710; the Nara period- during which the imperial palace at Nara was built, and in addition to Shintoism, the official religion of the imperial family, the spreading of Buddhism as state religion begins; the Heian period- from 794 to 1185, the imperial court relocates to today's Kyoto (*Heyan kyo*) and buddhism spreads among the people; the Kamaruka period- from 1185 to 1333, when the samurai become the ruling social stratum; the Muromachi period- from 1333 to 1568; the Azuchi Momoyama period- from 1568 to 1600, during which the country's unification and of a range of political and economic reforms were begun; the Edo or Tokugawa period- from 1600 to 1868, trade is expanding, even with European countries, society is increasingly stratifying and diplomatic relations with the US are officially established; the *Meiji* period- from 1868 to 1912, when after the civil war the Charter Oath, as a kind of the first modern Japanese Constitution is formulated, providing for a unified Council of State comprising Upper and Lower House, presidential cabinet and five state ministries (for religion, war, international affairs and justice), this period coincides with Japan's rise to the status of world power; the Taisho period- from 1912 to 1926; the Showa period - from 1912 to 1989, after World War II Japan amended its Constitution (1947), reaffirming the role of the Parliament and new political parties were created; and the *Hensei* period- from 1989 to the present.

Japan's social, political and cultural development from centralised feudalism, through authoritarian state, to the democratic industrial society differs from its European counterpart, despite some evident similarities, in one essential feature.¹⁸¹ Namely, while the European evolutionary model, during the transition from feudalism, involves class disputes between reactionary conservatives and marxistically profiled class of the poor, the consensual form of politics prevailed in Japan during the breakup with the feudal paradigm. The Japanese transformation into a modern bureaucratic state, accomplished during the *Meiji* era, is marked

¹⁸¹ Pye, L. W. and Pye, M. W. (1985) *Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority*, Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, pp. 158-160.

several academically intriguing characteristics: (1) extraordinary speed of the metamorphosis from the shogunate system into a modern bureaucratic one; (2) absence of charismatic leadership; (3) efficiency and ease with which different opposing and potentially conflicting elements were consolidated into some form of pacification, harmony or order; and (4) the transition of the basic Japanese cultural code from a distinct national, virtually total introversion to the national extroversion, marked with a pursuit of more perfect or propulsive practice models in virtually all that concerns the political or economic sphere, while minding that the system of its own traditions was not devastated in the process. To a greater or lesser degree, Japanese transformation process succeeded in realising the transposition of power as a monopolistic attribute of some dominant, monopolist class or ascriptive group into a power associated with a national consensus.

As already suggested in the part dealing with identity, one theoretical strand in the modern approach to nationalism treats the nation as the newly-constituted and historically contingent form of collective identity that never achieve or fulfil the self-proclaimed contentions related to their common purpose and primordial basis. Having this in mind, one of the major dilemmas related to the deconstruction of the Japanese national narrative can be expressed as a quest for modernity without the loss of identity.¹⁸² There has been a shift in emphasis from the nation that is synonymous with the state, towards indigenous identities profiled as non-Western, to opposing tradition to the modern state as an expression of the imagery of westernisation which attempts to assert its inclination for the statist understanding of the national culture as hegemonious over other social and cultural traditions. Often marginalised or particularly overlooked in the discourse on Japanese nationalism has been the history of perceiving the nation *per se* as a single ethnic corpus, as well as the tension between the ethnic (I would say: generic) nation and the political state. Japanese nationalist narratives, as a result of marginalisation of the ethnic imagination, are usually equalent to the narratives of the westernised and glorified state; there has been a scholarly neglect of the narrative of ethnic (generic) nation and a more naturalised vision of the community (often suggested as important categories in understanding the Japanese perception of nation).

For a proper understanding of Japanese national discourse it is necessary, above all, to comprehend theoretical projection of “ultra-nationalism” (*chō-kokkashugi*) of Masao Maruyama,

¹⁸² Tanaka, S. (1996) *Japan's Orient: Rendering Pasts into History*. Berkeley: University of California Press, p. 3.

one of the greatest postwar Japanese political thinkers.¹⁸³ It would be wrong to understand this proposition as a universal championing of radical nationalism, as it is rather surpassing or a peculiar substitute for a state. To a greater or lesser extent, we deal with an inadequate interpretation of the essay *Theory and Psychology of Ultra-Nationalism* that is predominantly oriented to clarification of the political context that characterised Japan during World War II.¹⁸⁴ In fact, Maruyama's main intention is not utter discredit of nationalism, but distinction between healthy, post-war nationalism, a combination of democracy and civic nationalism (*kokuminshugi*), and a malign pole, ultra-nationalism or state militarism of Japanese imperialism. To this should be definitely added the articulation of an alternative concept of ethnic national awareness (*minzokushugi*).

Fundamentally speaking, when we discuss Japanese national narrative, we can distinguish its three variants: (1) *kokuminshugi*- based on the concept of *kokumin*, nation organised in a political entity, which does not necessarily have to be derived from ethnic principle; (2) *minzokushugi*- based on the concept of *minzoku*, nation understood as predominantly ethnic community; and (3) *kokkashugi*- based on favouring or glorification of the state (*kokka*), on its positioning above everything else, even nation itself. Differentiation of various definitions of nation and nationalism (ethnic nationalism, political nationalism, cultural nationalism, civic nationalism, etc.) is relatively quite novel to the western political thought.¹⁸⁵

Bearing that in mind, when we focus on cultural nationalism it should be emphasised that it is not a conceptual variation or modification, but rather an “aggregative” concept that informs us how ideologies mobilise identity within a range of distinguished modes of nationalism, i.e. how different forms of nationalism are mobilised via cultural discourse. It could be said that cultural nationalism (*bunka nashonarizumu*) is oriented towards renewal of a national community through creation, preservation or strengthening cultural identity in those moments of crisis when

¹⁸³ See Maruyama, M. (1969) *Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics*, London: Oxford University Press and Doak, K. (2007) *A History of Nationalism in Modern Japan: Placing the People*, Leiden: Brill.

¹⁸⁴ Maruyama, M. (1969) *Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics*, op. cit., pp. 1-24. and Gayle, C. A. (2001) “Progressive Representations of the Nation: Early Post-war Japan and Beyond.” *Social Science Japan Journal*, 4(1): 1-19.

¹⁸⁵ See Yoshino, K. (1992) *Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan: A Sociological Enquiry*, London: Routledge.; Ignatieff, M. (1993) *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism*, Toronto: Penguin Canada.; Stilz, A. (2009) “Civic Nationalism and Language Policy.” *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 37(3): 257-292.; Mason, A. (2000) *Community, Solidarity and Belonging: Levels of Community and Their Normative Significance*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.; and McKim, R. and McMahan, J. (eds.) (1997) *The Morality of Nationalism*, New York: Oxford University Press.

it is perceived to be endangered, missing or inadequate. Civic nationalism, unlike ethnic which gives prominence to a certain ethnic group within a society, presupposes that social collective identity and political sovereignty emanate from adherence to a certain set of values, not encumbered by favouring race, religion, gender, language or ethnicity, i.e. valid for all territorial-component encompassed states. It should be also added that political nationalism is oriented toward realisation of a representative state and for relational political community and assertion of civil rights to its members, thus enabling the experience and functioning of a common political community.

The phenomenon of intellectual nationalism, captured by the term *nihonjinron*, is also relevant for the understanding of the Japanese nationalism. It literally means the “discussion about Japan” and it refers to the reinvention, recalibration and redefinition of the Japanese “uniqueness” and distinctiveness.¹⁸⁶ In relation to the primary nationalism of the pre-war and wartime Japan, *nihonjinron* denotes the secondary, post-war variant of the Japanese nationalism. Simultaneously, it is also designated as the “resurgent cultural nationalism” as opposed to the “prudent revivalist nationalism”, which seeks to annul negative attitudes to some elements of the “old, primary nationalism” the emperor system (*tennō-sei*), or some of its symbols and practices. The thriving of the Japanese cultural nationalism is characteristic of the 1970s and 1980s and it coincides with the extraordinary Japanese economic boom. In this context, *nihonjinron* is treated as: (1) an attempt to reconstruct the national identity threatened by aggressive westernization and rapid industrialization, to formulate a symbolic line between the Japanese (“us”) and Westerners (“them”) and/or the to re-affirm and sustain the sense of historical continuity with the authentic Japanese tradition; (2) as a source of the Japanese economic wonder and of Japan’s consequent moral victory; (3) as the concealment of the capitalist (manipulative) nature of the Japanese society by downplaying the ideological nature of the harmony and homogeneity of the social culture articulated by *nihonjinron*; and (4) as the intrinsic feature of self-reflexion and self-examination incorporated in the Japanese culture with the relevant referral to the outgroup references.

¹⁸⁶ See Yoshino, K. (1992) *Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan: A Sociological Enquiry*, London: Routledge, pp. 7-29, 137-168. and Kowner, R. (2002) “Deconstructing the Japanese National Discourse: Laymen’s Beliefs and Ideology.” in Donahue, R. T. (ed.) *Explaining Japaneseness: on Japanese Enactments of Culture and Consciousness*. West Port: Ablex Publishing, pp. 169-183.

Self-perception of the Japanese position, at least on the level of political and economic elite, can be identified by terms of a peaceful state (*heiwa kokka*) and a trade state (*shonin kokka*).¹⁸⁷ To understand Japanese collective identity is impossible if we bypass a “vertical” historical component of the national narrative, by defining it as a mere recent temporal provision, as a “horizontal” national process of codification and recodification of its own historically simulated symbolic content. Moreover, unlike individualism, horizontality and self-autonomy as main attributes of western societies, Japanese social structure is distinguished by interpersonalism, verticality and dependence/other-directedness. It is thought, therefore, that the prevalent image of Japanese society could be more successfully explained through vertical stratification of the institutions or clusters of institutions in relation to horizontal stratification of classes or castes.¹⁸⁸ What is interpreted as important for Japanese society is not, for example, labour force confrontation with capitalists and ruling class, but rather conflict and confrontation of companies A and B.

The concept *kokutai* is drawn into the foreground as an underlying Japanese pre-war identity narrative (or set of narratives) and focal point of Japanese pre-war Asian imaginarium. Its direct translation means national essence or a community as a political entity. Initially, the original, mythologically positioned, the concept highlights the permanence of the emperor system (*tennosei*) or throne (Japanese emperor is a continuing monarch and deified patriarch that incarnates the state or temporally limitless succession of imperial status), i.e. state, and in that context *kokutai* is symbolically tied to Japan as a divinely unified state.¹⁸⁹ Subsequently, in concordance with Meiji Restoration, symbolic reconfiguration of the concept occurs and it begins to denote an autonomous state capable of surviving in the milieu of Western colonialism, thus becoming a specific ideological matrix for legitimation of sovereignty on the domestic and foreign plane respectively. As another element of politicisation of symbolic characteristics of the concept an amalgamation with the narrative of elites can be distinguished, where *kokutai* surpasses a dichotomy of inner-outer, and the attitudes of autochthonous Japanese elites of the

¹⁸⁷ Tamaki, T. (2010) *Deconstructing Japan's Image of South Korea: Identity in Foreign Policy*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 1-15.

¹⁸⁸ Nakane, C. (1972) *Japanese society*. Berkeley: University of California Press, p. 87.

¹⁸⁹ See Gluck, C. (1985) *Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.; Jansen, M. B. (1984) “Japanese Imperialism: Later Meiji Perspectives.” in Myers, R. H. and Peattie, M. R. (eds.) *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 61-80.; Tamaki, T. (2010) *Deconstructing Japan's Image of South Korea: Identity in Foreign Policy*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.; and Kazuhiro, T. (2007) *The Meiji Constitution: The Japanese Experience of the West and the Shaping of the Modern State*, Tokyo: International House of Japan.

period demanded a unified and harmonious state capable of resisting Western colonial aggressiveness through progress based on strength (*fukoku kyohei*).

The locus of the most explicit hypostasis of *heiwa kokka* narrative is a Japanese constitution proclaimed in 1947. It should be emphasised, though, that despite the intensive dictate of Supreme Command of the Allied Powers (SCAP) during its formulation, the constitution contains a factor of autochthonous narratives as well, something which cannot be defined as exclusively a product of foreign intrusion. In that sense, post-war perpetuation of a pacifist cultural algorithm bespeaks of its domestication, of incorporation into narrative origins of Japanese elites, even under assumption that its superiority functions as a pure verbal improvisation, its textual centrality in foreign affairs narratives indicates discursive preposition within which a number of available options is legitimised. The most explicit narrative standardisation of thus expressed constellation can be noticed in the preamble and Article IX of the constitution. It is stated in the preamble: “We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationship, and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world.”¹⁹⁰ The article 9, as a glaring refutation of the war clause, prescribes the following: “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”¹⁹¹ The doctrine of Shigeru Yoshida should be added to this, the doctrine which can be expressed through the following dimensions of foreign policy: (1) safeguarding economic recovery and post-war reconstruction; (2) minimal armament, and (3) an alliance between Japan and the United States as a nucleus of Japanese security policy.

Narratives that are concerned with *shonin kokka* remain as yet another aspect of the manifestation or representation of Japanese identity. Several of its variances can be identified: (1) *chonin kokka*- manifests the idea that Japan epitomises a nation of “shrewd merchants”; (2) *kaiyo kokka* or maritime power-apart from defining Japan through its geographical attributes, the phrase

¹⁹⁰ *The Constitution of Japan* (available at: <http://web-japan.org/factsheet/en/pdf/09Constitution.pdf>, accessed May 13, 2014), p. 1.

¹⁹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 2.

indicates a distinctly profiled necessity for Japan to be a “mercantile state” as well; and (3) *shigen sho-koku* or resource-lacking state- symbolises Japanese dependence on import as a weak spot of the national corpus. Such symbolic conjunction, in addition to the military aspect, suggests the significance or incorporation of the economic dimension in the fundamental proposition of the security narrative; it, thus, means provision of natural resources and focus on the enhancement of scientific and technological potentials for the welfare of Japan, and furthermore underlines the importance of acting towards equalisation of the regional development with global economic trends. *Ergo*, proportionally to its economic capabilities and conforming to the concept of a peaceful nation, Japan is reliant on preserving of world peace and functioning on the line of the interests of the international society. To a greater or lesser degree in concordance with such a discursive distribution, Japan poses as a link between post-industrial world and developing countries (entailing as well the integration of China into the international economic system).

It could be said that Japanese understanding of freedom is similar to the one that characterises European corpus of nations, that it sprang from the influence of European conceptualisation of the state, constitutionalism and social democracy, that encompasses both pre- and post-war Japan.¹⁹² Undoubtedly, the Japanese, similar to Europeans, both in the conservative and social-democratic end of political spectrum, have adopted collectivist conception of freedom, they assume as a duty of the state to undertake warranting freedom from economic disturbances and social instability, which poses as a position diverse to American-profiled unconditional glorification of personal freedom as “divinised” principle. Both on the historical vertical and contemporary horizontal, Europeans absorbed the concept of freedom, but in such a way to, unlike American approach, be more articulate in their exploration of the balance between individually determined needs relating to the standards of good at the level of the society and state.

In my opinion, for this analysis can be useful for two more concepts. First, It should be added here that simultaneously with deliberative democratic discourse, where the focus is on a society on the certain level of development which materialises minimalisation of power in social relations, a theoretical recourse could be established, which as a core of democracy poses the issue of constitution of power forms compatible with democratic values. Such a proposition

¹⁹² See Garon, S. (2002) “Japan: State, Society, and Collective Goods versus the Individual.” in Taylor, R. H. (ed.) *The Idea of Freedom in Asia and Africa*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 214-248.

implies that thus defined nature of social relations has its counterpart in pragmatic foundation of a demand for legitimacy of power. Such an immanent impulse for bridging the gap between power and legitimacy does not mean that every power is automatically legitimate, but indicates that: (1) if a certain power succeeded in realisation, it is because it was recognised as legitimate; and (2) if legitimacy is based on aprioristic ground, it is because it results from realised power. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe hold that the link between legitimacy, power and hegemonic order represents what the deliberative project completely overlooks by its positioning of rational argumentation where the power was eliminated, and legitimacy based on pure rationality.¹⁹³ The first distinction that is needed to formulate agonistic-pluralistic model of democracy, as opposite to aggregative and deliberative models, is clarification of discrepancy between „meta-political“ and politics. As „meta-political“ we understand that dimension of antagonism which is, as it has already been indicated, inherent to human relations, antagonisms that can be materialised in various forms and types of social relations. Politics, on the other hand, indicates the universality of practice, discourse and institutions that aspire to impose a certain order and organise human coexistence in conditions of potential conflicts arising from a „meta-quality“ of a conflictuous human nature.

As a main goal of agonistic-pluralistic project can be pinpointed the way of transformation of enemy status into opponent (or rival) status, into a condition that would guarantee confrontation of ideas, but without elimination of their right to defence. This is a transformation of Schmittian antagonism (from ancient Greek word *ανταγωνισμός* meaning extreme enmity) into agonism (from ancient Greek word *ἀγών* meaning chivalrous rivalry). Thus set change represents objective meaning of liberal-democratic tolerance, the category of opponent does not eliminate antagonisms and should be distanced from the notion of participant in liberal competition with which is often identified; while liberal rivals fight for dominance within existent hegemonic system, agonistic opponents question the prevalent hegemony.¹⁹⁴ After all, the opponent can be defined as an enemy (antagonist), if that implies a legitimate opponent with whom we share the common space of ethical-political principles of liberal democracy: freedom and equality, struggle against ideas does not mean denial of the rights to defend those ideas.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹³ See Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C. (1985) *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*, London: Verso.

¹⁹⁴ Mouffe, C. (2005) *On the Political*, London: Routledge, p. 21.

¹⁹⁵ Mouffe, C. (2000) *The Democratic Paradox*, London: Verso, p. 102.

Agonistic concept does not treat the inversion of the enemy status into opponent status as radical metamorphosis of political identity, but defines it rather as horizontal process of identification paradigms conversion . It is obvious, therefore, that a primary function of agonistic pluralism, defined as reshaping of antagonisms into agonisms, demands a provision of channels through which collective passions could be completely fulfilled.

Secondly, For Emmanuel Levinas, a thinker on whose ethical proposition numerous poststructuralist thinkers have relied, ethic is relieved from metaphysicality and enthroned as the first philosophy. Contrary to the modern philosophical ethic which is, according to Levinas, founded on the Self, primordial relation is not oriented towards itself or objects, but towards the Other: it is an ethical relationship of a permanent responsibility for the Other. However, such an ethical constellation does not aspire to absorb the Other into itself but is in fact reliant on "perpetuation" of that distinction, which coincides with poststructuralist concept of one's identity being directly linked to distinction, a quality not to be feared of nor eliminated. It is a state where "I" is utterly and immensely obligated to the Other, an ethical relation that precedes and surpasses egoism and "tyranny of ontology", to be Self means to be open toward and responsible to and for the Other.¹⁹⁶ To toe the line, a "statist" conception of ethic, an ethical tendency toward state citizens and distancing from foreigners, can be criticised. It could be said that in various aspects Levinas' ethic is similar to Christian ethic of love, but its advantage lies in its altruistic dimension, i.e. the fact that it is not institutionalised through Christianity. Ethic represents a binary relationship, relationship between two people, while with the arrival of the (impersonal) Third arises a need for justice and politics, both to whom violence is immanent. The existence of the Third, therefore, suggests: (1) that we are all in connection with one another, (2) that personal responsibility towards others is under the influence of how others treat one another and what they do to or for others, (3) that the existence of the Third makes all relations both direct and intermediary; and (4) that the existence of the Third results in a situation where personal responsibility is limited and generates the issue of justice.¹⁹⁷ One of the exigencies of a just moral and political system is impartiality, equal respect for the equals and equal protection of universally available rights. A state can be founded on laws, protectionist and with judicial power,

¹⁹⁶ Hand, S. (1989) "Introduction." in Levinas, E. *The Levinas Reader*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 1, 4-5.

¹⁹⁷ Morgan, M. L. (2007) *Discovering Levinas*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 454.

but to be just in Levinas' sense it must be defined through personal responsibility for all and sundry, i.e. the excess of duty over rights must prevail.

As already suggested, constructivist interpretation of the disproportion between economic and military power of Japan, as underlying conceptual deviation from neorealist theoretical discourse, is based on indicating the trajectories by which common norms and ideas, cultural and symbolic codes, shape politics through formulation and reformulation of the identity and interest of the agent. Japanese international standing could be interpreted through resistance to insistence on parallelism between military capacities and, on the other hand, economic power, and the overall political standing in the international community. In other words, Japanese security policy possesses two distinguished qualities that deserve more detailed observation.¹⁹⁸ Firstly, it can be treated as non-traditional, as it is not strictly concentrated on military aspects but encompasses economic and political parameters, as well. Secondly, it is simultaneously flexible and rigid, flexible in the matters of economic security but rigid in the matters of military security, and both flexible and rigid when the focus of attention is political security (terms flexible and rigid are not related to any specific political orientation).

Bearing in mind what has been said previously, we can actually talk about Japanese anti-militarist culture, i.e. anti-militarist norms and (collective) identity, which, prodded by benevolent hegemony of the USA, developed in fifties and sixties of the past century.¹⁹⁹ Truth to be told, if such historical positioning can be even partially explained by international position of Japan, then the boom which followed in seventies and the international repositioning of Japan respectively testify to the continuity of national security policy, i.e. the fact that prominence is given to its pacifist cultural matrix. Therefore, it is founded on the belief that "if any advantage could be drawn from violence, it is unremunerative on a broader scale" and forging of national identity of Japan as a "peaceful mercantile state", which directly affects the perception and formulation of Japanese security concerns as attainable through peaceful means.

¹⁹⁸ Katzenstein, P. and Okawara, N. (1993) "Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies." *International Security*, 17(4): 84. and Katzenstein, P. (1996a) *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 1-17.

¹⁹⁹ See Berger, T. (1993) "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism." *International Security*, 17(4): 119-150.; Berger, T. (1996) "Norms, identity, and national security in Germany and Japan." in Katzenstein, P. (ed.) *The Culture of National Security*, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 317-356.; and Berger, T. (1998) *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

The development of an anti-militarist security algorithm can be accounted for by apocalyptic defeat of Japan in World War II and a consequential urge to thwart any possibility of a similar political-security constellation. Still, it is undeniable although less important that bipolar division of world power after 1945, as a significant historical milestone on the level of its international “distribution”, reflected itself on the metamorphosis of Japanese collective identity away from the optics of aggressive militaristic discourse toward the optics of mercantile-pacifist one, relating to the questioning of political mechanisms through which that transformation was achieved. Memories and beliefs associated with such epochal international historical events are interpreted and reinterpreted by political agents.²⁰⁰ However, that broadest cultural platform of Japanese security anti-militarism is transposed into a set of self-imposed restrictive rules on the defence policy: (1) non-nuclear principles- Japan does not possess, produce or allows installation of nuclear weapons on its territory; (2) a moratorium on participation in a collective defence; (3) a moratorium on arms exports; and (4) maximum appropriation of 1% of GDP for defence expenditure.²⁰¹

When we place Sino-Japanese relations in our focus, it is worth noting that the factor of history, as a well-researched topic, is treated in two argumentative ways:²⁰² (1) on the one hand, it opens up avenues for the perception of the traumatic experience caused by Japanese imperial expansionism against China, as a reified, ubiquitous or “default“ formative identity stance of Chinese indignation and victimization; (2) and, on the other, the history of Japanese imperial expansionism can potentially be utilized and/or controlled by the (communist) party elite in order to (2.1) use Japan’s war guilt to demand political concessions from Japan (pressures on Japan in this case are indirectly linked with China’s position in relations among great powers) and (2.2) utilize it to build a strong stance against Japan, defining them as patriotic forces and gaining them an extra “dose“ of legitimacy. The first explanatory discourse tends to position Japan using the narrative of the absolute (“natural“, “ontological“ “ absolute“ or “ public“) enemy, situated within the „state of affairs“ itself, as a default identity constant of the Chinese „Otherness“, which

²⁰⁰ Katzenstein, P. (1996a) *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan*, op. cit., pp. 2.

²⁰¹ Miyashita, A. (2008) “Where Do Norms Come From? Foundations of Japan’s Postwar Pacifism.” in Sato, Y. and Hirata, K. (eds.) *Norms, Interests, and Power in Japanese Foreign Policy*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 25.

²⁰² Suzuki, S. (2007) “The Importance of ‘Othering’ in China’s National Identity: Sino-Japanese Relationship as a Stage of Identity Conflicts.” *The Pacific Review*, 20(1): 25-26; Rozman, G. (2002) “China’s changing images of Japan, 1989–2001: the struggle to balance partnership and rivalry.” *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 2(1): 106

completes the circle of cultural distinction preference, while the second explanatory discourse treats Sino-Japanese relations as part of a more broadly framed cultural matrix of Western „Otherness“. This difference between the meta-petrification of Japan as the key identity nucleus and Japan labelled as the „advocate“ in the larger resolution of Western “Otherness” , is indeed the most striking example that no historical discourse is ontologically given and ethically “filtered”, it is contingent and in a perpetual process of construction, deconstruction and reconstruction depending on the dictate of the ruling elite, its text is written and re-written according to the predominant coding of political power.

Currently, Japan has territorial disputes with both China, concerning the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, and with Korea, about the Takeshima/Dokdo islands. In both cases, claims for sovereignty rights have had powerful historical discursive background. For the Japanese political establishment, the Senkaku islands represent an integral part of Japan’s territory, based upon both historical facts and international law.²⁰³ Namely, Japanese official narrative draws upon its incorporation of the disputed islands before the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki (17 April 1895) which ended the first Sino-Japanese war (1894-1895), and due to this, Chinese claims of the islands based on the treaty’s unfairness, are unfounded and irrelevant, as well as on the absence of such claims until 1968, when the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East declared the conflict zone as potentially rich in oil and gas. Recognizing that the San Francisco Peace Treaty (signed on 08 September 1951) did not include the Takeshima/Dokdo Islands as one of the territories that Japan should despite explicit demands by South Korea to place the islands on the list of problem territories, Japan treats South Korea’s sovereignty over the islands as not in line with international law, and therefore also as illegal occupation.²⁰⁴

A Free Trade Agreement (FTA) represents an arrangement of two or more states on creating a zone of free trade, in which all potential trade barriers are eased or eliminated (the agreement does is not necessarily limited to the customs tariffs or import quotas, but also to military issues and free flow of people). Besides bilateral negotiation between Japan and South Korea and China and South Korea and the fact that Japan and China did not sign the agreement, there are also trilateral negotiations among all three parties. It is true that the FTA would be

²⁰³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2013) *The Senkaku Island*, [online] Available at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/pdfs/senkaku_en.pdf [Accessed 05 July 2014], pp. 1, 7, 11.

²⁰⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2014) *Takeshima: Seeking a Solution based on Law and Dialogue*, [online] Available at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/takeshima/pdfs/takeshima_pamphlet.pdf [Accessed 05 July 2014], p. 2-3.

conducive to the strengthening of economic ties based on mutual benefit of the parties involved (win-win situation), but the Joint Study Committee in its *Joint Study Report for an FTA among China, Japan and Korea* from 2011 suggests ways and methods for the settlement of contentious issues in its Chapter entitled: *Disputes Settlement Mechanism*.²⁰⁵ This Chapter, which aims to facilitate the peaceful settlement of disputes, includes institutes ranging from Consultations, Good Offices, Conciliation or Mediation to Arbitral Tribunals or Panels, as well as the execution of awards or reports by the Arbitral Tribunals or Panels. Perceptions of the enemy no doubt influence the course and success of trilateral cooperation, due to negative attribution and stereotyping that lower the total sum of trust among the parties. A ramification of such a situation is that any initiative undertaken by Japan with a view to bolstering economic cooperation is treated with a high level of suspicion and deemed as political intrigue, manipulation or trickery. As suggested earlier, if there is any perspective of hostility that is exposed to deconstruction: the economic dimension in this case, as a kind of contradictory balance, nearly always there is also the narrative segment, due to the depth of the enemy identity matrix, which still figures as a change-defying text, or in this case: a full spectrum of political relations between Japan and China.

In my opinion, Japanese pacifistic code and analog discourse of transformation of hostility into friendship is best manifested in the construction of a regional narrative, because Japan gravitates²⁰⁶ towards the formulation of peaceful and non-aggressive international regional texts. Regionalism could be determined in two mutually permeated manners. On the one hand, it could be understood as an expression of ideational categories, as a unique conceptual view of advantages arising from the development of common norms, values, goals and policies among people and governments of a particular part of the world.²⁰⁷ On the other hand, regionalism could be understood from the institutional viewpoint, in terms of existence of transnational institutions that enable a formally regulated co-operation among states in the given geographic area.²⁰⁸ It is by no means indisputable that relations between these two propositions entails the execution of an engaged realisation of the idea of the region through establishment of a certain institutional

²⁰⁵ Joint Study Committee (2011) *Joint Study Report for an FTA among China, Japan and Korea*, [online] Available at: <http://www.meti.go.jp/press/2011/03/20120330027/20120330027-3.pdf> [Accessed 03 July 2014], pp. 110-112.

²⁰⁶ See Yamazaki, R. (1997) "Review of the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation: A Japanese Perspective." *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, 9(2): 27-44.

²⁰⁷ Kim, S. (2004) "Regionalization and Regionalism in East Asia." *Journal of East Asian Studies*, 4(1): 39-67.

²⁰⁸ See Pempel, T. J. (ed.) (2005) *Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

structure: when we consider the dynamics of creation of a certain region, ideas precede the formulation of a specific regional institutional framework. Regionalism, therefore, refers to political structures that reflect and shape strategies of governments, corporations and various non-governmental organisations and social movements.²⁰⁹ Despite the agreement of governmental and non-governmental agents on general norms, values, goals and policies, significant frictions could occur among the members of the region on the level of establishment of regional borders, the rhythm of regional evolution or guidelines for regional development. An essential element in the approach to regions also lies in the fact that regions are not predetermined or static, so their analysis should incorporate evolutive perspective that takes into account both structural changes and changes in perception and self-comprehension of relevant regional agents.²¹⁰ Moreover, as it has been already mentioned, regions can be understood even without their physical geography mapping or determinedness as already given, natural and essential, in a sense of being socially constructed, founded on common identity and politically open to a whole spectrum of changes.

Apart from the notion of regionalism, which, thus, is comprised of ideas, identities and ideologies linked to regional project, the notion of regionalisation could be determined as a process of creation of material bonds that lead to enhancement in co-operation, convergence or integration out of state borders in a given geographical area, as a process of regional interaction which results in the creation of regional space. Actually, regionalisation emphasises multidimensional deliberation of regionalism, i.e. the fact that the development of one region consists of the consideration of cultural, economic, political, security and social factors needed for its exhaustive perception and formulation of an adequate regional arrangement.²¹¹ It should be mentioned that this process could be perceived both as a factor in opposition to globalising trends and a propulsive moment of globalisation. The relationship between regionalism and regionalisation can be set as a relationship of a state/states governed project, directed to organisation of a special regional space in accordance with defined economic and political positions, with a non-governmental or social project, a complex formulation of institutions, rules and patterns of social interaction of non-governmental agents, i.e. as a relationship of public

²⁰⁹ Katzenstein, P. (2000) "Regionalism and Asia." *New Political Economy*, 5(3): 354.

²¹⁰ Camilleri, J. (2003) *Regionalism in the New Asia-Pacific Order*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, p. 25.

²¹¹ Taylor, P. (1993) *International Organization in the Modern World: The Regional and the Global Process*, London: Pinter, p. 7.

policy initiatives and civil sector activities.²¹² It should be noticed that, apart from this standpoint, there coexists also a standpoint that claims that regionalism stands for a political project where the state is not the only involved agent, and those various agents that coexist with their own visions and concepts: at times identically oriented, while sometimes colliding, formulate ideational regional context. Qualitative improvement of the co-operation among regional agents leads to what could be marked as a concept of regionalism: harmonization of political regimes, cultural predicaments, economic policies and security agreements.

Inadequate (weak) institutionalisation of East Asia could be explained by the fact that the weaker states in the region see the formation of regional institutions as a consequence of an unequal local distribution of power, which predominantly reflects the interests of the stronger states and negatively impacts their security. It could be also defined in a completely opposite way: as a result of current policies of China and Japan, which is not prone to rash actions directed to formal institutionalisation of regional integrations, quite opposite to the preferences of the weaker regional states towards their creation.²¹³ However, if we put into focus the factors that are not decisively linked to relations of power (neo-realistic aspects), the development of regional Asian institutions can be marked as a rather complicated, not only due to significant diversity of regional states, but also a tendency of regional states to informal, negotiative approach to politics (as opposed to formal-legalistic method). Furthermore, unlike closed European regionalism, Asian regionalism can be defined as an open variant, the one that implies non-discriminatory trade practices and a will to accept new members. Such a conjunction is most often explained by a high level of economic, political and cultural heterogeneity of Asian states, and the relationship of the Asian region with the USA. In pursuit of this line of enquiry, weak institutionalisation can be explained also by: (1) the fact that the USA after World War II promoted the principle of bilateralism for Asia and multilateralism for Europe; (2) the fact that the construction of a collective identity made the establishment of a formal regional integration easier, but Asian political agents refused to acknowledge the idea of creation of a separate community at that level; and (3) the fact that disproportionality in the nature of Asian states was such that it hindered the creation of regional institutions. The most important field of the Asian regional integration was

²¹² Dent, C. M. *East Asian Regionalism*. Routledge, London, 2008, p. 7. and Gamble, A. and Payne, A. (2003) "The World Order Approach." in Söderbaum, F. and Shaw, T. M. (eds.) *Theories of New Regionalism*, New York: Palgrave, p. 50.

²¹³ See Katzenstein, P. (1997) "Introduction: Asian Regionalism in Comparative Perspective." in Katzenstein, P. and Shiraishi, T. (eds.) *Network Power: Japan and Asia*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 1-47.

the market, i.e. the increase in trade, direct investment, technological transfer and capital flow, so that, accordingly, a crucial role was played by multinational corporations, while political co-operation played a minimal one. This way of association, the process „down upwards“founded on economic ties and networks, is different from the process of political dialogue „up downwards“, characteristic of Europe, that precedes economic transactions.

In the late 80s and 90s of the previous century, the two most common conceptions of regions in this part of the world were manifested through a notion of transpacific region institutionalised via the forum of Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC, founded in 1989, with the main aim of establishing free trade and investments zones until 2020)²¹⁴ and a conception of restricted region of South-Eastern Asia institutionalised via Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN, founded in 1967, with the main aim of its evolving into ASEAN Economic Community, AEC, i.e. the creation of a common market, until 2015),²¹⁵ which in 1997 was expanded to include China, Japan and South Korea (in the form of ASEAN Plus Three, APT). While the necessity of establishment of such an organisation as APT (primarily focused on financial co-operation and integration) is by no means called into question by its members, on the other hand there are visible discrepancies as to the purpose of the organisation, the means of implementation of its proclaimed goals and membership. A product of such conditions are two opposing visions of the future of East-Asian regionalism: (1) on the one hand, it is seen as a compact region which is more or less quite satisfactorily expressed through APT model (this standpoint is championed by the majority of ASEAN members as well as China); (2) on the other hand, it is thought that APT should pose as a foundation for the establishment of a far broader regional organisation (this standpoint is supported by governments of India, Australia and Japan). The common denominator of both concepts is the treatment of a region as an adequate form of tackling the common economic, political and military challenges, although the approach to those is not in unison but divergent in certain characteristics.

When we consider Japanese approach to the region, first of all it should be said that Japanese foreign policy is „imprisoned“ by the historical vertical of a permanent dilemma over political, economic and cultural inclination toward Asia or toward the West. After World War II,

²¹⁴ Members of APEC are: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, China, Hong Kong, the USA, Canada, Mexico, Peru, Chile, Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, Vietnam, Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Russia.

²¹⁵ Members of AEC are: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malesia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam.

especially during Korean War, Japan developed strong economic and security ties with the USA, which have been maintained up to the present day. At the same time, ties with the rest of Asia were primarily based on economic matters, i.e. Japan's need for natural resources and organising cheap production, which at the given moment improved the position of the state on the demanding global market.²¹⁶ Moreover, after World War II, Japan radically severed traditional ties with its geographical background, which resulted in further binding with various countries in Asia and Pacific. This particularly applies to Australia with which several initiatives for promotion of economic regionalism have been launched (as far back as 1960 a mutual idea of creating Pacific regional community was promoted), which culminated with establishment of broadly conceived APEC in 1989. Finally, as a counterbalance to more and more prominent economic and military dominance of China, as one of the most important values of East-Asian grouping processes Japan sees extensive regional inclusivity through active engagement of ever higher number of Asian states.

At the moment, it could be said that East-Asian regionalism is a manifestation of the prevalence of the „conceptual trend“ or vision incorporated in ASEAN, i.e. APT, and indirectly of Chinese approach to cardinal principles, organisational frame and institutional setting of the region itself. At this point it must be, however, mentioned that ASEAN is encumbered with certain „problems“ which can to a greater or lesser extent influence the level of success of its operability, which does not necessarily lead to degradation of its position of conceptually or organisationally most acceptable mode of co-operation. In that sense, the principle of noninterference in internal matters of member states may influence the level of regional cooperativity and integrations that can be reached, and a desire to create regional community is thwarted by insistence on inalienability of state sovereignty. A significant resultant conceptual point of „ASEAN view“ of the region's future, therefore, is consensual decision-making. A direct consequence of consensuality is an extremely complicated procedure for the increase in membership of the organisation itself, complicated in terms of having to reconcile occasionally very different and rigid views of the member states, which directly suggests a certain level of inherent isolation, difficulties and „regulatory reserve“ on the matters of its expansion. Furthermore, China and Japan regard ASEAN (i.e. APT) as a leading organisation of institutional

²¹⁶ See Miyagi, T. “Post-War Japan and Asianism.” *Asia-Pacific Review*, 13(2), 2006, pp. 1-15.

development of East-Asian regionalism. This implies that, in order to preserve such a position, we could hardly expect the support for the idea of broadly conceived region.

Similarly, even though the conceptual construction of „ASEAN and APT community“ particularly strong and the organisations themselves (ASEAN i APT) have contributed to the increase in the volume of co-operativity and intensifying the sense of regional affiliation and identity, this identity formula, as a sum of common values and beliefs, is painfully slowly and „cautiously“ developed. No doubt that such a constellation of cultivation of regional amalgamation is connected with „more than complex“ differences as underlying characteristic of the region. Bearing that in mind, impeding neo-realistic moment would be prolongation of antagonism between two leading regional powers- Japan and China, although interdependency of two states becomes bigger and bigger (Japan has become to Chine the most important foreign capital and technology source, while China has become to Japanese companies a crucial production area). From a constructivist racourse, „too broadly” set regionalisation, characteristic of EAS (East Asia Summit), could lead to essentially non-problematic trans-regionalisation, but with a potential for even further deepening of already significant intra-regional disproportionalities as a focal point of the inadequate rhythm of conceptual formation of regional identity.

Conclusion

The idea of enemy is actually manifested in a wide range of options and choices in understanding, discussing and responding to disputes and dangers. Even the position marked as “enemy” for a lack of choice, which surely the case may be, often presents a special kind of decision. The idea of enemy relies on the emotions and ideas that preceded politics itself, it is derived from wider cultural opinions, bordered by axiomatic beliefs, mythology, iconography, rituals and stereotypes, and with them it attempts to provide answers to questions associated with existence, order and suffering. It has an independent logic that consists of a “hermeneutic need” to give meaning to violence and danger. In this sense, whether we assume that war is inherent in human nature, there is a set of possibilities associated with our perception, meaning and reactions in relation to the phenomenon of hostility and our ideas and notions expand or narrow the field of choice, i.e. available options. So, in the enemy deconstruction process, it is necessary to insist on two aspects: (1) evaluation of the specific in the sense of renewed authorisation (and/or “neo-humanization”) of the political action field; and (2) acknowledgement of evil as a re-assessment of an individual’s own participation in the design of the enemy. The process implies intervention in the sense of initial rejection of domination of the reified “ritual language“ and “ceremonial“ behaviour aimed at perpetuating some cultural paradigm interpreted as hostile, including the re-coding of the entrenched (institutionalised) modes or codes by the culture of networked risk perception.

More or less, all efforts for a complete political consolidation of the former Yugoslav space are associated with defining the enemy’s cultural-code as an important part of a broader, still distinct, emphasis on the national as a result of persuasive elite actions. Since the collapse of Slobodan Milosevic’s regime of, Serbian political elite of democratic provenance has been focused on establishing the relations between the nations of former Yugoslavia on new foundations. For this process, significantly burdened with war crimes, the bombing of Serbia, Montenegro's exit from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the proclamation of Kosovo independence, it can be said that as much as the attribute “evil” appears in the definition of the enemy, as part of national identity profiling, so does the likelihood of violence increase, while the phrase “dangerous enemy” embodies risk. Consequently, malice, as “pure wickedness”, is deterministic and danger is probabilistic. Danger also makes room for non-violent activities and

the newly established Serbian perception of the Yugoslav nations, United States and the European Union shifts from evil foes to normal enemies- with whom it is possible and necessary to negotiate, regardless of any potential disputes and disagreements.

Although developments in the international environment land opportunities for the present-day Japan to redefine the level of independence of its military potentials, chances of this actually happening are scarce. Even if Japanese policy-makers moved forward into radical changes of such range, they meet considerable resistance by much of the populace and by elites, proponents of anti-militarist culture. In that context, although further evolution, correction and adjustment of the Japanese pacifist explication (construct) of defence and the consequent or conceptually broader interpretation of the enemy will be contingent on the extent, scope and depth of the international system transformation, it would be difficult to conceive these to be different from anti-militarist preferences that have been prevailing for seventy years now. The anti-militarist narrative has, in fact, become an indelible segment of the perception of the nation's self and as such, the formative cultural text in defining a full spectrum of norms, institutions and practices.

In summa, hostile entities are not constructed from the cultural-social-political vacuum, their persistence is a publically perpetuated narrative and mythological parable, controlled and directed by various types of elites. A political foe is, to a greater or lesser degree, a conceptual metaphore of the autochtone and alochtone political space, it is not an ontologically positioned quality of the internal and external (state or national) state of affairs that is transcended, and thus, predefined and meta-fixed, at least because this approach would imply that all individuals are at the same time enemies and friends, or some kind of „ontological chaos“ in which everyone would not only potentially, but actually be both an enemy and a friend to everyone else. *Ergo*, an enemy in the sphere of international relations is constructed and reconstructed, it is situational, contextual and historically contingent.

Bibliography:

- Aalto, P., Harle, V. and Moisiu, S. (eds.) (2011) *International Studies: Interdisciplinary Approaches*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Acharya, A. (1997) "Ideas, Identity, and Institution-Building: From the „ASEAN Way“ to the „Asia-Pacific Way.” *The Pacific Review*, 10(3): 319-346.
- Adler, E. (1997) "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics." *European Journal of International Relations*, 3(3): 319-363.
- Agger, B. (2004) *The Virtual Self: A Contemporary Sociology*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Aho, J. (1994) *This Thing of Darkness: A Sociology of the Enemy*, Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- Aho, J. (1998) *The Things of the World: A Social Phenomenology*, London: Praeger.
- Aristotel (1987) *Retorika (Rhetoric)*, Belgrade: Nezavisna izdanja 40.
- Anderson, B. (1998) *Nacija, zamišljena zajednica (Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism)*, Beograd: Plato. [Anderson, B. (1983) *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London: Verso.]
- Ashley R. (1986) "The Poverty of Neorealism." in Keohane, R. (ed.) *Neorealism and Its Critic*, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 255-301.
- Ashley, R. (1989) "Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism, and War." in Der Derian, J. and Shapiro, M. (eds.) *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics*, New York: Lexington Books, pp. 259-323.
- Ashley, R. (1996) "The Achievements of Post-structuralism." in Smith, S., Booth K. and Zalewski, M. (eds.) *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 240-254.
- Bajar, Ž. F. (2009) "Imaginarno u identitetskoj afirmaciji (Imaginary in an Identity Affirmation)." in Halpern, K. and Ruano-Borbalan, Ž. K. (eds.) *Identitet(i): pojedinci, grupa, društvo (Identity/Identities: Individual, Group, Society)*, Beograd: Clio, pp. 384-390.
- Baker, M. (2006) *Translation and Conflict: A Narrative Account*, London: Routledge.
- Barnett, M. and Duvall, R. D. (2005) "Power in World Politics." *International Organization*, 59(1): 39-75.
- Bartelson, J. (2009) *Visions of World Community*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Baudrillard, J. (1983) *Simulations*, New York: Semiotext(e).
- Befu, H. and Guichard-Anguis, S. (eds.) (2001) *Globalizing Japan: Ethnography of the Japanese Presence in Asia, Europe, and America*, London: Routledge.
- Beitz, C. (1999) *Political Theory and International Relations*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Berger, P. and Luckmann T. (1991) *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*, London: Penguin Books.

- Berger, T. (1993) "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism." *International Security*, 17(4): 119-150.
- Berger, T. (1996) "Norms, identity, and national security in Germany and Japan." in Katzenstein, P. (ed.) *The Culture of National Security*, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 317-356.
- Berger, T. (1998) *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Bleiker, R. (2003) *Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Blundell, M. W. (1991) *Helping Friends and Harming Enemies: A Study in Sophocles and Greek Ethics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991.
- Boas, M., Marchand, M. H. and Shaw, T. M. "The Weave-World: The Regional Interweaving of Economies, Ideas and Identities." in Söderbaum, F. and Shaw, T. M. (eds.) *Theories of New Regionalism*, New York: Palgrave, pp. 192-211.
- Brooks, S. (1997) "Dueling realisms." *International Organization*, 51(3): 445-478.
- Brown, R. H. (1990) "Rhetoric, Textuality, and the Postmodern Turn in Sociological Theory." *Sociological Theory*, 8(2): 188-197.
- Brown, W. (2001) *Politics Out of History*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Bruner, J. (1991) "The Narrative Construction of Reality." *Critical Inquiry*, 18(1): 1-21.
- Buck-Morss, S. (2000) *Dreamworld and Catastrophe: The Passing of Mass Utopia in East and West*, Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Burchill, S., Linklater A., Devetak R., Donnelly J., Paterson M., Reus-Smit C. and True, J. (eds.) (2005) *Theories of International Relations*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Burr, V. (1995) *An Introduction to Social Constructionism*, London: Routledge.
- Camilleri, J. (2003) *Regionalism in the New Asia-Pacific Order*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Campbell, D. (1992) *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Carr, E. (1946) *The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, London: Macmillan.
- Cassirer, E. (1946) *Language and Myth*, New York: Dover Publications.
- Clark, M. (1990) *Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Coleman, M. (1984) "Nuclear Politics in the 1980s." *Journal of Psychohistory*, 12(1): 121-132.
- Cooper, R. (2000) *The Postmodern State and the World Order*, London: Demos.
- Cornell, S. and Hartmann, D. (2007) *Ethnicity and Race: Making Identities in a Changing World*, London: SAGE.
- Dean, M. (2003) *Critical and Effective Histories: Foucault's Methods and Historical Sociology*, London: Routledge.

- Dent, C. M. (2008) *East Asian Regionalism*, London: Routledge, 2008.
- Denzin, N. (1986) "Postmodern social theory." *Sociological Theory*, 4(2): 194-204.
- Der Derian, J. and Shapiro, M. (eds.) (1989) *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics*, New York: Lexington Books.
- Der Derian, J. (2001) "The War of Networks." *Theory and Event*, 5(4): 10-21.
- Derrida, J. (1982) *Margins of Philosophy*, Brighton: The Harvester Press.
- Derrida, J. (2001) *Writing and Difference*, London: Routledge.
- Desch, M. "It is Kind to be Cruel: The Humanity of American Realism." *Review of International Studies*, 29(3): 415-426.
- Devetak R. (2005) "Postmodernism." in Burchill, S., Linklater A., Devetak R., Donnelly J., Paterson M., Reus-Smit C. and True, J. (eds.) *Theories of International Relations*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 161-188.
- Doak, K. (2007) *A History of Nationalism in Modern Japan: Placing the People*, Leiden: Brill.
- Donnelly, J. (2000) *Realism and International Relations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Douglas, M. (1996) *Natural Symbols: Explorations in cosmology*, London: Routledge.
- Đerić, G. (2005) *Prvo lice množine: kolektivno samopoimanje i predstavljanje- mitovi, karakteri, mentalne mape i stereotipi (First Person Plural: Collective Selfawareness and Representation- Myths, Characters, Mental Maps and Stereotypes)*, Beograd: Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju and Filip Višnjić.
- Đurić, J. (2008) "Identitet i interkulturalnost- Srbija kao mesto prožimanja Balkana i (Srednje) Evrope [Identity and Interculturality- Serbia as a Place of Permeation among Balkans and (Central) Europe]." *Filozofija i društvo*, 19(3): 217-232.
- Dorđević, J. (2009) *Postkultura: uvod u studije kulture (Postculture: An Introduction to the Study of Culture)*, Beograd: Clio.
- Eco, U. (1984) *Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language*, London: Macmillan Press.
- Eagleton, T. (1996) *Literary Theory: An Introduction*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Farley, E. (1996) *Deep Symbols: Their Postmodern Effacement and Reclamation*, Valley Forge: Trinity Press International.
- Finnemore, M. (1996) "Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology's Institutionalism." *International Organization*, 50(2): 325-347.
- Formozo, B. (2009) "Rasprave o etnicitetu (Discussions about Ethnicity)." in Halpern, K. and Ruano-Borbalan, Ž. K. (eds) *Identitet(i): pojedinci, grupa, društvo (Identity/Identities: Individual, Group, Society)*, Beograd: Clio, pp. 295-312.
- Foucault, M. (1966) *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*, New York: Vintage.
- Foucault, M. (1969) *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language*, New York: Harper Colophon.

- Foucault, M. (1994) "The Order of Things." in Faubion, J. D. (ed.) *Michel Foucault Essential Works: Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology*, New York: The New Press, pp. 261-269.
- Foucault, M. (1994) "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History." in Faubion, J. D. (ed.) *Michel Foucault Essential Works: Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology*, New York: The New Press, pp. 369-393.
- Foucault, M. (2002) "Truth and power." in Faubion, J. D. (ed.) *Michel Foucault Essential Works: Power*, London: Penguin Books, pp. 111-134.
- Fuller, S. (2007) "Genealogy." in Ritzer, G. (ed.) *The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology*, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 1896-1897.
- Funabashi, Y. (ed.) (2003) *Reconciliation in the Asia-Pacific*, Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Gamble, A. and Payne, A. (2003) "The World Order Approach." in Söderbaum, F. and Shaw, T. M. (eds.) *Theories of New Regionalism*, New York: Palgrave, pp. 43-63.
- Gane, N. (2002) *Max Weber and Postmodern Theory: Rationalization versus Re-enchantment*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Garon, S. (2002) "Japan: State, Society, and Collective Goods versus the Individual." in Taylor, R. H. (ed.) *The Idea of Freedom in Asia and Africa*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 214-248.
- Gayle, C. A. (2001) "Progressive Representations of the Nation: Early Post-war Japan and Beyond." *Social Science Japan Journal*, 4(1): 1-19.
- Gilpin, R. (1986) "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism." in Keohane, R. (ed.) *Neorealism and Its Critics*, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 301-322.
- Gilpin, R. (1996) "No one loves a political realist." *Security Studies*, 5(3): 3-26.
- Gluck, C. (1985) *Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Golubović, Z. (1999) *Ja i drugi: antropološka istraživanja individualnog i kolektivnog identiteta (I and Other: Anthropological Studies of Individual and Collective Identity)*, Beograd: Republika.
- Goodman, N. (1978) *Ways of Worldmaking*, Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company.
- Grimshaw, A. (2001) "Discourse and Sociology: Sociology and Discourse." in Schiffrin, D., Tannen D. and Hamilton, H. E. (eds.) *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003, pp.750-752.
- Gutting, G. (1989) *Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Scientific Reason*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Habermas, J. (1981) "Modernity versus Postmodernity." *New German Critique*, 22: 3-14.
- Habermas, J. (1987) *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Hand, S. (1989) "Introduction." in Levinas, E. *The Levinas Reader*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 1-9.
- Hamilton, P. (1992) "The Enlightenment and the Birth of Social Science." in Hall, S. and Gieben, B. (eds.) *Formations of Modernity*, Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 17-71.

- Halpern, K. and Ruano-Borbalan, Ž. K. (eds) (2009) *Identitet(i): pojedinci, grupa, društvo (Identity/Identities: Individual, Group, Society)*, Beograd: Clio.
- Harvey, D. (2003) *The New Imperialism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hinchman, L. P. and Hinchman S. K. (eds.) (1997) *Memory, Identity, Community: The Idea of Narrative in the Human Sciences*, Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Hinde, J. R. (2000) *Jacob Burckhardt and the Crisis of Modernity*, Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Hobsbawm, E. (1985) "Introduction: Inventing Traditions." in Hobsbawm, E. and Ranger, T. (eds.) *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hobsbawm, E. and Ranger, T. (eds.) (1985) *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hook, G. D., Gilson J., Hughes C. W. and Dobson, H. (2005) *Japan's International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security*, London: Routledge.
- Ignatieff, M. (1993) *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism*, Toronto: Penguin Canada.
- Ignatieff, M. (1998) *The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience*, New York: Henry Holt and Company.
- Ivy, M. (2005) "In/Comparable Horrors: Total War and the Japanese Thing." in Harootunian H. and Park H. O. (eds.) *Problems of Comparability: Possibilities for Comparative Studies*, Durham: Duke University Press, pp. 137-151.
- Jansen, M. B. (1984) "Japanese Imperialism: Later Meiji Perspectives." in Myers, R. H. and Peattie, M. R. (eds.) *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 61-80.
- Joint Study Committee (2011) *Joint Study Report for an FTA among China, Japan and Korea*, [online] Available at: <http://www.meti.go.jp/press/2011/03/20120330027/20120330027-3.pdf> [Accessed 03 July 2014]
- Jung, C. G. (2003) *Four Archetypes: Mother, Rebirth, Spirit, Trickster*, London: Routledge.
- Katzenstein, P. and Okawara, N. (1993) "Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies." *International Security*, 17(4): 84-118.
- Katzenstein, P. (1996a) *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Katzenstein, P. (ed.) (1996b) *The Culture of National Security*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Katzenstein, P. and Shiraishi, T. (eds.) (1997) *Network Power: Japan and Asia*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Katzenstein, P. (1997) "Introduction: Asian Regionalism in Comparative Perspective." in Katzenstein, P. and Shiraishi, T. (eds.) *Network Power: Japan and Asia*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 1-47.
- Katzenstein, P. (2000) "Regionalism and Asia." *New Political Economy*, 5(3): 353-368.

- Katzenstein, P. (2005) *A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Kazuhiro, T. (2007) *The Meiji Constitution: The Japanese Experience of the West and the Shaping of the Modern State*, Tokyo: International House of Japan.
- Keohane, R. (1986) (ed.) *Neorealism and Its Critics*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Kersten, R. (1996) *Democracy in Japan: Maruyama Masao and the Search for Autonomy*, London: Routledge.
- Kim, S. (2004) "Regionalization and Regionalism in East Asia." *Journal of East Asian Studies*, 4(1): 39-67.
- Kloskovska, A. (2005) *Sociologija kulture (Sociology of Culture)*, Beograd: Čigoja štampa.
- Kordić, S. (2010) "Ideologija nacionalnog identiteta i nacionalne kulture (The Ideology of National Identity and National Culture)." in Ajdačić, D. and Lazarević Di Đakomo, P. (eds.) *U čast Pera Jakobsena (In honor of Per Jacobsen)*, Beograd: SlovoSlavia, pp. 225-239.
- Kunio, Y. (2006) "Japanese Culture and Postwar Economic Growth." in Harrison, L. E. and Berger, P. (eds.) *Developing Cultures: Case Studies*, London: Routledge, pp. 83-101.
- Kumar, K. (1995) *From Post-Industrial to Post-Modern Society: New Theories of the Contemporary World*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Kowner, R. (2002) "Deconstructing the Japanese National Discourse: Laymen's Beliefs and Ideology." in Donahue, R. T. (ed.) *Explaining Japaneseness: on Japanese Enactments of Culture and Consciousness*. West Port: Ablex Publishing, pp. 169-183.
- Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C. (1985) *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*, London: Verso.
- Langer, S. (1953) *Feeling and Form: A New Theory of Art Developed from Philosophy in a New Key*, New York: Scribner's.
- Langer, S. (1956) *Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite, and Art*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Leiter, B. (1994) "Perspectivism in Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals." in Schacht, R. (ed.) *Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality: Essays On Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals*, Berkeley: University of California, pp. 334-357.
- Lemert, C. (2005) *Postmodernism Is Not What You Think: Why Globalization Threatens Modernity*, Boulder: Paradigm Publishers.
- Levinas, E. (1989) *The Levinas Reader*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Long, D. (2011) "Interdisciplinarity and the Study of International Relations." in Aalto, P., Harle, V. and Moisiso, S. (eds.) *International Studies: Interdisciplinary Approaches*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 31-66.
- Lyotard, J. (1984) *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Lyotard, J. (1988) *The Differend: Phrases in Dispute*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

- Madison, A. (2001) *The World Economy: A Millennial Prospective*, Paris: OECD.
- Marder, M. (2005) "Carl Schmitt and the Risk of the Political." *Telos*, 132: 5-24.
- Martin, R. (1988) "Truth, Power, Self: An Interview with Michel Foucault." in Martin, L. H., Gutman, H. and Hutton, P. H. (eds.) *Technologies of the Self*, Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, pp. 9-16.
- Marauyama, M. (1969) *Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics*, London: Oxford University Press.
- Mason, A. (2000) *Community, Solidarity and Belonging: Levels of Community and Their Normative Significance*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Matić, M. (1998) *Srpska politička tradicija (Serbian Political Tradition)*, Belgrade: Institut za političke studije.
- McGowan, J. (1998) *Hannah Arendt: An Introduction*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- McKim, R. and McMahan, J. (eds.) (1997) *The Morality of Nationalism*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Mearsheimer, J. (1994-1995) "The False Promise of International Institutions." *International Security*, 19(3): 5-49.
- Mearsheimer, J. (1999) *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
- Milošević-Dorđević, J. (2008) *Čovek o naciji: shvatanje nacionalnog identiteta u Srbiji (Man and Nation: the Understanding of National Identity in Serbia)*, Beograd: Institut za političke studije.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2013) *The Senkaku Island*, [online] Available at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/pdfs/senkaku_en.pdf [Accessed 05 July 2014]
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2014) *Takshime: Seeking a Solution based on Law and Dialogue*, [online] Available at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/takeshima/pdfs/takeshima_pamphlet.pdf [Accessed 05 July 2014]
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Republic of Korea (2012) *Dokdo: Korea's Beautiful Island*, [online] Available at: <http://dokdo.mofa.go.kr/eng/pds/pdf.jsp> [Accessed 09 July 2014]
- Mitchell, T. (1991) "The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics." *The American Political Science Review*, 85(1): 77-96.
- Mitchell, T. (2006) "Society, Economy, and the State Effect." in Sharma, A. and Gupta, A. (eds.) *The Anthropology of the State: A Reader*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 169-187.
- Miyagi, T. (2006) "Post-War Japan and Asianism." *Asia-Pacific Review*, 13(2): 1-16.
- Miyashita, A. (2008) "Where Do Norms Come From? Foundations of Japan's Postwar Pacifism." in Sato, Y. and Hirata, K. (eds.) *Norms, Interests, and Power in Japanese Foreign Policy*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 21-47.
- Morgan, M. L. (2007) *Discovering Levinas*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Morgenthau, H. (1954) *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 2nd edn. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

- Mouffe, C. (2000) *The Democratic Paradox*, London: Verso.
- Mouffe, C. (2005) *On the Political*, London: Routledge.
- Murphey, R. (2009) *A History of Asia*, New Jersey: Pearson Education.
- Nakane, C. (1972) *Japanese society*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Norris, C. (1987) *Derrida*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Oppenheimer, L. (2006) "The Development of Enemy Images: A Theoretical Contribution." *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, 12(3): 269-292.
- Pagels, E. (1996) *The Origin of Satan: How Christians Demonized Jews, Pagans, and Heretics*, New York: Vintage Books.
- Palan, R. (2000) "A world of their making: an evaluation of the constructivist critique in International Relations." *Review of International Studies*, 26(4): 575-598.
- Peirce, C. S. (1931-1958) *Collected Papers*, Vols. 1–6, Hartshorne, C. and Weiss, P. (eds.), Vols. 7–8, Burks, A. W. (ed.), Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Pempel, T. J. (ed.) (2005) *Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Pepper, S. (1972) *World Hypotheses: A Study in Evidence*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Patterson, M. and Renwick Monroe, K. (1998) "Narrative in Political Science." *Annual Review of Political Science*, 1(1): 315-331.
- Platon (1983) *Država (The Republic)*, Belgrade: Beogradski grafičko-izdavački zavod.
- Putnam, H. (1992) *Renewing Philosophy*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Pye, L. W. and Pye, M. W. (1985) *Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority*. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Radenović, S. (2006) "Nacionalni identitet, etnicitet, (kritička) kultura sećanja (National Identity, Ethnicity, (critical) Culture of Memory)." *Filozofija i društvo*, 3(2): 220-237.
- Reed, I. A. (2011) *Interpretation and Social Knowledge: On the Use of Theory in the Human Sciences*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Rengger, N. J. (2005) *International Relations, Political Theory and the Problem of Order: Beyond International Relations theory?* London: Routledge.
- Renwick, N. and Cao, Q. (1999) "China's Political Discourse Towards the 21st Century: Victimhood, Identity, and Political Power." *East Asia: An International Quarterly*, 17(4): 111-143.
- Reus-Smith, C. (2002) "Imagining society: constructivism and the English School." *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 4(3): 487-509.
- Reus-Smit C. (2005) "Constructivism." in Burchill, S., Linklater A., Devetak R., Donnelly J., Paterson M., Reus-Smit C. and True, J. (eds.) *Theories of International Relations*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 188-213.
- Ricoeur, P. (1976) *Interpretation Theory*, Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press.

- Rieber, W. R. and Kelly, R. J. (1991) "Substance and Shadow: Images of the Enemy." in Rieber, W. R. (ed.) *The Psychology of War and Peace: The Image of the Enemy*, New York: Plenum Press, pp. 3-41.
- Risse, T. (2000) "Let's argue!: Communicative Action in World Politics." *International Organization*, 54(1): 1-39.
- Ritzer, G. (2011) *Sociological Theory*, 8th edn. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Rose, G. (1998) "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy." *World Politics*, 51(1): 144-172.
- Rousseau, D. (2006) *Identifying Threats and Threatening Identities: The Social Construction of Realism and Liberalism*, Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Rozman, G. (2002) "China's changing images of Japan, 1989-2001: the struggle to balance partnership and rivalry." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 2(1): 95-129.
- Rot, K. (2000) *Slike u glavama (Images in the Minds)*, Beograd: XX vek and Krug.
- Ruano-Borbalan, Ž. K. (2009) "Identitet, resurs za akciju (Identity, a Resource for Action)." in Halpern, K. and Ruano-Borbalan, Ž. K. (eds) *Identitet(i): pojedinci, grupa, društvo (Identity/Identities: Individual, Group, Society)*, Beograd: Clio. pp. 419-424.
- Ruano-Borbalan, Ž. K. (2009) "Kultura, vrednosti, sve postmoderne (Culture, values, all kinds of postmodern)?" in Halpern, K. and Ruano-Borbalan, Ž. K. (eds) *Identitet(i): pojedinci, grupa, društvo (Identity/Identities: Individual, Group, Society)*, Beograd: Clio, pp. 321- 331.
- Ruggie, J. G. (1998) "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge." *International Organization*, 52(4): 855-885.
- Sato, Y. and Hirata, K. (eds.) (2008) *Norms, Interests, and Power in Japanese Foreign Policy*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Sadakata, M. (2013) "New Regionalisms, Border Problems and Neighbouring policy: A Comparison between Southeast Europe and East Asia." *Serbian Political Thought*, 7(1): 5-20.
- Sarup, M. (1993) *An Introductory Guide to Post-structuralism and Postmodernism*, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
- Saussure, F. de (2011) [1916] *Course in General Linguistics*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Scheurich, J. J. and McKenzie, K. B. (2007) "Foucauldian Archeological Analysis." in Ritzer, G. (ed.) *The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology*, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 1771-1774.
- Scheurich, J. J. and McKenzie, K. B. (2005) "Foucault's Methodologies: Archeology and Genealogy." in Denzin, N. and Lincoln, Y. (eds.) *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research*, London: SAGE, pp. 841-869.
- Scheurman, W. (1999) *Carl Schmitt: The End of Law*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Schiffirin, D., Tannen D. and Hamilton, H. E. (eds.) (2003) *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003, pp.750-752.
- Schmitt, C. (1996) *The Concept of the Political*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- Schmitt, C. (2003) *The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum*, New York: Telos Press.
- Schmitt, C. (2005) *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Schmitt, C. (2008) *Constitutional Theory*, Durham: Duke University Press.
- Schram, S. (2003) "Return to Politics: Perestroika and Postparadigmatic Political Science." *Political Theory*, 31(6): 835-851.
- Schwab, G. (1996) "Introduction." in Schmitt, C. *The Concept of the Political*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Schweller, R. (1997) "New Realist Research on Alliance: Refining, Not Refuting, Waltz's Balancing Proposition." *American Political Science Review*, 91(4): 927-930.
- Schweller, R. and Priess, D.(1997) "A Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding the Institutions Debate." *Mershon International Studies Review*, 41(1):1-32.
- Sebeok, T. (2001) *Signs: An Introduction to Semiotics*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Searle, J. R. (1993) "Rationality and Realism, What Is at Stake?" *Daedalus*, 122(4): 55-83.
- Seats, M. (2006) *Murakami Haruki: The Simulacrum in Contemporary Japanese Culture*. Lanham: Lexington Books.
- Sheridan, A. (2005) *Michel Foucault: The Will to Truth*, London: Routledge.
- Shils, E. (1958) "Tradition and Liberty: Antinomy and Interdependence." *Ethics*, 68(3): 153-165.
- Shils, E. (1965) "Charisma, Order, and Status." *American Sociological Review*, 30(2): 199-213.
- Shils, E. (1975) *Center and Periphery: Essays in Macrosociology*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Sim, S. (2001) "Postmodernism and Philosophy." in Sim, S. (ed.) *The Routledge Companion to Postmodernism*, London: Routledge, pp. 3-15.
- Smit, A. (1998) *Nacionalni identitet (National identity)*, Beograd: XX vek. [Smith. A. (1991) *National identity*, London: Penguin Books.]
- Smith, S., Booth K. and Zalewski, M. (eds.) (1996) *International theory: positivism and beyond*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Somers, M. R. and Gibson, G. D. (1993) "Reclaiming the Epistemological 'Other': Narrative and the Social Constitution of Identity." *CSST Working Paper #94* and *CRSO Working Paper #499*, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan.
- Sorensen, G. (2006) "The Transformation of the State." in Hay, C., Lister, M. and Marsh, D. (eds.) *The State: Theories and Issues*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 190-209.
- Staub, E. (1998) "Early Intervention: Prediction and Action." in Langholtz, H. J. *The Psychology of Peacekeeping*, Praeger, London, p. 31-41.
- Stein, J. G. "Image, Identity and Conflict Resolution." in Crocker, C. A., Hampson, F. O. and Aall, P. (eds.) *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict*, Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, pp. 93-111.

- Stilz, A. (2009) "Civic Nationalism and Language Policy." *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 37(3): 257-292.
- Storey, J. (2009) *Cultural Theory and Popular Culture: An Introduction*, Harlow: Pearson-Longman.
- Strinati, D. (2004) *An Introduction to Theories of Popular Culture*, London: Routledge.
- Suzuki, S. (2007) "The Importance of 'Othering' in China's National Identity: Sino-Japanese Relationship as a Stage of Identity Conflicts." *The Pacific Review*, 20(1): 23-47.
- Suzuki, S. (2009) *Civilization and Empire: China and Japan's Encounter with European International Society*, London: Routledge.
- Szalay, L. B. and Mir-Djalali, E. (1991) "Image of the enemy: Critical parameters, cultural variations." in Rieber, R. W. (ed.) *The psychology of war and peace: The image of the enemy* New York: Plenum Press, pp. 213–250.
- Tanaka, S. (1996) *Japan's Orient: Rendering Pasts into History*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Taylor, P. (1993) *International Organization in the Modern World: The Regional and the Global Process*, London: Pinter.
- Tamaki, T. (2010) *Deconstructing Japan's Image of South Korea: Identity in Foreign Policy*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Thiele, L. P. (2002) *Thinking Politics: Perspectives in Ancient, Modern, and Postmodern Political Theory*, New York: Chatham House Publishers.
- Tidwell, A. C. (1998) *Conflict Resolved? A Critical Assessment of Conflict Resolution*, New York: Continuum.
- Tijes, A. M. (2009) "Kulturna proizvodnja evropskih nacija (Cultural Production of European nations)." in Halpern, K. and Ruano-Borbalan, Ž. K. (eds), *Identitet(i): pojedinci, grupa, društvo (Identity/Identities: Individual, Group, Society)*, Beograd: Clio, pp. 332-344.
- Tillich, P. (1959) *Theology of Culture*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Tismaneanu, V. (1998) *Fantasies of Salvation: Democracy, Nationalism and Myth in Post-Communist Europe*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Torring, J. (2005) "Poststructuralist Discourse Theory: Foucault, Laclau, Mouffe, and Žižek." in Janoski, T., Alford, R. R., Hicks, A. M. and Schwartz, M. A. (eds.) *The Handbook of Political Sociology: States, Civil Societies, and Globalization*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 153-172.
- Vasquez, J. (1997) "The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative versus Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition." *American Political Science Review*, 91(4): 899-912.
- Vasquez, J. (1999) *The Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Vayrynen R. (2003) "Regionalism: Old and New." *International Studies Review*, 5(1): 25–51.
- Vilho, H. (2000) *The Enemy with a Thousand Faces: The Tradition of the Other in Western Political Thought and History*, London: Praeger.
- Vogel, E. (1986) "Pax Nipponica?" *Foreign Affairs*, 64(4): 752–767.

- Waltz, K. (1959) *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Waltz, K. (1979) *Theory of International Politics*, New York: Random House.
- Waltz, K. (1986) "Political Structures." in Keohane, R. (ed.) *Neorealism and Its Critics*, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 70-97.
- Weber, M. (1946) *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Weber, M. (1949) *The methodology of the Social Science*, Glencoe: The Free Press.
- Weber, M. (1978) *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Wendt, A. (1992) "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics." *International Organization*, 46(2), 1992, p. 391-425.
- Wendt, A. (1994) "Collective Identity Formation and the International State." *The American Political Science Review*, 88(2): 384-396.
- Wendt, A. (1999) *A Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wendt, A. (2003) "Why a World State is Inevitable." *European Journal of International Relations*, 9(4), 2003, p. 491-542.
- Wolfers, A. (1962) *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press.
- Yamazaki, R. (1997) "Review of the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation: A Japanese Perspective." *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, 9(2): 27-44.
- Young, I. M. (1990) *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Yoshino, K. (1992) *Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan: A Sociological Enquiry*, London: Routledge.
- Žunić, D. (1999) Nacionalizam i književnost: srpska književnost od 1985 do 1995 (*Nationalism and Literature: Serbian Literature from 1985 to 1995*), Beograd: Open Society Institute (available at: <http://rss.archives.ceu.hu/archive/00001127/01/133.pdf>).



Prof. Dr. Djordje Stojanovic

Djordje Stojanovic graduated from the Faculty of Political Science, University of Belgrade (Serbia) as one of the best students of his generation. At the same Faculty of University of Belgrade he earned a Master of Philosophy and a Doctor of Philosophy degrees in Political Science. He works at the Institute for Political Studies in Belgrade (Serbia) and teaches as associate professor at the Faculty of European Legal and Political Studies, Educons University, and the Faculty of Media and Communication, Singidunum University. He has published several dozens of scientific papers in various academic journals and participated in several local and international academic conferences.

He authored four scientific monographs: *Civil Society: Historical Development of the Concept*, *Associative Democracy: Issues and Perspectives*, *Labyrinth of Scientific Thought and Expression* and *Anatomy of the Contemporary State*. He is currently editor-in-chief of the *Serbian Political Thought*, a member of editorial boards of several academic journals, as well as a co-ordinator of the project *Demokratski i nacionalni kapaciteti političkih institucija Srbije u procesu međunarodnih integracija*, br. 179009, (Democratic and National Capacities of Political Institutions of Serbia in the Processes of International Integrations, № 179009), financed by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of Republic of Serbia.

He has been also appointed as a member of scientific board of the VII, VIII, and IX international conferences on Political Science, International Relations, Security Studies (2013, 2014, and 2015) which is organised by the Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities "Lucian Blaga", University of Sibiu, Romania. He was engaged in the one-month (15/05/2013-15/06/2013) individual research project at the Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research (Braunschweig, Germany) on the subject of *Nation, State, and Borders: Europe and the Balkans in the Late XX and XXI Century*.

CALE Discussion Paper No.13

The Symbolic Construction of the Enemy: the Case of Serbia and Japan

Author Prof. Dr. Djordje Stojanovic

Published by Center for Asian Legal Exchange (CALE)
Nagoya University
464-8601 Furo-cho, Chikusa-ku, Nagoya, JAPAN
Tel: +81 (0)52-789-2325 Fax: +81 (0)52-789-4902
<http://cale.law.nagoya-u.ac.jp/>

Issue date 15 November, 2015

Printed by Nagoya University Co-operative Association

© All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher.

CALE Discussion Paper No.13 (November, 2015)

CALE Nagoya University
Center for Asian Legal Exchange